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The National Forum on Judicial Independence, convened by the AmericanJudges Association in October 2004 in San Francisco, forms the basis forthis special issue of Court Review.  The Forum, conceived by AJA’s then-
president Mike McAdam, sought to provide both a review of current threats
to judicial independence and of actions judges can take to preserve it.  In
addition, while judicial independence is often discussed in an abstract way,
the Forum emphasized its importance at the trial-court level.
I hope you will take some time to review the Forum sessions, reprinted in
this issue.  Speakers included one of the nation’s top experts on judicial elec-
tions, Roy Schotland, a public-opinion expert who advises groups like the
ACLE, John Russonello, both the chief justice and the administrative director
of the California courts, Ronald M. George
and Bill Vickrey, and judges from throughout
the United States.  At day’s end, one of the
attending judges said (see page 52), “I’m fired
up and I’m excited from today’s forum.”  I
think you’ll find the discussions inspiring and
interesting as well.
There are a great number of people and
organizations to whom we express the thanks
of the American Judges Association for their
help with the Forum:
• The Joyce Foundation, which provided
generous financial support.  We thank
Larry Hansen for his support and confi-
dence in this project.
• All of those involved with the one-hour PBS program, Inside the Law,
filmed at the conference:  Associated Broadcast Consultants, Inc., and its
producer, Gary Nenner, associate producer and editor, Melissa B. Butler,
and host, Jack Ford.  
• The California state courts, which, in addition to the presence of the chief
justice and administrative director of the court system, provided invaluable
logistic and other support through Bill Vickrey and his staff.
• The American Judges Foundation, which also provided financial support
for the Forum.
For our Canadian readers, I recognize that this issue is predominantly
about legal issues in the United States.  I can tell you that the Canadian AJA
members in attendance at the Forum did find the discussions there of inter-
est.  To the extent that there are materials you’d like to see in Court Review
that would be of specific interest to you, though, please let me know.
In addition to the Forum proceedings, we have two other items of interest
in this issue.   First, we have our standard Resource Page on the last page of
the issue, with some brief items of interest to judges.  Second, we reprint
excerpts from a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eight Circuit (see page 68) that may have a great impact on the way judicial
election campaigns are conducted in the United States.– SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to encountered by many
judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.  Guidelines for the submis-
sion of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page
79 of this issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit,
condense, or reject material submitted for publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit: Mary S. Watkins (maryswatkinsphoto@
earthlink.net). The cover photo is of the Lafayette
County Courthouse in Lexington, Missouri, the oldest
Missouri courthouse that has remained in continuous use
as a courthouse. The courthouse was built in 1847 at a
cost of $14,382. During the 1861 Civil War battle of
Lexington, the courthouse was fired upon; a cannon ball
embedded in one of the columns can be seen in the
photo.
©2005, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member sub-
scriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
subject to change without notice.  Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to
Association Services, National Center for State Courts,
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Over their lifetime, most citizens will never see the inside of
a jail or be a participant in a criminal trial.  They may come to
the courthouse for traffic violations and for domestic relations
cases, to pay property taxes, deal with landlord-tenant matters,
or obtain documents for other events in their lives.  As a result,
their understanding and appreciation for the judicial system
must be gathered from other sources.  We must provide accurate
information.
Citizens receive information about the judicial system from
the media, particularly television.  Television cases are resolved
in approximately 22 minutes; on at least one show, that includes
the commission and investigation of the crime, as well as the
trial itself.   Important legal rulings are made in the hallways,
elevators, getting into or out of vehicles or in
chambers.  There is no record made of the pro-
ceedings and usually only the judge and the
attorneys are present.  I don’t know about you,
but I have yet to make an important legal ruling
off the record and while I was getting into my car
in the county parking lot.  Television trials have
only two or three witnesses a side and they are
asked only a few extremely well-crafted ques-
tions.  Closing arguments are beyond succinct—
beautifully and flawlessly delivered by each attor-
ney. When something goes “wrong” in a case, it
is usually the fault of  dishonest police officer, a bad lawyer, or
incompetent judge.   Certainly these are not average trials in
Washington County, Oregon, yet this is the nightly view of tri-
als, lawyers, judges, and courts.  
Over time these powerful images develop into opinions
about the judicial system, the third coequal branch of our gov-
ernment.  Polls indicate that the legal profession is not held in
the highest regard.  There is a growing lack of faith in the judi-
cial system, which I believe to be a new trend.   If the judicial
system really operated as it is portrayed, I would not have much
faith in it either.  I believe the growing public opinion is incor-
rect and must be changed.  
Civics lessons on the importance of the judicial system in
preserving the rule of law must be re-taught.  And who better to
begin the lesson than judges.  If we do not correct the picture,
who will?  As “The Voice of the Judiciary,” the AJA has begun
the process by its participation in the National Forum on
Judicial Independence that makes up the pages of this special
issue of Court Review and the taping of an edition of the PBS
program Inside the Law. The program has aired on PBS stations
throughout the United States during 2005.
As judges, we are neutral and approach each case without a
preconceived position for either side of the legal question being
presented.  We are bound by precedent and must apply laws that
are constitutional, even if we personally did not vote for them
or believe they are the best way to resolve an issue.  This does
not mean that we cannot speak out about the role and the
importance of the judicial system.  Basic civics is not off limits.
What is the role of a judge?  Just what is the job of the judicial
system in our society and why is it important in preserving the
rule of law?  These are all topics I believe we as judges must dis-
cuss with our local service groups, civic associations, and
schools.  The people we serve must understand why they should
care and what might occur if they don’t.  
Writing is not my strongest asset.  I was a trial lawyer.  I am
a trial judge.  In Oregon, we have a unified trial bench, causing
me to handle traffic cases one day, followed by a civil or domes-
tic relations matter, followed by a capital murder case.  On the
average day I have contact with many people.
Like you, the vast majority of my in-court time is
spent with a very small percentage of the overall
population of my county. The vast majority of
my time—and that of my fellow judges—is spent
on the criminal-justice side of the judicial ledger. 
I encourage each one of you to take an oppor-
tunity to talk to a school group, civic organiza-
tion, or local service group.  Law Day is an easy
day to start, but why wait?  Speak at your local
civic groups about the rule of law and its impor-
tance in their lives. Take the time to have a school
group visit the courthouse and sit in on part of a trial or hear-
ing.  Yes, you have to be careful of the trial subject matter and
sometimes they wiggle just a little and make a little more noise
than we typically allow, but the chance to teach something of
value should not be missed.  Take the time to answer some of
their questions.  I have received some of the best questions from
third-grade students eager to learn something new.  Be “The
Voice of the Judiciary” in your community or others will be it
for us.  
I have been a member of the AJA since 1992.  I attended my
first annual meeting in Maui and I have not missed an annual or
midyear meeting since.  Every one has been a great experience
in education, networking, and social events.  During each edu-
cation session, I learned something new and useful.  After every
meeting I brought back information to my county to better
serve the people of my judicial district.  Without a doubt, how-
ever, the 2004 annual meeting in San Francisco was the best
educational experience of them all.  The programs on judicial
independence (excerpted in this issue), the Medgar Evers case,
First Amendment and media issues for judges, bias in the court-
room, elder abuse, judicial leadership, problem-solving courts,
interstate compacts, and Professor Whitebread’s annual review
of the opinions of the Supreme Court all were excellent and very
well attended. Programs such as these prepare us to become
“The Voice of the Judiciary.” 
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President’s Column
Gayle A. Nachtigal
2. Adam Liptak, Judicial Races in Several States Become Partisan
Battlegrounds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1.
Editor’s Note:  California Supreme Court
Chief Justice Ronald M. George presented
the keynote address at the October 2004
National Forum on Judicial Independence.
We reprint his remarks here.
Courts have often been cited as theweakest of the three branches ofgovernment.  I do not necessarily
agree with that assessment, but increas-
ingly courts are realizing that that does
not, in any event, mean they can or
should remain silent or passive and allow
our sister branches to determine our fate.
Court governance and leadership, elimi-
nating bias, improving access, and judi-
cial independence are critical areas upon
which we all must focus.  They are nec-
essary factors not only in preserving the
strength of the judicial branch in our
state and federal governmental struc-
tures, but also in ensuring that our nation
continues at every level to be governed by
the rule of law.
The significance of the traditional
notion of judicial independence has been
highlighted by a number of recent trends.
Lately, many of us have come to realize
with more and more force that judicial
independence, deeply ingrained though
it is in our national and local cultures,
cannot ever be taken for granted.
There is continuing uncertainty sur-
rounding permissible judicial speech fol-
lowing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.1
The increasing politicization of judicial
selections—whether by election or
appointment—at the national and state
levels has profound implications for the
administration of justice and the counter-
majoritarian role of the courts.
Legislative decisions on court funding
made in response to unpopular decisions,
partisan interpretations of decisions
based purely on results, and threats of
recall and opposition are heard with dis-
maying regularity.  Some of you probably
saw an article in the New York Times yes-
terday2 that served as a timely reminder
of the increasingly political nature of
judicial elections.
We in California have no magic bullet
to solve the difficult question of preserv-
ing judicial independence, but we have
taken a wide variety of approaches in this
endeavor.  You may find them of interest
in your home jurisdictions, so I will dwell
on some of these by way of sharing our
experience with you.  Moreover, as the
immediate past president of the
Conference of Chief Justices, I can assure
you that the chief justices in your states,
by and large, also are deeply committed
to taking steps to preserve judicial inde-
pendence.
We in California have focused on two
components we consider essential to
judicial independence.  The first is the
very essence of the judicial function:
independence and fairness in decision
making.  Courts, in order to fulfill their
constitutional obligations, of course must
be free to decide cases based upon their
merits.  The goal of the judicial branch is
to uphold and enhance the rule of law
while—unlike the representative
branches of government—remaining
unswayed by personal preferences or the
latest opinion polls.
Courts, of course, must rely on the
trust and confidence of the public we
serve.  As Chief Justice of California, I
chair the Judicial Council, the constitu-
tionally created entity charged with set-
ting statewide policy for California’s judi-
cial system.  Among our major goals have
been ensuring access and fairness and
strengthening and preserving the inde-
pendence of the judicial branch.  To that
end, we have undertaken a wide variety
of educational and informational pro-
grams aimed at both those who work in
the courts and those who are served by
the courts.  Eliminating bias is a subject
integrated into the core curriculum of the
California Center for Judicial Education,
our premier provider of judicial and staff
education.  In addition to substantive
material, courses provide extensive infor-
mation on ethics, administrative and
managerial responsibilities, and commu-
nity involvement.
Courts in turn are reaching out to
their communities through programs
coordinated with community groups,
school projects, and educational public
forums.  For example, even our
California Supreme Court the last few
years has been holding one session each
year in a location apart from our standard
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three venues, which are San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and Sacramento.  In each
instance, the Court of Appeal for that dis-
trict, in coordination with the local
courts, educational establishments, and
bar associations, has created extensive
materials pertaining to the cases sched-
uled for oral argument.  These are made
available for use by thousands of stu-
dents, some in attendance in the court-
room and others by television, and all
with informed teachers, judges, and
lawyers available in each classroom to
lead discussions and answer questions.  A
statewide public-service cable network
also has broadcast each of these court
hearings to large portions of the state.
We truly have electronically expanded
the walls of both the courtroom and the
classroom.
Our local courts engage in regular
planning and involve their communities
in discussions about how better to serve
the public’s needs.  Judges are available as
speakers for community groups and pub-
lic forums, and actively participate in
activities aimed at improving the admin-
istration of justice to a degree consistent
with ethical constraints.
Now these are only some of the steps
courts are taking, but they are emblem-
atic of how seriously we take our obliga-
tion to inform and involve the public in
order to foster greater confidence in and
understanding of the role of an indepen-
dent judiciary.
The response from the public has been
overwhelming and enthusiastic.  The jus-
tices of our six Courts of Appeal also
have moved out of their chambers and
into the community to hold sessions in
different parts of their geographic juris-
diction and to coordinate with local
schools to make these sessions rich and
engaging educational tools.
The second component of judicial
independence, which sometimes receives
less attention than the first, but is key to
ensuring the strength of the first, is insti-
tutional independence.  In addition to
decision-making independence, courts
must secure adequate funding so they can
remain immune to financial threats and
pressures.
This critical need for certainty in fiscal
support for the judicial branch is not a
novel notion.  For example, one can find
reference to it in the early history of our
nation.  Alexander Hamilton in the
Federalist Papers, No. 79, discussed the
proposed provision forbidding any
decreases in the compensation of judges
during their term of office.  He made an
observation that applies generally to the
judicial branch when he wrote, “We can
never hope to see realized in practice the
complete separation of the judicial from
the legislative power, in any system
which leaves the former dependent for
pecuniary resources on the occasional
grants of the latter.”
In California, our quest for establish-
ing predictable, adequate funding for
courts statewide has acquired more and
more urgency.  The demands and expec-
tations placed on the judicial branch have
greatly expanded as the diversity and
complexity of our state have grown.  In
the early 1990s, the situation had become
critical.  The existing combination of
individual county support for local
courts and limited state support resulted
in major variations in the administration
of justice and the quality of justice from
courthouse to courthouse.
It became impossible to ignore the
gross inadequacies of the fiscal structure
as some courts came perilously close to
bankruptcy, and others cut back vital ser-
vices to the public in order to retain the
ability to maintain core programs.  The
range of services for the public, the time
to get to trial, the hours of clerk’s office
access, all differed from county to county.
Consistency in the actual administration
of justice was elusive at best, and in some
areas the ability of courts to serve public
needs was at great risk.
After many years of discussion and
advocacy among the courts, the counties,
and our sister branches of government,
legislation was enacted in 1997 shifting
from the counties to the state the respon-
sibility for funding the trial courts.  This
was a major curative step toward equaliz-
ing adequate services statewide, and the
need for it became apparent my first year
as chief justice.  I embarked upon a pro-
ject that nobody had undertaken before,
accompanied by Bill Vickrey, the
Administrative Director of the California
courts.
The two of us visited the courts in
every one of California’s 58 counties.
That first year we had to obtain emer-
gency funding just to keep some courts
from closing, and this problem became
progressive throughout the system.  So
once we obtained state funding the fol-
lowing year, that was a major step toward
creating a true judicial branch and not
one just in name, as opposed to a frag-
mented series of judicial entities across
the state.
During those visits it became apparent
to me that there was a substantial degree
of duplication in the services provided by
our municipal courts and the superior
courts in terms of filing windows, differ-
ent clerks’ offices, different interpreters’
services, jury pools, jury commissioners,
and overlapping purchasing of supplies,
and that efficiencies could be achieved
both in terms of savings to the taxpayers
and expansion of court services to the
public if we were to merge our two levels
of trial court into a single level.
So in 1998 we persuaded the legisla-
ture to place on the ballot a constitutional
amendment permitting a merger of the
courts on a county-by-county basis.  We
could not have gotten it through if we
had tried to do it in one fell swoop.  The
electorate approved this measure by a
two-thirds vote, and our trial courts
began another fundamental revision pur-
suant to this constitutional amendment.
County by county, the municipal and
superior courts decided to merge into one
level of trial court.  About 50 of them did
this within the first six months.  The last
eight had some problems, but through a
combination of carrots and sticks we got
them all done and went from having 220
trial courts in our state to 58 courts, one
in each of our 58 counties.
These structural changes not only
guaranteed more stable and dependable
funding across California, but also helped
solidify the court system as not merely a
loosely affiliated group of individual
venues, but as a more fully realized
coequal, independent branch of govern-
ment with a statewide perspective and
presence.
The benefits of this approach have
been reflected in the growth of
California’s judicial branch budget during
the past four years.  Despite a very shaky
start to the budget process at the begin-
ning of the current year, given the eco-
nomic problems facing California and its
government and the generally gloomy fig-
ure for our state’s fiscal outlook, after
meetings and negotiations I and members
of our staff had with Governor
Schwarzenegger and his staff, he agreed to
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budget revisions that resulted in adding
almost one hundred million dollars to our
current trial court budget, which amounts
to $2.31 billion, a 4.4 percent increase
over the prior year and part of an overall
16 percent increase in trial court funding
since fiscal year 2000-2001.
The original budget proposed for
January 2004 would have been disastrous
and would have resulted in court closures
and employee layoffs, but as I noted, we
ended up receiving a substantial increase
to that figure.  Now we shall have a diffi-
cult year, like everyone else, but will get
through it all right.  I should note here,
with reference to the size of our budget,
that we have more than 1,600 judges in
California, plus approximately 400 court
commissioners and referees.  Our system
is the largest in the United States, far sur-
passing the size of the federal court sys-
tem nationwide, and perhaps the largest
in the Western world.
The bottom line in dollars and cents
for our system’s current fiscal year is a
budget that still does not meet all of the
needs of our branch, but that allows
courts to maintain services for the public
at a reasonable level.  Some courts have
reduced hours of service and have cut
back certain programs, but by and large
courts have been able to cope.
The improvement in the judicial
branch’s situation this year resulted in
large part from hearings that were held
up and down the state on court needs and
on the impact of court programs, includ-
ing one hearing conducted before our
Judicial Council, and I believe you will be
interested in one particular presentation
that was quite striking.
The speaker was a CASA worker, a
Court Appointed Special Advocate, who
told the story of meeting with a 16-year-
old girl in juvenile hall who was trying to
provide her younger siblings with the sta-
bility their parents could not, but who
had succumbed to the drug and alcohol
abuse that she herself had learned from
those very same parents.  This young
woman had made remarkable progress,
overcoming her addiction, finishing high
school, going on for more education, and
returning as a counselor to the drug
rehab center that had helped her.
The former client then began to read a
prepared statement on what the CASA
volunteer had done for her.  She soon lost
her composure, as did many others in the
room, as she explained in direct words
how the volunteer’s support and belief in
her had changed her life.
This was one of several presentations
that brought home the positive effect
court services can have on individual
lives.  It is not about courts, not about
judges.  It is about access, about the ser-
vices that we provide to the public.  The
public has to understand that they are the
real stakeholders in this.  The hearing
conducted before the Judicial Council
was televised on the California Channel,
and not long afterwards I received a letter
from the president of the United
Domestic Workers of America stating
that his organization, based on what its
members had seen on the broadcast,
wished to make a donation to the CASA
program.
The recent budget cycle involved more
than successful advocacy to restore judi-
cial branch resources to a manageable
level.  A budget trailer bill strongly sup-
ported by legislative leadership of both
parties—we worked hard to get this, I can
assure you—and also supported by the
governor and the state and local bar asso-
ciations, included important revisions to
the process by which our judicial branch
budget is considered by the other
branches, revisions that I believe will be
of interest to you and that will certainly
enhance our ability as a coequal, strong,
and effective branch.
Under the new approach, an auto-
matic adjustment to the base funding for
trial-court-operating costs will be
included each budget year.  The figure is
determined through a formula that
includes changes in per capita personal
income and changes in population.  The
assumption will be that the new budget
will include these adjustments from the
past year, rather than potentially starting
again from zero with a need to rejustify
the base budget each and every year.
In addition, under the new budget
process, our proposed budget for the trial
courts will be submitted concurrently to
both the legislature and the governor.
Under the preexisting procedure, the
budget had been submitted initially to
the governor, and only those items
approved by him and the Department of
Finance were included in the budget pro-
posal presented by the governor to the
legislature and hopefully advocated by
his staff on our behalf.  Now, instead of
having the executive branch trim our
budget proposal and then hopefully
advocate on our behalf, we are able to
present exactly what we think we need
directly to the legislature.
This may sound highly technical and,
undoubtedly, the details will be arcane to
those not steeped in state budget termi-
nology, but the fundamental message is
far from technical.  We have accom-
plished a sea change in our branch’s rela-
tionship with its sister branches.  The
judiciary’s budget no longer will be
treated as that of just another state
agency, but instead will be accorded the
deference and consideration due an equal
branch of government.
This does not mean that California’s
courts will have free reign to demand
increases.  Far from it.  The process con-
templated is a collaborative one in which
the judicial branch has the responsibility
to be accountable and to carefully and
completely justify its budget requests, but
changes in judicial branch governance
during the past several years have made
this a far easier task.
These modifications ultimately benefit
the judicial branch, the state, and the
public at large by establishing responsible
and responsive growth.  As a result of the
revised budget structure, we anticipate a
new era of predictable and stable fund-
ing, equal funding across the state, and
funding adequate to permit court opera-
tions to meet the public’s needs.
The third prong of our structural
reform lies in the physical surroundings
of the courts.  Our judicial branch has
actively sought the authority and the
resources to acquire courthouse facilities
from the counties that now own them.
Once funding for the trial courts shifted
from a local responsibility to a state oblig-
ation, it was no longer sensible—and the
counties realized this—for the counties
to own and maintain existing and future
court facilities.  Some of these court-
houses are structurally unsafe and need
to be replaced, and the degree of mainte-
nance has varied quite a bit now that the
counties basically feel they are out of the
courthouse business.
The Trial Court Facilities Act, which
was enacted at our urging in the year
2002, provides the authority to begin the
transfer of all of the 451 court facilities in
California from the counties to the judi-
cial branch.  This involves more than
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2,000 courtrooms, about 10 million
usable square feet, and about $4 billion
worth of real estate.  It is one of the
largest transfers of real estate anywhere.
This year’s budget grants more than $23
million in expenditure authority to sup-
port the staff required to oversee the
transfer of facilities and to plan the con-
struction of new facilities.
The facilities transfer measure is pred-
icated on self-funding.  You may wonder
how we are able to accomplish this in dif-
ficult economic times.  Well, there are
three sources.  First of all, there is a re-
direction of court-generated revenue,
which is flowing into a state courthouse
construction fund instead of going to the
counties.  There is a special filing fee that
is deposited into the court construction
fund as well, and this funding will be
supplemented by a future bond measure,
which is expected to be on the ballot in
2006 or 2008, so this project has no
impact on the state’s general fund.
The basic concept of courts control-
ling their own physical environment, and
specifically the judicial branch rather
than a bureaucratic agency of California
state government exercising this control,
is truly a novel one that we anticipate will
have tremendous benefits to our system.
We no longer will have to compete at the
local level with schools and police and
fire services and emergency rooms.
Instead, there will be a more reliable
income stream, which we will manage in
providing and maintaining necessary
facilities for the courts.
I have spoken about the important
structural changes that we have made,
mainly these three mammoth reforms:
the switch to state trial court funding,
unification of our trial courts into a sin-
gle level of trial court, and the process
underway to acquire all the courthouse
facilities in the state.  These measures
collectively have given us a more stable
base from which to concentrate on our
goal of improving our relationship with
the public in order to effectively adminis-
ter justice for all and to ensure a strong
and independent judicial system.
It has been repeatedly demonstrated
that the courts achieve their greatest suc-
cesses in enhancing their services to the
public when the judicial system collabo-
rates with other interested and affected
segments of the community, including of
course the bar.  
The word “court” traditionally con-
jures up a vision of two lawyers standing
before a black-robed judge seated on an
elevated bench arguing a matter that the
judge will resolve by rendering a deci-
sion.  That decision then will be carried
out by the parties, usually outside the
presence of the court, and, of course, the
gulf between that vision and the reality of
our courts today perhaps has never been
greater.
In many proceedings in California,
especially in family law, neither party to a
dispute has a lawyer or can afford one.
Many of California’s courts report that 80
percent of those persons seeking a
divorce or child custody or child support
are not represented by counsel, and that
the same is true of 90 percent of those
seeking domestic violence restraining
orders and 90 percent of the tenants in
landlord/tenant cases.
Reflecting California’s increasingly
multicultural society, a growing number
of our state’s litigants do not speak
English but instead—and this always
amazes me to recite it—speak one of the
approximately 100 languages that are
translated each year in California’s courts,
running literally the gamut from “A” to
“Z”—Albanian to Zapotec.  The changes
in the population of those who come
before the courts challenge our precon-
ceptions about the courts and demand of
us that we respond creatively.
Ensuring effective access based on
community needs is critical to the ability
of the courts to meet the changing expec-
tations and needs of the public.  Access to
justice signifies far more than providing
an open courthouse door.  It includes
allowing meaningful access so that indi-
viduals can vindicate their rights.
The resolution of a legal issue can pro-
foundly affect an individual’s future.  Will
a family be able to stay together?  Can a
disabled child obtain the care and assis-
tance to which she is entitled?  Can an
elderly homeowner keep her only asset,
her home?  Will the veteran whose life
has been derailed by substance abuse find
his way back to a productive life?
Often the small cases that set no prece-
dent nonetheless will have a life-chang-
ing impact on an individual or a family.
When we speak of policies to improve
access and of making services available to
a broader segment of the community, it is
easy to think merely in abstract terms.  In
California, we have tried hard never to
lose sight of the fact that real people with
real problems are involved, and that with
what is often a remarkably small invest-
ment of time, individual lives can be
turned around.  In the final analysis, it is
our ability to provide justice for all that
creates our strength.  How well we suc-
ceed in this endeavor says much about us
as a society.
When I became Chief Justice of
California in 1996, I began my visits to
courts around the state in response to a
commitment I made in the first of the
State of the Judiciary Addresses that I
have given every year to a joint session of
the legislature.  What Bill Vickrey and I
learned in those visits—we were able to
communicate with judges, court employ-
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ees, lawyers, and community leaders—
helped lead to the successful implementa-
tion of many of the changes that I have
described.  The purpose of those changes
was not to make things easier for judges
and court staff but rather to improve pub-
lic access to and trust in our legal system.
I now want to highlight just a few of
our initiatives that I hope will give you a
sense of how broadly our courts have
interpreted their mission to improve
access and fairness in our justice system:
• Courthouse family-law facilitators
now are at work in every county, help-
ing persons navigate their way
through the crucial proceedings of
family law—divorce, child custody
and support, domestic violence, and so
on.  Many local courts have developed
self-help centers that focus on serving
individuals who are not fluent in the
English language.  Some courts now
offer regional services in rural areas,
even providing vans that travel to
remote parts of the county that other-
wise are underserved.
• At the urging of the Judicial Council
and the state bar, the legislature began
to provide a $10 million annual appro-
priation for an Equal Access Fund to
aid unrepresented litigants in civil
cases, through various legal aid ser-
vices and organizations.  This has
enabled us to establish self-help cen-
ters at courthouses with the assistance
of legal-services providers.
• Community participation in court
planning is now commonplace.
Juvenile peer courts, community
evenings when judges answer ques-
tions from members of the public,
educational programs in local schools
that teach our children about our judi-
cial system and why it is important to
them, all of these are part of the
process of increasing community
access and finding new tools for courts
to better interact with their own com-
munities.
• Collaborative justice courts, focusing
on cases involving drug use, domestic
violence, or mental health problems,
have had remarkable success, and I
know that has been the case in many
of your states.  These courts work
closely with prosecution and defense
counsel, local probation departments,
education providers, therapists, and
various social services and other com-
munity agencies to create programs
that are fashioned to affect the under-
lying problems that often are the cause
of the criminal behavior that lands an
individual before the court.
Court involvement does not end with
adjudicating guilt or innocence and
imposing sentence.  Instead, it encom-
passes trying to change the underlying
conduct and conditions that led to the
offense.  One court commissioner testi-
fied before our Judicial Council that the
drug treatment courts in her county had
reversed the statistic on success rates for
defendants.  Where previously 80 percent
were projected to reoffend within two
years after release from custody, after
drug court 80 percent were still success-
fully free of drugs after two years.  Such
individuals are required to seek and
maintain employment, and often the
result is a reunited family.  Truly, lives get
turned around.
All this, of course, also makes eco-
nomic sense when one considers the cost
of keeping an individual in custody, the
benefits to society in creating a produc-
tive and tax-paying citizen, and the finan-
cial as well as the emotional cost of plac-
ing children in foster care when they have
to be removed from the home because of
their parents’ substance abuse.
Our court system has significantly
expanded its use of technology in the last
few years.  We have installed interactive
self-help kiosks in many courthouses,
equipping them with user-friendly forms.
We are in the process of simplifying our
court rules.  Perhaps the most impressive
technological achievement is our self-
help website, which provides a broad
array of services online.  Its more than
900 pages of information already have
been translated into Spanish, and large
portions are being made available in other
languages commonly spoken in
California.
More than 3 million visitors use the
site each month.  It contains all 580
Judicial Council forms for use in court
proceedings, forms that now can be com-
pleted online.  It offers background infor-
mation on the court system and on indi-
vidual courts, as well as practical infor-
mation on how to proceed, including
directions to the local courthouse.  The
website offers links and directions to
where one can obtain additional assis-
tance, legal and otherwise—for example,
the location of the nearest domestic vio-
lence shelter—and it has links to a host of
other law-related websites of many sorts.
It already has won awards, but most
importantly, it has demonstrated that
online access to information about the
courts is a remarkably useful resource for
the public.
We also have made jury service less
burdensome and more inclusive of a
broader spectrum of the population
through the one-day-or-one-trial mode of
jury selection.  Under this system, one’s
jury duty is satisfied by showing up at the
jury assembly room for one day unless
one is actually sent out to a courtroom
Where 80 percent were 
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where jury selection is underway.  Having
shown up for jury service myself in
response to summonses I received the
last few years, both under the old system
and the new, I can assure you that we
have made substantial progress in
improving the system.  How we treat or
mistreat our jurors comes back to us in
terms of community support and legisla-
tive support for the courts.
We have increased the compensation
of jurors, and jurors in civil cases also are
now getting the benefit of our new plain-
language jury instructions that are ren-
dered by the trial judge to guide them in
their deliberations.  We hope to have the
set of instructions for criminal cases
available next year.  We went through
them all and rewrote them in plain
English instead of arcane Victorian prose.
One of the ones I like to cite as an exam-
ple deals with the credibility of witnesses.
We used to say, “Innocent misrecollection
is not uncommon.”  Now we say, “People
sometimes forget things.”3 Why not
make it simple?
California’s court system has experi-
enced enormous innovation during the
past several years, but there is no guaran-
tee that the road ahead will be easy, and
we are far from meeting all the needs of
the public we serve.  Like many other
states, California faces tremendous bud-
get challenges, and our judicial system’s
ability to continue to innovate and
respond to reasonable community needs
is not assured.
California’s judicial branch is fortu-
nate to have been able to work closely
with the other two branches of govern-
ment.  That is something I have worked
very hard to achieve.  Each year I have
dozens of meetings with individual mem-
bers of the legislature, one on one, with
the governor and his administration, and
also with other entities that are stake-
holders and partners in the justice sys-
tem, emphasizing the need for adequate
court funding and the essential role that
the courts play in our democracy.  The
message I and others strive to convey to
those who wield the purse strings in
Sacramento and Washington, D.C., is
that the courts are not a mere luxury to
be funded in times of prosperity and
neglected in bad times, nor should the
fortunes of the courts be dependent upon
the popularity of their latest rulings,
interpretations, and applications of the
law.
We seek to convey the message that
the judicial system is not simply another
bureaucratic agency.  It is one of the three
separate, independent, and coequal
branches of government.  It differs from
its sister branches in the influences that
must guide its functioning.  We, of
course, as we all know, must be guided by
the state and federal constitutions,
statutes, and precedent that embody the
rule of law in our nation and our individ-
ual states.  Although courts are an inte-
gral part of our democracy, they are not
and should not be considered simply
another representative arm of govern-
ment responsive to the newest polls and
sensitive to the latest trends.
We are striving to make our court sys-
tem even more worthy of the designation
“judicial branch.”  In California, our
courts have taken on unprecedented
responsibility for improving access, pro-
viding accurate fiscal information, and
better communicating with lawyers, liti-
gants, and the public.  We have become
active guardians of judicial independence
and of the rule of law.
These days we sometimes hear the
courts and the Bar criticized as impedi-
ments to the best interests of our nation
or to the will of the people.  I strongly
disagree.  In my view, judges and lawyers
must be—and to a great degree are—
committed guardians of the rule of law
and of the rights of all Americans.  Every
day in California, and I know in your
states as well, judges and lawyers can be
found reaching out to all segments of the
community, developing programs to
assist self-represented and underserved
litigants, contributing pro bono services,
representing clients ethically and effec-
tively, and impartially adjudicating civil
disputes and criminal charges.  I have no
doubt that this is true in all your jurisdic-
tions as well.
In my view, our legal and judicial sys-
tem, and those who labor in its court-
houses and law offices, deserve praise
and gratitude from those who cherish our
nation and the freedoms it extols.  By
working together to ensure indepen-
dence, increase access, and provide the
finest administration of justice possible,
judges, court staffs, and attorneys con-
tribute mightily to the strength and dig-
nity of our nation and its principles.
In many respects these are challenging
times for all of us, as private citizens, par-
ents, members of the legal profession,
and those privileged to serve on the
bench, but these challenging times offer
opportunities to better serve the public
and strengthen our structure of govern-
ment.  We in California, like many of
you, have been focusing on creative
change and improvement.  We look to
you for ideas and innovation.  Many of
the improvements in California that I
have mentioned have come from other
states.  We often have been the benefi-
ciary of your efforts, and we have adapted
your successes to our own needs.  We
look forward to working with you in the
future to ensure and improve access to a
fair and effective system of justice every-
where in our nation.
Ronald M. George has been the Chief Justice
of the California Supreme Court since
1996.  He joined the California Supreme
Court in 1991 following service on the Los
Angeles Municipal Court, Los Angeles
Superior Court, and California Court of
Appeal.  In 2003-2004, he served as presi-
dent of the Conference of Chief Justices and
as chair of the Board of Directors of the
National Center for State Courts.  He
received the William H. Rehnquist Award
for Judicial Excellence in 2002.  He is a
graduate of Princeton University and
Stanford Law School.
3. See Peter M. Tiersma, Jury Instructions in the New Millenium, COURT
REVIEW, Summer 1999, at 28, 29-30.
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The first panel discussion at the National Forum on Judicial
Independence reviews the budget pressures encountered by the judi-
ciary and their impact on judicial independence.  The discussion
was led by then-AJA vice president Michael A. Cicconetti, a munic-
ipal judge from Painesville, Ohio.  Panelists were Michael L.
Buenger, Missouri state court administrator, Lawrence G. Myers,
court administrator for Joplin, Missouri, and Robert Wessels, court
manager for the County Criminal Courts at Law in Houston, Texas.
The National Forum on Judicial Independence was supported by a
generous grant from the Joyce Foundation of Chicago, Illinois.
JUDGE MICHAEL CICCONETTI:  Michael Buenger, in his recent
article in Court Review,1 . . . makes us aware of the fiscal crisis,
if we don’t know [already], that began in 2001 which has
resulted in many court budgets being cut.  Well, where does that
leave judges?  We have statutory criminal guidelines, require-
ments to dispose of criminal cases.  We may have our state
supreme court guidelines requiring us to dispose of civil cases
in a certain period of time, yet we have mandates to cut our bud-
gets 6%, 10%, whatever it may be, of which 80 or 85% is per-
sonnel.
Then the other constraints on judicial independence:  We
can’t say anything.  You know we have limits on what we can
say.
We also have the reality that many of us are in politics.  We
have to run for election, so do we speak out?  Do we journalize
our court budget and get into a battle with our local funding
authority and then the next year have to face reelection?  . . . .
MR. MICHAEL BUENGER: . . . [T]oday . . . the stakes are very
high.  They’re not only high in terms of budgets, but they’re also
high in terms of attacks on the judiciary, efforts to remove
judges, efforts to impeach judges, so on and so forth, but the
one thing I think is important to keep in mind is that the stakes
have always been high.  Today really isn’t all that different.  It is
just new for us.
I’ll give you the perfect example.  Oddly enough, the “Father
of Judicial Review,” John Marshall, wrote in 1804 a letter to
Justice Chase, who was being subjected to impeachment in the
Senate for his decisions—he suggested to Justice Chase that in
lieu of actually going through impeachment over improper deci-
sions, the legislature ought to form itself as an ultimate court of
appeals.  Now imagine that, the father of judicial review sug-
gesting in an effort perhaps motivated more out of political real-
ity than legal necessity, suggesting that the legislature be in a
position to review the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to
make sure that they comport with the public’s sentiment.
The stakes have always been high.  They are simply higher
today, I think, as a result of the change in the stature of the judi-
ciary in the last 50 years.  There was a time, I think, when you
went into your local communities and you talked to your citi-
zens and judges were viewed as independent actors.  The con-
nection between you and perhaps a judge in the county over
was tenuous, perhaps based on friendship, but certainly not
based on any sense of institutional connectedness.
I think what has happened in the last 50 years is the judiciary
has emerged somewhat along the lines of what Chief Justice
George was saying.  The judiciary has emerged with a new sense
of its institutional standing, and that’s not only a challenge in
terms of funding and in terms of our relationship with our sis-
ter branches.  It’s also a challenge in terms of our relationships
with each other.  What one court does in one part of the state of
Missouri can have implications for all courts in the state of
Missouri now.
The other comment I would make to you is that when it
comes to issues of budget there is, I think, a distinction between
what happens on the state level and what happens on the local
level, and I recognize in making that statement that I may come
across as perhaps disconnected from local concerns, and I’m
not—I actually began my career as a legal counsel for an appel-
late district in Ohio that was funded by the counties—but with
the evolution of state funding for the judiciary, there has
changed the dynamic by which courts get their money, and that
dynamic is basically one in which:  Where do you go as the state
supreme court or as the administrative office of the court when
you have a confrontation with your state legislature over fund-
ing?  Where do you go?
And the reality is there is no place to go, and so it is forcing,
I think, state-funded systems to become much more engaged in
the legislative process to tell the story of the judiciary not only
at the local level, but also at the state level, because in the
absence of public support, in the absence of public understand-
Is Judicial Independence a
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ing, in the absence of the public’s willingness to in fact support
the concept of judicial independence and an independent judi-
ciary, it will be nearly impossible for us to withstand institu-
tional attacks as we’re seeing them today.  
MR. LAWRENCE MYERS: As Mike said, I’m the municipal court
administrator in Joplin.  Prior to that I had about 25 years of
experience in juvenile courts.  I had the unique experience in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, when I was the court administrator of the
juvenile court, to receive a call from the county commissioner
who funded the juvenile court, saying, “Larry, the county has
50,000 extra dollars.  Could you use it?”
That was more than 20 years ago.  I don’t know that Lou
Harris would make the same call today.
My first three years as the court administrator of the Jackson
County Juvenile Court in Kansas City, Missouri, each year the
circuit court’s budget, of which the juvenile division was a part,
was before the judicial finance committee, trying to resolve the
differences between the executive branch of government and
the judicial branch of government as to what our needs were.
So I’ve seen a little bit of all of it.
I have a very good situation in Joplin, where the 473 munic-
ipal courts in the state of Missouri are funded by the local cities.
Joplin is very kind to us.  I get to prepare my budget with input
from the judge.  It’s presented to the city manager and we are
treated fairly.  That’s not true of other cities.
The topic for today is, “Is judicial independence a casualty
in state and local budget battles?”  In Missouri, in many of the
municipal courts the answer would be no, not because they’re
not a casualty, but because they couldn’t get a ticket to the
fight.  They weren’t invited by the judicial branch, and in fact
at this time the judicial branch of the state is making some
demands on the municipal courts for statewide reporting,
which I support, but they are providing some budget problems
because there are issues that require funding and we did not
have input in the battle.
The battle with the legislature—perhaps the 473 municipal
courts could have helped fight that because we weren’t invested
in getting money from the state, but perhaps we had personal
contacts with our state legislators that could have been advan-
tageous in that battle.
We’re also not invited by the executive branch because
each municipal court has been structured by their city based
upon what the city wanted them to accomplish, and with lit-
tle input from either the legislative or the judicial branch of
government.
There’s an architectural saying that “form follows function,”
and a lot of cities in Missouri have structured their municipal
courts around the functions that they want them to perform. 
. . . [M]y article in the special issue of the Court Review . . . deals
with institutional independence of the municipal courts.2
Seventy-six percent of the judges are part-time.  Eighty-eight
percent of the prosecutors are part-time.  Thirty-five percent of
the court administrators are part-time, but that’s misleading
because when you ask, “What other functions do you per-
form?” something like 48% of them also have a title or a func-
tion in a department of the executive branch of government,
such as they are court administrator, court clerk, city clerk,
police clerk, clerk for the prosecutor, etc.  We had 31 different
titles the court administrators and court clerks looked at.
When we asked, “Who do you report to?” a minority of them
report to the judiciary.  We had something like 5% that report
to the chief of police, another 5% or 6% that report to the pros-
ecutor.
Now those are structured that way and I think that that’s sort
of a shot across our bow that we need to look at, the institu-
tional independence of the judiciary, and in many of those cases
either the city clerk or the chief of police or somebody in the
executive branch prepares their budget and presents it without
input from the municipal court judge or court administrator, an
area of major concern. . . .
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I’m facing a 6 percent ordered cut from the
city of Painesville, who is our local funding
authority, and how do you handle that? What
do you do to save face with the general public?
– Michael A. Cicconetti
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MR. ROBERT WESSELS: . . . It seems to me that whether you’re a
casualty or just get wounded in the budget process, most of the
issues we face need to be addressed long before we ever get in a
room and a confrontation begins, whether you’re state funded or
locally funded.
I happen to come from a state where, other than the appel-
late courts, the state pays the salaries of the general-jurisdiction
judges and a part of the salary of limited-jurisdiction judges.  All
the other expenses for the operation of the court system in the
administration of justice are borne by the counties.
From time to time I’ve been able to reflect a little on things.
When it comes down to it, what do you have to develop in order
to be successful?  I think the foundations are really pretty sim-
ple:  trust and credibility; accountability; becoming fact-based;
managerial competence; and developing a new vocabulary to
explain to funding authorities why we have value in what we do
both in terms of how it will impact them in the administration
of the overall county or state and what the impacts are from the
perspectives of the constituents.
Why is it that the businessman who is the sole proprietor
needs to have access to courts to get a civil matter resolved so
that isn’t hanging over his head and has the business on hold?
What is it that we can do through effective structuring of case
management systems and early screening of cases to stop men-
tally ill offenders from hitting the jails, then going to the hospi-
tal districts, then coming back around . . . and that circle con-
tinues, at huge expense, without someone stepping in?
What can we do to reduce the number of folks who come
back for return business who are poorest?
We know there are effective strategies out there.  We’ve seen
it—whether in the drug courts, mental-health courts, family-
violence courts.  We’ve seen what happens when judges get
involved and the resources are targeted instead of just moving
cases through and getting dispositions.  Unfortunately, we’ve
been largely unable to put a value on that and explain that to the
funders in terms that they can appreciate and recognize how
that impacts the other areas of their budget.
In our county alone, through changing some case-manage-
ment practices, we reduced the average daily jail population by
350 persons by having cases screened immediately, 24 hours a
day, seven days a week, having judges provided information
they needed to make decisions on jail and bond.  Well, 350 peo-
ple on average per day at what is now $65 a day becomes real
money.
If you can reduce the amount of time a case takes to get
through the system, you can just say you cut it in half.  Without
changing a court cost or raising a fine, you will have doubled
the amount of revenue as a result of case disposition.
I think we have to become much more adept and much bet-
ter at describing our business and our process in a way in which
we can show the value that it has to both the citizens and to the
funding authorities.
JUDGE CICCONETTI: . . . A personal aspect:  I’m facing a 6%
ordered cut from the city of Painesville, who is our local fund-
ing authority, and how do you handle that?  What do you do to
save face with the general public?  Because what happens is you
get a backdoor response.
Recently, and I don’t know if it was because of budgetary rea-
sons or not, in Kansas City, for instance, you would say I need
this money to have the cases flow like they should flow and
have dispositions properly completed.  Well, then they start
checking your key card:  “Well, you came in at 9:15 in the
morning.  You should have been here at 9:00.  If you want to get
your cases through, then do the work on time and don’t leave
before 4:30.”
And then, of course, that is just a fire for the press and it goes
on and, all of a sudden, because you fought over a budget cut,
you are now facing a public outcry as to your work habits and
schedule, and we’re getting hammered on that.
The question here is the judicial independence.  How has
anyone handled that with budget cuts?  Did you make the bud-
get cuts? . . .
JUDGE JEROME LaBARRE:  . . . I’m a general-jurisdiction judge
from Portland, Oregon.  We have 38 judges on our court.
Oregon’s economy took a real dive in the last couple years and
as a result, and maybe my colleague from a neighboring court,
Judge Nachtigal, can give the exact figure, but I think it was
around a 20% budget cut we took in the middle of a biannual
budgeting time period.  We had to go to four-day weeks with
our staff.  We had to give 10% budget cuts of our staff.  Judges
The topic for today is, “Is judicial indepen-
dence a casualty in state and local budget bat-
tles?” In Missouri, in many of the municipal
courts the answer would be no, not because
they’re not a casualty, but because they 
couldn’t get a ticket to the fight. They 
weren’t invited by the judicial branch . . . .
– Lawrence G. Myers
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came in five days a week, but on Fridays there was no staff.
There were no court sessions.  We had numerous cuts.
In Portland, one of the things we did to try to take this crisis
and turn it into an opportunity is we started a very active judi-
cial outreach effort, which actually I have been chair of the com-
mittee.  Among other things, we gave 60 speeches to commu-
nity groups within about a 14-month period.  We’re still doing
this.
We’ve set up a program with our legislators in the Portland
metropolitan area.  The metropolitan area is about a million and
a half people, and the legislators come to our court once a year.
We have kind of an open house we present.  We don’t put our
hands out and say we want money, but we try to talk about the
positive things we’re doing in the drug-treatment courts, what
we’re doing in juvenile court, and so we’ve had kind of a multi-
ple set of responses.  We don’t think we’ve got it all figured out
yet, but I’m very encouraged by some of the earlier presenters
because I really do think we need to take a positive approach,
and there really are many things we can do.
I don’t want to downplay this, but one of the things I think is
an incredible strength we have that we don’t realize, we’ve had
the one-jury, one-trial, one-day approach with our juries for a
while.  With our cuts we had to go back to juries for two days.
We have 150 to 200 jurors come in the courthouse now every
single day, four days a week.  If you do the math on that on the
back of an envelope, you’ve got over a hundred thousand citi-
zens coming in the courthouse.
We have a judge give a welcoming talk.  I’m one of the five
judges—it rotates—and I give welcoming talks for about 15 or
20 minutes and I really try to touch on judicial independence,
on how it’s so essential in our democracy.  It goes to the very
core of what we’re about as a country, and I think communicat-
ing with our citizenry this way, we can really turn this thing
around.
So that’s a very long answer to what we’ve done in Portland
with the big crisis.
JUDGE CICCONETTI: . . . Well, why is it so important that we
maintain control over the budget process for our judicial inde-
pendence? . . .
MR. BUENGER: I’ll go back to an earlier remark that I made, and
that is that I think what has happened over the last 50 years is
there has been a real growth in the sense of the judicial branch
as an institution of government, perhaps more so than at any
point in our nation’s history.  What has come with that fact is
also the opportunity for institutional attack, and I think that
we’re seeing that, for example, in Missouri with an attempt to
repeal the Missouri nonpartisan court plan.  We’ve also seen it
through the budget process because, whether we like it or not,
the legislature’s ultimate weapon is always the budget.
I have been in numerous meetings with legislators.  Recently
a legislator who appeared before our presiding judges men-
tioned that if the court gets involved in the issue of tort reform,
there will be no end to where the legislature might go on bud-
get issues.
Today the administration of justice is intimately tied with the
resources that are available to it.  In the past, the notion of thera-
peutic courts, drug courts and the like, was a foreign concept,
but the courts today are involved in the lives of individuals, per-
haps more so than at any point in the past, and in order to do
that effectively, to do that well, it has to have the resources to
pull that off.
And to the extent that we can’t control, for example, in
Larry’s case, to the extent that the judiciary has very limited con-
trol over its resources and over its budget, that does dictate our
capacity to provide service to the people.  But there is, I think,
an important twist on this, and it was mentioned by the judge
from Oregon and others.  I think when we stand before our leg-
islature and say, “You need to treat us differently,” that that rings
hollow because then the director of the Department of Social
Services gets up and says, “I don’t have any discretion over my
caseload, either.”
Our capacity to articulate judicial independence in the bud-
get context is fairly limited.  We’re not very good at it.  We sim-
ply are not.  We kind of rely on this concept of judicial inde-
pendence, but we really haven’t explained it well, and I think if
we’re going to secure the resources that we need to actually
administer the justice system well, part of what is incumbent
upon us is to explain to the public what we do and to be willing
to be held accountable for how we use resources.
I always think of judicial independence as two prongs.  One
is the judge’s decisional independence, your capacity as a judge
to say yes and no, and to do so without undue influence from
outside political institutions or outside groups.  I also think that
there is an institutional independence, and while I would never
advocate judges having to stand before a legislative body as John
Marshall once suggested to explain your decisions, the flip side
of it is judicial independence cannot be a shield by which the
institution holds itself unaccountable to the public.
I think that . . . the greatest challenge for us is to begin to
think of ways that we are willing to institutionally hold our-
selves accountable to the public, and to that extent I think we
will be much more successful in securing the funding that we
need.  Organizations that demonstrate a capacity of success,
succeed.  Organizations that sit back and try to defend existing
principles even in the face of evidence that you can’t do it that
way anymore, will fail.  And the challenge for us in this new
change, this kind of paradigm of growth, I think, of the institu-
tional judiciary, is to figure out ways by which we will hold our-
selves accountable to the public, to one another, for the way we
use resources, for the way that we run our courts.
I think in doing that we secure not only the independence of
the institution, but I also think we secure the independence of
what you do, which is the most important thing, which is to
render impartial justice so that when people come into the
courtrooms of the United States and our states, they at least have
a sense that they have a fair shake.
MR. MYERS: I would agree with that and also clarify my earlier
statement.  We receive a great deal of support from Mike and his
office.  I think that there’s things that we need to learn and that
we can learn, and I think the drug courts have provided us with
some opportunities.  There’s community involvement, including
the location that Ron George was talking about, going out into
the community, coalition building with stakeholders, service
providers.  There’s media involvement.  The media is enthralled
with drug courts.
But what I also think they are able to do and where the state
office helps the municipal courts is they help to articulate and
understand what their purpose is, what they are about, what
they are doing, and then they are able to report back to the com-
munity how successful they have been in doing it, and I think
that as I do my research on the municipal courts, I’m appalled
at how they don’t understand—many of us in the system—what
our purpose is.
There are those in the state of Missouri in the municipal
courts who think the purpose of the municipal court is to gen-
erate revenue for the city.  They forget our job is to do justice,
to provide equal protection, to guarantee you liberty, to
enhance social order, and to guarantee due process of law, and
I think that that’s what we need to be able to articulate, like
Mike says, what our purpose is and then also how well we are
doing that. . . .
MR. WESSELS: You know you don’t get funded when the fund-
ing authority doesn’t understand both in terms of need and
value, and I think oftentimes we begin in these situations to be
reactive when every other department is going in and saying
here is the minimum level of X that we have to have.  Pick an
agency.  You’ve been to the hearings.  You know how those
things go.
I think the judiciary and the court systems need to become
much more proactive even before the budget starts, before you
get in the mechanics of preparing the budget, and go in to fund-
ing authorities and be talking about here is what we need.  Here
is what we can accomplish if you will fund program X or Y, if
you allow us to expand this, if you will give us the resources
and invest in us to do a pilot program.
Having done that, though, the judiciary needs to accept
being accountable for the performance of those programs, for
how we’re using those dollars, and once again, instead of wait-
ing for the legislature to say, “Here are your performance mea-
sures,” we should be going in and saying, “Here is how we are
going to measure ourselves,” and turn the argument around
and make the argument in terms of programs that relate to
funding screens and the consequences of not funding, and get
out in front of this issue instead of being reactionary to it. . . .
JUDGE CICCONETTI: . . . You know you talk to judges at these
conferences and I don’t think I’ve ever spoken to one judge who
isn’t sensitive about the expense of attending a conference:
“Make sure that all your expenses are documented, they’re rea-
sonable, etc., to go back.”
Well, in Ohio, and there’s, I think, four or five municipal
judges here from Ohio, we have a little secret and it’s a little out
that we have.  It’s a permissive statute called a “Special Projects
Fund” that allows municipal judges to attach a dollar amount
to each case that goes through the court, charge the defendant
for that, and use it for special projects.  The money is collected
by the court, it goes into the city treasury, but cannot be spent
without a journal from the judge, so you are accountable for it,
but it also doesn’t come out of your general fund . . . —for edu-
cational expense, travel expenses, extra building projects that
you may want to do.  It can only be spent by the judge and only
by journal.
So some of the expenses I use in particular, any AJA
expenses, come out of the special projects.  It does not come
out of my normal travel budget, which I use for the local north-
ern Ohio and also for the state judicial programs.  So that, I sup-
pose, avoids some possible criticism under the general budget
and it saves that.  That’s not subject to the 6% cuts that we got.
Does anyone else have anything?  How is your spending?
When you come to these conferences, is anybody not con-
cerned about public reaction to that, even though you know
that you should be here and the education, the 13 1/2 hours
that you gain here, is for judicial education?  But who amongst
us is not concerned about any public reaction to that?  I think
we all are, but is that another constraint on our judicial inde-
pendence? . . . .
MR. RON H. GARVIN: I’m going to make a statement and, of
course, I come from a different perspective than most folks in
the room here.  For those who don’t know me, I’m the Vice
Chairman of the Board, Veterans Appeals.  That’s in the federal
system and currently I’m the acting chairman.
Several years ago we had a cut in our budget that was given,
passed on to us by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.  We had a
cut in budget of about 15.4%.  Now just to give you a perspec-
tive of where we are, I have 56 judges and about 228 clerks that
support this system.  We do about 38,000 appeals a year.  That’s
what we did this year.
When we were cut by 15%, I had a Board of Judges meeting
and in that meeting we talked about judicial independence, but
we also talked about judicial collegiality, and what the judges
determined in that Board of Judges meeting is that with a 15.4%
cut in budget, we were going to improve productivity, and we
did.
We improved productivity for the clerks by 20%, measurable
and articulable, and we improved the output of the judges by
25% in that year we were cut.  Since then, because of our cred-
ibility, our budget has been increased every year and we’re
almost back to where we started, and I think within a year or so
we’re going to be beyond that.
So there is judicial independence.  Nobody ever tried to tell
us how to decide cases, what should be contained in those deci-
sions, and as a matter of fact, during that period of time we
improved our, what we call, deficiency-free decisions from like
90% to 93%.
So along with independence, you need leadership and colle-
giality and perhaps that will help, and I think you gentlemen
are saying the same things.  Prove that you’re going to do it.
Thank you.
JUDGE JAY D. DILWORTH: I’d like to comment on your fund
that you used to fund some of this.
Eighteen years ago, when I became a judge in Nevada, there
was a statute that provided $10 for every traffic and misde-
meanor fine to go into a fund that would be for court use.  The
original court would get $2.50.  The $7.50 would go into the
Supreme Court AOC, and specifically in the legislature it says
your funding source cannot offset your budget by that amount.
However, it has now reached up to a maximum of a hundred
dollars on fees—and I don’t have the figures, but a real large
percentage of the Nevada Supreme Court budget—that’s theirs,
not initially with us.  The Supreme Court’s [budget] comes from
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that fund and any time we say we want to do it locally, [they
say,] “You fund it.”
And so one of the things that happened is the legislature saw
this as a way to grab some of the money that goes to the state,
50% plus a dollar goes to the court.  Forty-nine [percent] goes
to the Department of Vehicles, training, whatever the legislature
wants to do.  They found another funding source by just con-
tinually increasing this amount.  You can have a $5 fine in
municipal court and I believe it’s $65, is what it works out to be.
So you got to watch out for that.  It can really come back to
bite you, and whenever we want something, they say, “Well, pay
for it for yourself.”  Yes, we do use it, but it’s that kind of a sit-
uation, so it can be a double-edged sword. . . .
JUDGE JAMES W. OXENDINE:  . . . I’m a superior-court judge
in Georgia and I have sat on the other side of the fence.  I have
been in the legislature.
You know what we do in Georgia, and we’re funded by the
state, we find through the Council of the Superior Court
Judges, and I know most states have an organization similar to
that, we at our midyear meeting develop our legislative pack-
age.  We develop our budget.  We then submit our budget to the
supreme court justice, who speaks for the judges of general
jurisdiction.
Now the state court, the magistrates, and the other judges in
Georgia that are funded by local jurisdictions, they sort of pad-
dle their own way, but at the general level with superior-court
judges, once we get our budget in place and we submit it, we
then break out into our own area and certainly if we had any
influence in our own area of influence, and we will work with
the legislature.
For example, I served with the Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee in the House.  Well, I will go to Tom and say,
“Look, Tom, we need some help.”
Now the governor has nothing to do with our budget.  We
bypass him and the governor’s budget altogether and go straight
to the chief justice.  He presents our budget.  The legislature
votes it up or down or they can amend it.  The only way the
governor can get to us is he can veto, and that’s not been done
in the 20 years that I’ve been involved in this situation.
What I would recommend if you are in a situation like we’re
in, you need to do your planning and work the legislature.
Now we have on our finance committee or our appropriations
committee in the House, there’s about 15 people, but about five
or six of them make the decision, and we work those folks.  I
mean we don’t let them go to bed until they know why we have
in our budget what we have.  Frankly, I have had some things
that we’ve asked for we did not get, but the basic support of the
courts we’ve always gotten and we’ve never had a decrease and
we’ve never had the legislature to ask us to give back or to cut
our budget, and I’ve been doing this for 20 years.
So I would just simply suggest that, and somebody said
awhile ago, “Well, we have judicial independence.”  That does
not mean that we don’t have to, ever once in a while, beg.
I learned a long time ago when I first got into politics if you
ain’t born with it, you have to beg people to vote for it, and I’m
not above begging when it comes to money, and judges ought
to realize that sometimes we ought to beg a little.  Thank you.
JUDGE JOHN E. CONERY:  . . . On these court-cost issues, you
got to be real careful that they don’t get out of hand.  In
Louisiana, the basic court costs are up above $200 in our juris-
diction, so if you run a stop sign, the fine is $25, but the court
cost is $225, so it’s $250 and people are starting to get upset.
The legislature passes these court-cost initiatives to keep
from having to raise taxes.  When any special-interest group
wants money, like CASA or the crime lab, it’s supported by
these court costs.  Different entities.  Of course, the judges get
a cut for our travel and whatever else we want to do, like you,
the discretionary fund.  The DA gets a cut for the operation of
his office, and the clerk of the court, the sheriff.
By the time everybody is dipping into the pot, the poor
sucker that runs a stop sign is funding the criminal-justice sys-
tem, and that creates a big backlash, you understand, on the
part of public.  You know they don’t mind paying a $25 fine if
they run a stop sign, but why does this poor sucker have to
fund the entire state operation of the judiciary, the district attor-
ney, the sheriff, the clerk, and everybody else?  So we got to be
real careful about that because it could get out of hand quickly,
as it has in Louisiana.
I think what has happened over the last 50
years is there has been a real growth in the
sense of the judicial branch as an institution
of government . . . . What has come with that
fact is also the opportunity for institutional
attack . . . .
– Michael L. Buenger
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Just as a short aside, there is a committee now established by
the legislature to try to control these court costs to make sure
that a legitimate request is made before it is voted on by the leg-
islature.  It doesn’t work.  Our own DA went and bypassed that
committee, who turned down his request for a $25 additional
fee to fund his truancies, and went directly to his legislators,
put it in a local bill, and it passed.  So be very, very careful about
adding court costs. . . .
JUDGE NORMAN MURDOCK:  . . . I’m retired.  I’m a police-
court judge from Hamilton County, Ohio, and spend my win-
ters in Sedona and decided to come over because I have an
interest in what happens in the courts.
Somewhat echoing what was said before, I spent a long time
in the legislature and was a county commissioner in Hamilton
County, and I’m sure the two Mikes are familiar with the
processes in Ohio.  I think it’s important to remember—for the
judges particularly—that other elected officials, especially those
who do funding, feel a serious obligation for the accounting of
those moneys that they’re responsible for, so the judges must, I
think, understand that and recognize that when they’re dealing
with the other branches of government.
I became a judge later in my political career and sometimes
I felt rather demeaned by judges and their approaches to me
either as a county commissioner, as a funder, or as a legislator
playing a leadership role, and sometimes I think also the judges
feel and exercise their authority in their role in a rather aloof
manner, and I think that is counterproductive, quite frankly.
Echoing what was said earlier, we would see judges in the
legislature essentially in the budgetary process when they
wanted something, when they needed money, when they
wanted to fund their budget, as well on a county level in the
major metropolitan counties see the judges and their people
come before us when they wanted something, and I think
judges forget that this is a political process, unfortunately or
fortunately.
I think we’re all accountable, whether we’re judges or not,
but I think it is essential that judges and their representatives
on a regular and frequent basis become, if you will, friends of
those in the other offices that account for those budgets and
that make those decisions about budgets, and I don’t think
that’s demeaning.  I think, on the other hand, it is important
and I think it goes towards establishing judicial independence,
not aside from the philosophy that we all believe in, in judicial
independence, but establishing that independence in your rela-
tionship with people on the county level and with people on the
legislative level.
Other than the public confrontations, I would suggest and
urge if you have those private, legitimate, and yet worthy meet-
ings and explanations of what you’re doing and why you’re
doing it, everybody knows the role of the judiciary.  There’s no
secret in terms of the role of the judiciary, but establishing those
relationships I think are essential, and I would encourage you
to do that.  Thank you.
Michael A. Cicconetti is judge of the Painesville (Ohio) Municipal
Court.  He was vice president of the American Judges Association
in 2004-2005.  He is known for creative sentencing practices in
misdemeanor cases.  
Michael Buenger has been the state court administrator in
Missouri since 2000.  Before that he was the state court adminis-
trator for South Dakota from 1995 to 2000.  He is a past president
of the Conference of State Court Administrators and has a law
degree from St. Louis University School of Law.
Lawrence G. Myers is the municipal court administrator for the
city of Joplin, Missouri.  He is a past president of the National
Association for Court Management.  He spent 17 years with the
juvenile bureau of the district court in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and served
as administrator of the juvenile division of the circuit court in
Jackson County (Kansas City), Missouri.  
Robert Wessels has served since 1976 as the court manager for the
county criminal courts at law in Harris County (Houston), Texas.
He has an M.A. from Houston University and is a fellow of the
Institute for Court Management.  He is a past president of the
National Association for Court Management.
[W]hat do you have to develop in order to be
successful? I think the foundations are really
pretty simple: trust and credibility; account-
ability; becoming fact-based; managerial com-
petence; and developing a new vocabulary to
explain to funding authorities why we have
value in what we do . . . .
– Robert Wessels
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The second panel discussion at the National Forum on Judicial
Independence reviews the pressures to judicial independence that
can come through the election of judges.  The discussion was led by
then-AJA president-elect Gayle Nachtigal, a trial judge from
Washington County, Oregon.  Panelists were Roy A. Schotland,
professor of law at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.,
and Jeffrey Rosinek, a circuit court judge in Miami, Florida.  The
National Forum on Judicial Independence was supported by a gen-
erous grant from the Joyce Foundation of Chicago, Illinois.
JUDGE GAYLE NACHTIGAL: “Judicial Elections:  Current
Threats to Nonpartisan Elections, and Are Retention Elections
Safe?”  That is a topical discussion given the tenor of the times
and where we are in the political election scene in this year of
2004. . . .  I am the president-elect of the American Judges
Association, and I just successfully waged a campaign for
reelection in the state of Oregon.
Of course, I had no opponent.  It was an easy election.  I
think it cost me $50, which was the cost of the filing fee, but if
I had drawn an opponent, we were prepared in my small
county to spend in excess of $50,000 to retain my seat, so I was
very glad that I only had to spend $50 of the $50,000 we had
set aside.
In Oregon it’s unique in the sense that we’re not allowed to
raise any money to have our own elections.  I can’t know who
donates to my campaign.  I can’t ask the campaign committee
to form.  It’s supposed to just happen, and I have to sign off all
the forms and certify that they are in fact accurate over some-
thing I’m not allowed to have any knowledge of, so I was glad
to only have to certify for $50, and that came out of my check-
ing account. . . .
[Conference attendees then viewed some recent television
commercials from judicial election campaigns, including ads
for and against members of the Ohio Supreme Court.1]
PROFESSOR ROY A. SCHOTLAND: . . . It is a special pleasure
and privilege to be with you.  Taking off from what you just saw
from Ohio—and let me just note I hope it will please you—that
the ads against Alice Resnick backfired; whether she would
have won anyway, who knows?  But she did, in fact, win with
a very handsome spread, and just about everybody thought
those ads were counterproductive.
Two years later, if anything, Ohio looked worse.  Happily,
thanks to the fact the bar association has done much more than
it did back then, this year it’s looking pretty good.  The bar
association got centrally involved in 2002 and I think that
changed the culture, and when all is said and done, there’s a
great deal here about the local culture and the expectations and
the level of tolerance.
Let me go back to 2002 two days after the election that
included two seats on the high court.  Chief Justice Tom Moyer
said this about the ads run that time by interest groups on both
sides, and the ads that kept running despite very strong all-out
efforts by the candidates on both sides to get the ads stopped.
The chief said this:  “Candidates were outraged.  Citizens were
outraged.  I am outraged.  Anybody who places his or her trust
and confidence in a constitutional democracy should be out-
raged.”
Now, traditionally political campaigns for judicial posts have
been about as exciting, it has been said I think by a Florida
judge, as a game of checkers played by mail.  They have been
low-key affairs conducted with civility and dignity.  Now what
has changed and how widespread is the change?  Well, in the
how-widespread note, if you haven’t had it in your state, don’t
think you’re safe, because it spreads.  It has constantly spread
and we’re getting, because of what’s been happening in the
spread, unprecedented media attention.
The cover story of Business Week four weeks ago was, “The
Battle Over the Courts:  How Political and Theology and
Special Interests Are Compromising the U.S. Justice System.”2
This midsummer, past midsummer, the outstanding magazine
The Economist had an article.3
Yesterday’s New York Times had a front-page story,4 which
I’m afraid belongs to the sky-is-falling school.  For example, the
headline is about “Partisan Battlegrounds,” but you can’t find
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the words “Republican” or “Democratic” or “party” in the ad.
By partisan they mean overheated, and the facts they have were
badly overheated.  They quote a source that as of October 17,
a week ago, more than $8 million had been spent in judicial
races on TV in contrast, the source said, to 2002, when only $1
million had been spent by October 19, but if you go to the
material from that same source, they report that the total
spending on TV in 2002 was $8 million, and I know you spend
more at the end.  I’m just having trouble believing that $7 of
the $8 million spent was in the last ten-plus days, and it also
left out of the fact that TV is only a piece of the picture.
Total spending in 2002 was $29 million.  This time we’re
certainly going to be above that.  We’re running around $35
[million] now, but total spending back in 2000 by candidates
alone was $45 million, 90-plus percent up from two years ear-
lier, and $45 million was only a piece of the picture.  For the
first time we saw, and we still haven’t gotten to this bad then,
spending by non-candidate groups, both local and national,
which totaled $16 million, most particularly from the U.S.
Chamber, so we saw in 2000 $62 million.
Now the sky is not falling, and it’s appalling that the Times
didn’t mention the major steps forward.  North Carolina has
taken one with an effort at public funding.  I hope to get to that
later. The Ohio Bar, as I said earlier, is entitled to enormous
credit.  The problems, however, are unquestionably getting
worse than they had been.  Let’s remember Sergeant Friday and
try to get the facts and see what they mean.
Start with context, but first one last opening note.  Last
Wednesday in Minneapolis, the Eighth Circuit had an en banc
hearing on whether Minnesota can constitutionally hold non-
partisan judicial elections.5 Now that affects only 20 states, so
if they lose—and the way the questions went, I wouldn’t want
to put a lot of money on winning—those of you from nonpar-
tisan states have some interesting time ahead.  There was
another issue in that case, whether Minnesota can constitu-
tionally require, as 29 other states require, that judicial cam-
paign funds be raised not by the candidates personally, but by
their campaign committees.
Two weeks ago lawsuits were brought in Alaska, Indiana,
Kentucky, and North Dakota by anti-abortion groups trying to
knock out both state limits on pledges or promises of what
you’ll do on the bench.  “I promise to take care of tenants.”  I
don’t know how many of you will enjoy that regime.
Now, of course, the cover is that these plaintiffs, anti-abor-
tion groups—attacking the canons limiting campaign con-
duct—are trying to protect speech.  That is misleading.  What
they’re trying to do is not protect speech, but take away the
protection of choice because if they can get candidates to have
to say their litmus-test questions, they can decide who comes
in and who doesn’t.
Context.  We have judges facing elections of some type in
39 states, 87% of our appellate judges and trial
jurisdiction/general jurisdiction trial judges facing contestable
elections.  Nonpartisan or partisan are 53% of the appellates
and 77% of the trial judges.
Now the difference between those percents and the 87 are
retention elections.  Retention elections come from the drive to
end contestable elections, a drive that began in 1906 with a
major speech by Roscoe Pound.  That led, as probably just
about all of you know, to the so-called merit plan with screen-
ing the appointments and retention afterwards, which
Missouri adopted in 1940.
An awful lot of people don’t realize that Missouri still has
two-thirds of their trial judges running in partisan elections.  A
history which I’ll give in one moment says that to talk about
ending contestable elections is—forgive me—a copout.  It is a
distraction from moving forward to reduce the problems we
have.
For example, Florida’s appellate judges are in the merit-and-
retention system.  Their trial judges run in nonpartisan con-
testable elections.  Most of them aren’t challenged, but it’s con-
testable.  In 2000, Florida voters faced a ballot proposition
about whether their trial judges should change by local option
to appointment and retention just like their appellates.  The
highest vote for that change in any jurisdiction in Florida was
41% for it. . . . 
Last year in Texas, the Senate voted to change from partisan
elections to appointment.  The House was just about to have a
vote when in came the grassroots against change, again heav-
ily motivated by the concern about a litmus test on choice, and
the House did not even hold a vote.
Last year in Ohio, the chief justice opened a major effort to
change the [procedure] to appointment for the supreme court
only.  That died at birth.
Next Tuesday in South Dakota, where just like Florida the
appellates are appointed and [retained], and trial judges are in
contestable nonpartisan [elections], the South Dakota voters
face a ballot proposition to change their trial judges.  They got
nearly unanimous support for this in the legislature, and we
don’t know what the voters will do,6 but we do know about
opposition, which has surfaced rather recently from, and I
quote, “pro-family groups”—here we are again—“Mothers
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5. In Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (2005), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that
the partisan-activities clause of Canon 5 of the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct violated the First Amendment.  (The decision is
excerpted beginning at page 66.)  In an en banc opinion, the court
also found that the Canon 5 provision forbidding solicitation of
campaign contributions and support violated the First
Amendment.  That decision, filed August 2, 2005, was fully joined
by eight of the 15 judges participating in the decision; three others
joined in the holding invalidating both provisions and most of the
opinion.  Three judges dissented, arguing that the matter should
have been remanded for an evidentiary hearing at which the state
would have had the burden to prove that the restrictions were jus-
tified by compelling state interests.  Another judge approved inval-
idating the partisan-activities clause, but did not join in invalidat-
ing the anti-solicitation provision.    
6.  The voters of South Dakota were similar to those in Florida—only
38 percent supported the constitutional amendment, which would
have changed the state’s method for selecting trial-court judges
from election to merit appointment.  Dirk Lammers, Voters Reject
Two Constitutional Amendments, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 3,
2004, available in abstract form at http://www.brennancenter.org/
programs/pester/pages/view_elerts.php?category_id=4&page=24
(last visited Sept. 24, 2005).  
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Against Drunk Driving” and—I don’t know if this is a frequent
alliance with Mothers Against Drunk Driving—“bikers”—that
does not mean bicyclists—“and other groups.”  I love what one
city official said:  “This is simply anti-baseball and apple pie.
It’s un-American.”
Please don’t tell him that 80 percent of South Dakota’s
judges initially get on the bench by appointment to fill a
vacancy.
Now what does history teach?  From 1906, with a national
drive to end contestable elections for judges, with the American
Bar and so many state bars and local bars all out with other
good-government organizations for change, well, if we con-
tinue at the pace of the last 98 years, in order to end contestable
elections for appellates, we need only another 160 years and for
trials we need only another 770 years, so let’s face the reality
that we’ve got.  We’re going to have contestable elections, and
the question is how we deal with the problems in them. . . .
Let me just close on the key question, which is what is to be
done, with three suggestions. 
First, we should take advantage of what the Missouri
Supreme Court did in response to White.7 Missouri and
Minnesota were asleep, and they had this obsolete announce
clause, which only six other states still had after the early
nineties changed the model code, so Missouri had to repeal
their announce clause, and they did that in about a page-and-
a-quarter order, which ended with this: . . . “recusal or other
remedial action may nonetheless be required of any judge in
cases that involve an issue about which the judge has
announced his or her views as otherwise may be appropriate
under the Code of Judicial Conduct.”
Now that is an inspired step. . . .  Missouri rotates the chiefs,
and I knew the prior one, I didn’t know the one under whom
this was done, and I saw him at a conference, and he said,
“What did you think of it?”  I said, “Well, I had an article out
in which I called it an inspired step,” and he rushed over and
gave me a big hug.  He was just so excited.  He’s Rush
Limbaugh’s cousin.
That step supports the overwhelming majority of candi-
dates who want to campaign judiciously.  They can say look, I
know what you want me to say, but if I say what you want, I
will be unable to sit in just exactly the cases that you care
about most.
Also the Missouri step enables a candidate whose opponent
who is stretching the envelope in saying some variant of “I will
hang them all.”  The person facing that can respond with, “My
opponent has told you what he thinks you want to hear.  What
he hasn’t told you is that by doing that, he’s going to be dis-
qualified from the cases you care about most.”
Now, last week the suit by the Kentucky anti-abortion group
succeeded in getting an injunction to knock out Kentucky’s
pledge or promise clause and the commit quotes, but the plain-
tiffs—again I say this is not about speech—the plaintiffs also
tried to knock out Kentucky rules on disqualification, and a
federal district judge who knocked out the canons said no, no,
we’re not taking out the disqualification.  So recusal, whether
you want to call it that or disqualification, looms more impor-
tant than ever.  That’s Step 1.
Step 2:  In the 5-4 White case, Justices Kennedy, with the
majority, and Stephens, in dissent, both urged that we need
more speech to meet speech.  We need sensible speech from
I can’t know who donates to my campaign.
I can't ask the campaign committee to form.
It’s supposed to just happen, and I have to
sign off all the forms and certify that they are
in fact accurate over something I’m not
allowed to have any knowledge of . . . .
– Gayle A. Nachtigal
7. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 535 U.S. 923 (2002).  For a
review and discussion of the White decision, see Roy A. Schotland,
Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2002,
at 8; Jan Witold Baran, Judicial Candidate Speech After Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2002, at 12.  
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representative, credible community leaders, if any candidates
are campaigning inappropriately, or outside groups—because
you can’t discipline the outside groups, but you can come out
and say they are doing violence to our judicial system.
In 2003, the ABA formally resolved that state local bars
should initiate committees to oversee judicial campaign con-
duct, and we already have this outstanding one in Ohio, which
started two years ago.  This year we have a fine one in Georgia
and a number of Florida jurisdictions.  We have statewide in
New York and though we’ve had some that go way back, like
Columbus, Ohio, and I think San Mateo, California.  The
spread of that is a wonderful step, and it’s very important that
you should know the National Center for State Courts has an
absolutely superb new pamphlet on how to start and operate
such a committee, and for that superb new pamphlet, Dave
Rottman is entitled to great credit.8
Third and last, a very simple, very powerful change:  How
long are your terms on the bench?  Of our appellate judges, 55
percent have more than six years, but 45 percent of elected
appellates have six or less, and of our trial judges 18 percent
have four years.  Now I don’t know what you think of that, but
I don’t understand having judicial independence and four-year
terms.  I cannot put those two things together.  Fifty-five per-
cent of the trial judges have six years.  I applaud the 27 percent
who are in states where they have more than six years.
Fourteen percent of our state trial judges have 11 or more
years.  If you want judicial independence, you want to reduce
problems in judicial campaigns.  Let’s go for longer terms.
Chief Justice Moyer, in his major effort after the 2002 mess,
put as his top priority—after the appointing of the supreme
court, which went down right away—the lengthening of terms.
Ohio has all its judges in six-year terms.  Think how many
judicial election problems are reduced by that simple step.
Think how much more attractive serving on the bench is made
by longer terms, and after all, isn’t the ultimate goal of all our
judicial selection reform to attract more fine people to the
bench and to keep more fine judges on the bench?  . . . .
JUDGE JEFFREY ROSINEK: . . . . For those of us who are judges
the question is:  What do we do to keep our job?  All the rest
are sort of superficial.  If we are in a state that has elections,
then do we act as a politician?  Do we set up campaigns?  Can
8. NATIONAL AD HOC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
CONDUCT, EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT COMMITTEES: A
HOW-TO HANDBOOK (2004), available at http://www.judicialcam-
paignconduct.org/Handbook.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005). The
handbook was published by the National Center for State Courts,
which has established a specific website that provides access to the
handbook and other materials related to judicial campaign con-
duct at http://www.judicialcampaignconduct.org (last visited Sept.
24, 2005).
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we do that under the laws or the canons that we have in our
state?
I just heard about Oregon’s 50 bucks.  Fifty dollars, that’s a
filing fee.  Fifty dollars doesn’t get you downtown in Miami by
bus anymore.  Our filing fee is about $6,500, so for someone
to decide they’ll run against me, he or she has to put up 6,500
bucks or for me to run I’ve got to do the same thing.  And our
law in Florida says something similar to that.  We cannot raise
funds.  I cannot ask anyone for money.  All I can do is set up a
committee that asks everyone for money, and I am not to know
who gives me the money and, of course, I have to send out
thank-yous to those people who have given me money.
So these are the things, the quagmires, that we as judges are
facing.  In 1971, the people of the state of Florida changed our
system.  We had a conglomerate of judges.  We had municipal
judges and we had officers of the peace and we had justices of
the peace.  We had court-of-records judges.
We finally went to a three-tier system:  the trial level and the
federal level and the Supreme Court.  At the trial level we have
two groups of individuals, the county judges, which every
county was required to have one and they were of limited juris-
diction, and we had general-jurisdiction judges, I think 20 cir-
cuits . . . had those, and five districts that handled the appel-
late judges and one supreme court, and then at that point in
time what was set up was that the trial-level judges would run
in a contested election.  They could be appointed by the gov-
ernor through a judicial nominating committee, but then at the
next general election they would have to run for reelection,
and they could draw opposition.  It was nonpartisan, but they
could draw opposition.
Well, that means if the governor appointed you in June,
you’d be running for election in September on your record.
Your record is that you know your way to the courtroom and
very, very little else, and for years judges tried to change that,
but of course the legislature got in its way because that’s the
way the system was set up.  But the appellate judges, the
appellate judges on the supreme court or the courts of appeal,
once they were appointed, they would run against their own
record as a merit retention.  That was our modified Missouri
Plan, and so what we had was this dual system, the contested
election for trial judges and then the merit retention, and
most of your states have a combination of some of these, but
in Florida we try to become less political and so in between
general elections when there was a vacancy, the governor
would appoint based upon recommendations from judicial
nominating commissions, and what was started in 1967 was
that the Florida Bar would appoint three people, the governor
would appoint three people, and those three would get
together in each judicial commission and appoint three other
individuals.
It seemed really fair until the reform took place . . . in 2001,
and the reform—I don’t know why they always use the word
“reform” when someone is getting screwed.  This time it was
just judges, of course.  The reform is that the governor would
appoint everyone.  The six people would select the three.  The
governor would make the appointment, but the Florida Bar
could recommend.
Now this took place because for some reason there was ani-
mosity between the courts and the legislature and the courts
and the governor, and I don’t know if it had anything to do
with election of 2000 that ended up in the Supreme Court of
the United States, but apparently it did.
So in Florida we have an interesting system.  We have a leg-
islature that is basically . . . off the wall sometimes when it
comes to judges.  They used to use the words “liberal” and
“conservative,” but now they use “activists.” I’m not too sure
what that means, but I think it starts with the letter “L” anyway.
So the judges were becoming activist judges and, therefore,
they should understand that that’s not their place.  I’m not too
sure what that meant, but, anyhow, that was in Florida.  So we
have this system of selection in Florida, not unlike many of
your systems.  The thing that we don’t have is partisan politics,
political elections.  We do not have Republicans who run
against Democrats as judges, though for some strange reason
the political parties do get involved and say that this nonparti-
san Democrat is running against this nonpartisan Republican.
I don’t know what that means.
Generally the public gets the idea of what that means and
we have limitations not of spending, but of how much a per-
son can contribute, and it’s $500, and that was by a judicial
order a number of years ago in a case that took place in Florida
from Miami.
So there are some limitations, but this year we’ve seen
incredible spending.  As Roy said, we’ve had—out of all the
judges running—only three contested elections.  I mean three
incumbents received opposition this year in Dade County.  All
three lost the election, and that bodes well for those who are
running in two years.  I would say at this point in time most of
them are very, very concerned about that and change under-
wear daily.
So in our communities in Florida, the judicial nominating
commission can recommend, but this is what’s happened in
the last few years with our judicial nominating commission.
The questions that these individuals are asking are somewhat
intrusive.
Example:  The new judicial nominating commission in a
place called Broward County, which is north of us, in
Montverde, one person asked a young lady who had some
small children whether or not she could balance single moth-
erhood with judicial service.  Of course, was that a proper
question?
Another one was, “How did you feel about the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2003 striking down Texas law criminalizing homo-
sexual activity?  As a homosexual, what do you think about
that?”
Another person was asked, “Are you a God-fearing person?”
And the individual atheist said, “To whom it may concern.”
And then another question concerning religious views:
“What do you think of the Alabama Supreme Court Chief
Justice directive of the Ten Commandments mounted in his
courthouse?”
An individual of the Florida Bar came in with a response by
the president that troubles me about these questions, but I
wasn’t there and I don’t know in what context they were taken.
I believe these were fairly new commissions.  They’ll probably
grow in the job.  Am I sorry that people were offended?
Absolutely, but this isn’t a perfect world and we learn from
experience, so it concerned a number of judges when the presi-
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dent of the Florida Bar took such a sometimes called cavalier
attitude.
Well, for judges the question is:  What are the factors that
threaten your judicial independence?  In a survey taken and 40
percent of the judges responded [that]:  (1) judicial indepen-
dence [is] being eroded by excessive criticism of judges for
issuing opinions that are at odds with the majority of individ-
uals; (2) judicial reelection is too politicized; (3) judicial selec-
tion is too politicized; and (4) judges are too dependent on
campaign contributions.
Well, in our state where contribution is a way of life the
question is:  Are judges too dependent upon them?  And the
answer is, well, it depends if you’re able to raise money or not.
We have one gentleman who raised $375,000.  It didn’t really
matter that his wife had a TV program.  She was a judge on the
TV program and people recognized her that way and he raised
$375,000 and he, by the way, won that election.  But there is a
perception that when you’re taking money, it affects the way
that you’ll make a decision, and that is a concern that judges
have.  It concerns us that we have to take this money.
What has changed from not only using money in elections
is the individuals who call political consultants, and in our
community political consultants is sort of a nasty proposition
because we receive as judges letters: “We hope that you will
hire our firm.  If you don’t, we are looking around for other
places to place our candidates.”  So you get a letter that is
somewhat extortive in nature and you have to sit and think,
“Do we hire this individual?”
One incumbent judge who lost spent almost a hundred
thousand dollars on consultants.  What he forgot to do is
spend money on the campaign.  He had all the consultants, but
the voters did not vote for him, and why did he lose? Well, he
would not respond.  He did not respond to much of the criti-
cism, and the criticism concerned some of his decisions.  We
in Dade County had a major . . . I don’t know.  Some of you
may have heard it about it.  The Elian case.  Elian?  I don’t
know if you heard about it.  Some of you may have heard about
that, a young lad who ended up going back to Cuba with his
father.  He was attacked on the Elian case though he had noth-
ing to do with it.  He ruled on a similar case for somebody who
went back to Jordan.  They said see, he did it in Jordan.  He will
do it in Cuba.
Well, that logic did not help this gentleman in this election.
It also did not help the fact that he handled the divorce or he
was the judge handling this divorce for a former mayor who
made this comment, and obviously the mayor did not like the
decision in the divorce case.
I don’t know if that had anything to do with his comments
on radio, but this individual lost the election.
Those are the concerns that judges have.  I mean the poli-
tics that’s involved with politicizing of a nonelection appoint-
ment, judicial nominating committee, the election campaign,
and the amount of money that we have to raise.  It’s totally
unlike Oregon for 50 bucks.  Fifty bucks.  Fifty bucks does not
buy you the filing fee, let alone the ads.
So those are the concerns that we have and the question
asked was, “Are nonpartisan selection or retention plans in
danger?”  The answer is judicial judges are in danger as a result
of what’s happening right now throughout our country. . . .
JUDGE SAMUEL LEVINE:  I’m . . . the retired past president
of the Board of Judges of the District Court of Nassau County,
the lower-level misdemeanor and the low civil cases in Nassau
County, a suburb of New York City, and the miracle of ‘96.  I
was 67 years of age when I ran for the seventh time on a minor-
ity party line and because of seven different factors in my sev-
enth campaign, including Clinton’s coattails in ‘96, I became
the chief judge of the District Court of Nassau County with 25
other of my colleagues.
However, I was in the minority party.  Therefore, the chief
judge or the president of the board was told I had no power to do
anything, and the New York Times . . . of December 30, 1996,
pointed out, “A Nassau Politician Lost Till He Won, or Did He?
Partisan battle over new judge’s powers in charge of 26 judges or
That step supports the overwhelming majority
of candidates who want to campaign 
judiciously. They can say look, I know what
you want me to say, but if I say what you want,
I will be unable to sit in just exactly the cases
that you care about most.
– Roy A. Schotland
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maybe just traffic ticket forums,”9 and the latter was the case
because my chief administrative judge of all of the courts of
Nassau County, population 1.3 million, 100 judges in all, said,
“Levine, you have no power to do anything.  Just sit in your
courtroom and your chambers and do your job.  You’re being
replaced.” Despite the fact that my predecessor had such a power.
The point I’m raising is that politics in our court system,
especially in New York, is something that is challenging the
very basic system of our judicial branch of government and the
question is—how do we eliminate politics from our court sys-
tem especially when you look at, in New York State, the chair-
man of each county’s dominant party has the control of the
selection and the appointment or election—we have both—in
their county throughout the state?
And in my particular county, one man, as the chairman of
the dominant party, has the control of the selection, election,
or appointment of 90 of the 100 judges and judicial hearing
officers in New York State, and therein lies, I think, the great-
est challenge to our judicial system here in the United States.
My question to the leaders of the American Judges
Association is what action can we or will we take as a body, as
an organization dealing with this serious major problem for
our system? . . .
JUDGE ROSINEK: . . . As long as there are elections, there’s poli-
tics, and that’s one of the things that I think judges should not
be afraid of.  I think that too often judges who do not believe
that they should be prepared to run for office are called former
judges because they’re not prepared to run for office, and if we
are elected, we have to be prepared to run an election.  Now
there are certain things you cannot do because of the judicial
canons, but outside of that we have to take the bull by the
horns and actually run.
For you who have four-year or six-year or eight-year terms
and then have to run, when I ran, after my election my cam-
paign started the next day, and how did it start?  Just by going
to speaking engagements, going to schools, going to churches,
going to synagogues, going to condo associations and speak-
ing, meeting with people, opening up the court, and I was pre-
pared.  If someone ran against me, I wouldn’t be afraid of run-
ning a campaign.
But you can’t take politicians out of it when you’re running
for office. . . .
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: Four points.  First, I have to take
issue with the over-lumped use of the word “politics.”  There’s
all kinds of politics in life.  There’s office politics, school politics.
You name it.  There’s a big difference between the politics in par-
tisan elections and the politics in retention elections and the 
politics in appointments, so the question is the kind of politics.
The best thing you can do to avoid it getting worse is—if
any of you knows an Eighth Circuit judge or knows anybody
who knows an Eighth Circuit judge, take them to a very fancy
resort as soon as you can and take them for a very long walk in
the woods about what they’re about to do, maybe, to the 20
states that elect some or all of their judges through nonparti-
san [systems].
. . . . I think you all ought to appoint a special committee
at once to be ready to talk about what to do if that one comes
in wrong, because if that one comes in wrong, you’re going to
have suits in 19 other states.  The only question is how fast.
Back in the end of 2000,  . . . 17 [state supreme court chief
justices] called a summit on judicial selection.  Their very first
recommendation was switch from partisan to nonpartisan, and
now we have the federal courts telling us how to run the states.
I don’t want to get into the Tenth Amendment because I think
I think that too often judges who do not
believe that they should be prepared to run
for office are called former judges because
they’re not prepared to run for office, and if
we are elected, we have to be prepared to run
an election. Now there are certain things you
cannot do because of the judicial canons, but
outside of that we have to take the bull by the
horns and actually run.
– Jeffrey Rosinek
9.  Bruce Lambert, Nassau Democrat Lost Till He Won, or Did He?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at B4. 
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there are plenty of stronger reasons that the federal judges
shouldn’t be telling the states how to run themselves.  Chief
Justice Abrahamson of Wisconsin just had fits when Justice
O’Connor said, “Well, if you don’t like elections, just don’t
have them anymore.”  That’s just flat cuckoo land.
The last point is the chiefs put an amicus brief into the
Eighth Circuit case and in that they have examples of six cate-
gories of things wrong with partisan elections.  And what you
described, I wish we had known about that because that would
have been a wonderful episode to put into the brief and I will
pursue that article.
JUDGE ROSINEK: Just one other thing, too.  Most people want
to elect their offices, and that includes judges.  They want to
vote.  That doesn’t mean they have to know anything about the
person or know anything about the individual who is running
or anything about the background or the abilities, but they want
to elect people, and one of the best examples for us is in the state
of Florida and Roy mentioned that before.  When 41 percent
now is the largest group of individuals—in I think it was
Manatee County—said they wanted to have merit retention for
their judges, but still 59 percent of them said no, and the aver-
age [statewide] was 32 percent said yes.  Thirty-two percent.  So
68 percent said no, they do not want to have merit retention for
trial court judges.  They want to reelect their judges.
Why?  Because they truly believe in the electoral process.
They believe that they have a right to select the individuals
who will be in office, whether it’s a judge or any other individ-
ual.  It doesn’t mean that it’s good.  It just means that they wish
to do it. . . .
JUDGE STEVE LEBEN:  I’m . . . from Kansas.  I’ve got a ques-
tion for Roy Schotland [about]  the judge from Miami that Jeff
Rosinek has discussed—who lost an election, who faced the
mayor in a divorce case, and faced comments about the Elian
case that really weren’t about that judge.  After the White deci-
sion, what would you suggest if you were speaking to that
judge, who was being attacked in an election, as to what was
permissible for him to say in his campaign and how to go
about it?
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: You need what Miami/Dade has
had—I don’t know where they were in this one—a campaign
conduct committee, the kind of thing I was talking about on
which David Rottman has that superb pamphlet on how to
start it and operate it.  You need the bar, and not just the bar.
The bar should initiate this, but it should include non-lawyers,
and they come out with a press conference and state [that] this
is not an appropriate bit of campaigning in a judicial election
and here’s why, and if you don’t have that, if the candidate is
there on his own, you’re in trouble.
JUDGE ROSINEK: Let me add to that, too.  The White case is
not quite in effect in the state of Florida because the Supreme
Court of Florida said that there’s a limitation on it, and we still
have that canon that says we really cannot speak directly to
certain issues.  In that case, it was not another opponent say-
ing these things.  It was an independent individual saying it.
So even if we had those political committees and the bar asso-
ciation, they can come out and say, well, this is incorrect, and
the judge should be able to say a few things, but it was not a
candidate who made these comments.  It was a former mayor,
who also lost in the election.
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: I wouldn’t underestimate the voters.
If you have a credible, highly respected group of leaders who
come together and say that doesn’t belong in our judicial cam-
paigns and our court system, I think it will make a difference.
You can’t do anything else. . . .
There are two more questions.  One is absolutely critical.
The judge mentioned the three incumbents who lost.  I men-
tioned earlier the uniquely important role of names in judicial
elections.  The three winners of those elections all had
Hispanic names.
For a second, the most important thing about Florida that
neither of us has said yet, but back in June, the unanimous
opinion of the high court of Florida, written and delivered by
Chief Justice Anstead, reprimanded a judge for improper cam-
paign conduct. . . . Chief Justice Anstead’s opinion is the best
thing ever written on judicial elections, and by “thing” I mean
opinion, article, speech, anything.
Now, yes, there may be something out there I’m just not
aware of, but I’ve been looking at these things for awhile and
that is just an absolutely golden bantering of the risk and the
opportunity that there is in judicial elections, so if you take
nothing else from our moment together here today, go look at
the full Florida Supreme Court opinion from last June10 and
just think of the beginning.
Judge Carmen Angel.  “The first matter of the new court’s
docket is a public reprimand of Judge Carmen Angel.  Judge
Angel, would you please approach the podium and remain
standing?”
And it ends, “Judge Angel, your public reprimand is now
concluded and you may leave.”
Just think of yourselves standing there and read this opin-
ion. . . .
JUDGE LEVINE:  I neglected to ask one question.  To what
extent can we as judges running for reelection or election fol-
low and carry out Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
and that is to engage in activities to improve the law, the legal
system, and the administration of justice?  How do we carry
that responsibility out? . . . .
JUDGE ROSINEK: I think by doing that which we do best:  that
we handle our positions professionally as judges, that we
respond to our communities as we add judges, and make deci-
sions based upon the law. I think Canon 3 is pretty relevant
for all of us that actually live in a courtroom and make deci-
sions.  I don’t think that we can hide from it.  I think we
shouldn’t hide from it.
I think there are a number of things.  Whether we’re called
activists or non-activists, I think we have to do what we deter-
mine to be best with an individual case and make the rulings
that we think are fair and proper.  We have an independent
judiciary, and if we are concerned about making comments
that others may not like, then our independence is taken away
by ourselves and so we can’t be fearful of what we say.
The worst thing that can happen is we lose an election.  So
what?  I mean it.  Ideally, so what?  The point is if we get up
there generally and make comments and make rulings based
upon reason and law, generally we’re not going to lose the elec-
tion, and all of you are examples of that. . . .
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: He says that so well.  I just want to
add that I think we need to get more serious and much more
organized about outreach.  We need to get Rottman to bring out
the pamphlet, for example, on what do we mean by judicial
activism?  We need to take issues about why are the judges’ jobs
different?  Why can’t you have ex parte contacts?  Why can’t
you make promises about what you’re going to do?  We need to
educate, and I start again with that superb Florida Supreme
Court opinion about judicial elections are an opportunity to
educate the bar and the public about the role of the courts.
JUDGE ROSINEK: Just one last comment.  In Sunday’s San
Francisco Chronicle, there was an article on judicial activism on
the docket at a Stanford event, and I’m going to quote Justice
Stephen Breyer, who said, “By judicial activism what you mean
in part is a judge who doesn’t decide the way I like it decided
and if that’s what you mean in part of an attack, then so be it.”11
We will never have a hundred percent.  You know when we
make decisions, 50 percent of the time we are going the wrong
way for somebody, and so we have to do what we think is right
and just, and if we’re to be guided by somebody’s else’s opin-
ion, then we should not be wearing those robes.
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The third panel discussion at the National Forum on Judicial
Independence explores the tension between setting up specialized,
problem-solving courts and maintaining judicial independence for
the judges assigned to such courts.  The discussion was led by
then-AJA president Michael R. McAdam, a judge on the Kansas
City (Mo.) Municipal Court. Panelists were Kevin S. Burke, a dis-
trict judge and past chief judge of the Hennepin County (Minn.)
District Court, and Mary Campbell McQueen, president of the
National Center for State Courts.  The National Forum on Judicial
Independence was supported by a generous grant from the Joyce
Foundation of Chicago, Illinois.
JUDGE MICHAEL McADAM: This was a topic that I wanted to
be particularly involved in as my background was to start off
as the Housing Court Judge of Kansas City, which was a newly
created position.  That position came about because of a char-
ter change in our city form of government that created a judge-
ship.  The underlying reason for the creation of that judgeship
was because our court . . . was rotating the housing court
docket amongst the then . . . seven judges, and there were sev-
eral that the constituency group that was heavily involved in
testifying and keeping an eye on neighborhood properties and
zoning violations . . . did not like in that rotation.  So they went
ahead and got a charter change, which is not unlike a consti-
tutional change, and created a permanent, but part-time, posi-
tion of Housing Court Judge so that it would be one person.
Now my guess is that when they did that, their idea was
they could then put pressure on that judge.  Now I can’t quote
anyone on that, but that’s kind of my speculation, and so what
was interesting was I had been previously the prosecutor 
prosecuting those cases, and so now it went through the
Missouri Plan of a selection of judges.  We had a panel of three,
I was one of them, and then the mayor and the city council
voted on the final judge and I was successful.
But as soon as I became the judge, obviously my relation-
ship with the constituency groups that I had been working
with previously as prosecutor was different, and it was trau-
matic, to say the least, to explain that I’m no longer in the role
you once thought of me as and I can no longer be in that role,
and so it became kind of an ongoing battle, to the point that
when there was a full-time position that opened up on our
bench, I immediately grabbed that and went to the full-time
position because it was a general ordinance violation docket
that doesn’t have any particular focus.
I’m no longer the Housing Court Judge, but I did it for three
years.  It was very interesting work, but there was that ele-
ment—and I didn’t have any formal thought about judicial
independence at that time—I just knew that it wouldn’t be
proper on an ethical basis to engage in the kind of activities
that a prosecutor can engage in once I became a judge.
So, with that background, let me introduce our two
esteemed panelists, and I mean that literally.  These are two
very dynamic people.  I am in awe of their talent and I will say
that probably more than once today, but I will say it for the first
time, at least.
Let’s start with Mary McQueen, the new President of the
National Center for State Courts.  Before that she was the State
Court Administrator for the state of Washington, responsible
for 175 employees, a budget of $105 million, and a very out-
spoken member of the Conference of State Court
Administrators . . . .   And then Judge Kevin Burke. Judge
Burke, as you know, is a member of AJA.  He’s also a member
of our Board of Governors.  He’s the Chief Judge of Hennepin
County District Court in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and he’s the
2003 recipient of the William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence. . . .
The format we’re going to use is I’m going to give each of
our two speakers, beginning with Kevin, five or ten minutes to
give opening remarks about this particular topic.  I do want to
point out that Kevin has two articles in the Court Review spe-
cial edition on judicial independence,1 so you can check out
both of those articles because I’m sure they will be coming up
as part of our discussion.
So with that I’ll turn it over to Kevin first and then after
that, Mary.
JUDGE KEVIN BURKE: A couple weeks ago my friend Mary
McQueen gave me a great opportunity.  She convinced me to
go to Beijing, China, to talk to Chinese judges about judicial
independence and accountability and their connection to the
community, and so I had a chance for four days to talk to a
large number of Chinese judges, and what really struck me
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there, and it is whatever transferable to the discussion we’re
here, what’s the appropriate connection to community?  How
responsive should the judiciary be to the community and yet
maintain their independence and accountability as a whole?
I think one of the things that plagues this discussion was
something I mentioned in one of the articles I wrote, and that
is the tyranny of the one or the other.  Too often we look at this
as either it’s one thing or the other, and I believe that the issue
of problem-solving courts, the issue of judicial independence,
and the issue of judicial accountability is very susceptible to 
. . . the tyranny of one or the other.  Courts need to be account-
able.  Courts need to be connected to the community.  That is
fundamentally how we preserve judicial independence.
We have had in our country a long history of problem-solv-
ing courts.  A hundred years ago, the juvenile courts were
established in Chicago.  We’ve had probate courts, family
courts, lots of different courts that have proven that you can
have an independent judiciary that solves people’s problems.
Last year there were over a hundred million cases that were
filed in the state courts of the United States.  There are only
about 27,000 of us who are judges dealing with those cases.
Surely with those numbers judges throughout the United States
need to be aggressive, willing to innovate, and willing to make
a difference to try to reduce the amount of litigation that we see.
I think one of the things that contributed to the perception
that problem-solving courts are an entanglement or a threat to
judicial independence in part is [that] although they were
well-intentioned, some advocates of problem-solving courts,
some advocates of drug courts, some advocates of domestic-
violence courts, have come across in such an evangelical fash-
ion that they turned some of our colleagues off.  That was
unfortunate.  It wasn’t necessary because I really do believe
that problem-solving courts fundamentally enhance the judi-
ciary’s ability to be independent.
What we heard this morning to begin with was a discussion
about budget, and in the 20 years that I’ve been on the bench,
you can’t go to a meeting in which judges won’t talk about
their concern that we don’t have enough money and we’re a
separate branch of government and they ought to adequately
fund us—and that’s true, but the fact of the matter is kids
ought to get an education and senior citizens ought to get
health care and a lot of other things that we compete with [in]
society to get the scarce resources that we need. 
I think fundamentally what problem-solving courts have
done is make the judiciary more responsive to a lot of our soci-
ety’s needs.  We’re a lot more effective with that.  So one prob-
lem I think was we oversold it internally and created this image
that it is a problem of judicial independence.
The second problem is real.  While it’s important that the
judiciary work with the other two branches of government,
some of the problem-solving courts came with strings that
really did conflict with a lot of the things most of us in the
room thought were important.  I’ll give you an example.  There
were probably 800 or 900 drug courts that were created around
the country, largely federally funded.  Many of those courts
were grant applications in which courts went into it, got the
federal grant, and then weren’t able to sustain it because the
grant application came with so many strings that when the fed-
eral money ran out, the court died.  That was a problem that
we should have anticipated.  The money was great, but the
strings were too tight to make it effective for us in the long
term.
If we’re going to be adequately funded, it is many times eas-
ier to get new funds for a new initiative than it is to put money
into your own base.  So the problem-solving courts are a good
opportunity to get additional money, but it is a problem in
terms of our courts being in a position to design your docket
based upon a grant application.  I think that is one of the areas
where the temptation to get the money sometimes overcomes
the judgment that most good judges have.
In the end, I think the answer to the question that was
posed is [that] problem-solving courts are no threat to judicial
independence.  They come from a long tradition of courts try-
ing to do well for people.
There’s a social scientist that many of you are aware of, Tom
Tyler.  Tyler’s research,2 I think, shows that problem-solving
courts in whatever fashion they come about are effective, but
Tyler says and what his research shows is almost all people,
almost all the hundred million people or hundred million cases
that come into the court, those people come into our court not
expecting to win.  They come in expecting to be listened to.
They come in expecting to leave the court understanding what
happened, understanding why the judge made that decision.
That is the common thread of all the problem-solving courts.
That message is important to maintain judicial indepen-
dence.  The reason that we advocate this is it is a means to an
end, not an end in itself.  Judicial independence ought to make
us more effective.  Problem-solving courts are a method of us
being more effective.  Problem-solving courts for the most part
have been places, in which in whatever form, dating back a
hundred years ago, people came in and felt like that judge lis-
tened to them and that they understood what happened and
why it happened when they left, and fundamentally the prob-
lem-solving courts in whatever fashion they had were judges
throughout the United States who demonstrated to litigants
who came before them that they cared about the people and the
issues that came before them.  Judicial independence is always
strengthened when people come in our courts and see judges
who care about the people who appear before them. . . .
MARY McQUEEN: Since I’m now removed from a state to a
commonwealth, I wanted to find out exactly what the found-
2. See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Tom
Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law,
30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003); Public Opinion of the Courts: How It
Has Been Formed and How We May Reshape It, COURT REVIEW, Fall
1999, at 46-53 (panel discussion including Tom Tyler).
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3. Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving
Approach, 22 YALE LAW & POL’Y REV. 125, 148-49 (2004).
ing fathers and mothers in Virginia thought about judicial
independence, and as you know, Thomas Jefferson hailed from
Virginia.  . . . I taught a course at Seattle University on judicial
administration—and as you know, Thomas Jefferson was not
always one of the most positive advocates for the judiciary.  But
in fact when the Constitutional Convention was gathered to
look at adopting the U.S. Constitution, there was a discussion,
and a lot of . . . that played itself out in the Federalist Papers,
about an independent judiciary, about the checks and balances,
and their experience at that time was that in the laboratory of
the states, . . . the judiciaries [had] become agencies or depart-
ments of the legislature. And Thomas Jefferson during the
Constitutional Convention spoke about the fact that gathering
all power into one branch, the legislature, was the extreme
example of despotic government.  So even Thomas Jefferson
recognized the need for an independent judiciary and then the
emerging republic.
Justice Cardozo commented that sometimes judges take
themselves altogether too seriously, that we need to find ways
to deal with the emerging issues brought before us and then
not worry so much that they won’t work themselves out.
I think Judge Burke has set a foundation for us to begin this
discussion about judicial independence in problem-solving
courts because how many of you at the end of the day want to
feel like you solved someone’s problem rather than resolving
another case?
Looking back on it, especially going through law school, I
think that’s what we always thought the judicial system was
about, was about solving problems.  I think as we move for-
ward, and I do believe and I agree with Judge Burke that it was
almost a marketing effort that we could go before legislators
and say, look, we’re going to solve this problem if you give us
this money and they could make that connection, and then it
was easier for us to get additional moneys for that specific pro-
ject, but really what we’re talking about here is judicial triage.
We can look to our emergency rooms and our colleagues in
the medical profession to say when an emergency case comes
in the door, they evaluate how best to deal with that problem,
that case, that patient, and I think problem-solving courts ele-
mentally are what is the best way to deal with these issues for
this person that has appeared before us.
Chief Justice Judith Kaye from the Court of Appeals in New
York wrote a law review article in the [Yale Law and Policy
Review] about problem-solving courts,3 and the way she tried
to define independence was basically whether or not the court
felt that it had the ability to make a fair and impartial decision:
Was there anything about the way that we had designed prob-
lem-solving courts that interfered with its ability to make a fair
and impartial decision?
Basically, if you look at what we think of as the general way
in resolving cases, it’s pretty much the same adversarial process
up until the sentencing phase, but we’ve used the ability of the
court to garner the services that have been needed to apply
them to the defendant’s case.  It’s not unlike what we’ve seen
courts be able to do, whether it’s in pro bono support or Legal
Aid or in trying to apply the impact [of] the court to make sure
that the advice of rights is given or that we have interpreters.
So if we look at the position that prosecutors and public
defenders and the Conference of Chief Justices and State Court
Administrators have taken, they in fact have endorsed—and
defendants have continued to participate in—these problem-
solving courts as direct evidence that they think that it has cre-
ated a fair and impartial forum.  So if we define independence
as a fair and impartial forum, I don’t believe that the problem-
solving courts have resulted in an intrusion on judicial inde-
pendence, and that’s the independence to make that particular
decision in that particular case.
I think you heard Michael Buenger this morning talk about
institutional versus individual independence to make deci-
sions.  I would like to comment, however, on the institutional
side, and I think Judge Burke began to comment about the
strings that were attached to funding.
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[P]eople come into our court not expecting to
win. They come in expecting to be listened to.
They come in expecting to leave the court
understanding what happened, understanding
why the judge made that decision. That is the
common thread of all the problem-solving
courts.
– Kevin S. Burke
In Washington State when we had the recession and the
downturn into the economy, the issue wasn’t whether or not
we could get additional money for new courts.  The discussion
formed around, “What are the core functions of the court?”
And mental-health courts or drug courts or DUI courts or uni-
fied family courts were [said] not [to be] core functions of the
court and so therefore shouldn’t be funded.
So if we look at the ability of the individual court to deter-
mine how to handle dedicated dockets or triage cases, that is a
threat on independence, and I think we have to change the dis-
cussion to move from the boutique court or the specialty court
to a discussion of judicial triage and dedicated dockets.
I think Alexander Hamilton said it in Federalist 7, that
nothing contributes more to the public’s respect and esteem for
government than the effective administration of justice, and it’s
that public trust and confidence that judges can bring about
and garner to ensure that the services that are necessary to cut
through the cycle, whether it be of family or of domestic vio-
lence or of drug abuse, will be applied.
It’s no different than the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Miranda. Sometimes it takes a judge and the influence of the
court to ensure that the resources that are necessary are
applied, and I believe that that’s what problem-solving courts
have done.
I think one of the challenges that we have is because prob-
lem-solving courts do garner the interest of the public.
Sometimes I know that my former Chief Justice in Washington
really felt good about being asked to attend drug-court gradu-
ations, and I think what we have to caution ourselves against
is cutting into the core funds for the court that would then be
dedicated by a funding agency rather than obtain additional
funds for additional services.
I also believe that as we’re moving forward to establish the
elements of a problem-solving court, we have to ensure that all
the judges on the bench appreciate the direction that we’re
going because I think that sometimes we’re our own worst ene-
mies, that somehow the judge that is on the problem-solving
court is viewed by her or his colleagues as getting more
resources or getting more public attention, and there has to be
an ability for everyone to see the importance and the improve-
ment in the entire administration of justice, rather than it
being seen as an individual judge’s special advocacy or issue.
In looking at the public’s reaction to problem-solving
courts, the National Center for State Courts . . . conducted a
public opinion poll.  Resoundingly when you ask questions
about the types of services that problem-solving courts pro-
vide, there was overwhelming support on the part of the pub-
lic that, yes, courts should be providing these services, and it
increases almost by 20 points if you’re asking African-
American defendants or Hispanic defendants because you are
the face of justice and the courts are where the defendants look
for an open and fair forum.
So when we’re talking about accountability, the cautions
that we’ve already heard are:  Is there a balance between
accountability and independence?  I noticed that you’ll have a
panel that will talk more directly on that later, but I think that
the accountability issue in looking at problem-solving courts,
the measure people want to use is recidivism, and I think we
have to be very cautious of that.
We don’t have to look more recently than when we first
started pretrial diversion programs to know that in the first
four or five years the recidivism rates look great, but then they
tend to start a downturn.  Well, it’s just mathematical.  The big-
ger the pool, the more opportunity that recidivism is going to
have to affect what looked like a 90% success rate.  But I think
the evidence that we’ve seen still supports the adoption of the
elements of problem-solving courts across the lines for all
types of courts.
The final thing that I wanted to mention that I don’t think
is a problem, but that when you’re having discussions about
problem-solving courts gets raised, are issues of judicial ethics,
and specifically that somehow when you participate with advo-
cacy groups and social service groups, does that somehow raise
an issue under Canon 3 about ex parte communications?
The ABA now, in reviewing the model Code of Judicial
Conduct, is specifically addressing that issue.  I think with a
close reading of Canon 3 it is not a concern because it says “ex
parte communications otherwise provided by law,” so if in fact
there is a court rule or a statute or a local ordinance that is
establishing a problem-solving court, I think that we can work
closely with the legislative branch of government to ensure
that those types of interactions are “authorized by law,” so I
don’t think that there’s any attack on judicial independence or
judicial conduct from that area.
And the final thing I just wanted to mention was that I think
that the central goal of the judiciary is to speak with one voice.
My colleagues here from Washington, that’s not a new mantra.
They heard that from me for 25 years.  But I think that when
we speak as individual judges and we speak as individual court
levels, it’s not in the best interest of the judiciary because the
legislature when finding a vacuum will fill it, and I think the
American Judges Association is that place for us to speak with
one voice.  Thank you.
JUDGE McADAM: Very good, Mary, and I agree a hundred per-
cent with your final comment that the AJA needs to take up
this challenge and fill that void, because it’s certainly being
filled whether we do it or not, and we may not like the result
that we get if we don’t step up and get involved in this issue.
I have a question that I wanted to ask that was based on
what Mary was saying because it’s . . . almost changed my
thinking about this.
Kevin, tell me, do you think that problem-solving courts are
like the magic bullet?  I mean they respond to community
needs as we’ve heard they do, and I think they do; they’re
favored by funders and budget types, legislators and executives
alike; and they’re an efficacious way to handle our dockets, our
caseloads, certainly in certain kinds of cases, anyway. Have we
discovered the magic bullet?
JUDGE BURKE: I don’t think that there is a magic bullet.  I don’t
think that there’s a magic way to deal with an assignment sys-
tem of judges and so it seems to me a natural extension of that
to say problem-solving courts are important, but it’s not the
most important thing that’s on in judicial administration.
I think one of the difficulties is if you look at the problem-
solving courts around the country, they’re all different.  For
example, I mentioned the drug courts.  If you look around at
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the evaluations, what do we know about them? One, there was
a cottage industry of people who were evaluating them.  They
were almost all different.  A lot of them had screenings on who
could get in and some of them were really narrow so that only
Mother Teresa who was caught with a small amount of mari-
juana could get in—and surprisingly enough, she was success-
ful—and then there was another group that did other kinds of
things.
So I’ve been trying to think about what made them uniquely
successful at the time, and I think it comes down to this.  The
judges initially who went into the drug courts were not afraid
to exhibit to the defendants that they cared about them.
Neutrality is really important for the judiciary, but it’s not the
same as saying that you don’t care about people and I think too
often judges, in their understandable desire to be neutral, have
masked that they care about the people who appear before
them.
Secondly, I think the atmosphere and awe of the drug courts
and all the other problem-solving courts that initially were
quite successful is that they were by design a place in which the
judges put a premium on listening to what the defendant had to
say and making the defendant believe that you were really lis-
tening to them, so their atmosphere was a little different.
I think the third factor was that there was a premium in the
problem-solving courts that the people who left those courts
understood why we made those decisions.  Those principles
apply in every area of practice that courts have, and so if we
could just take the lessons from problem-solving courts and
say my court, whether it’s designated as problem solving or
not, is a place in which people will be listened to and people
will leave my court understanding why I made that decision,
we will be a lot more successful.
And then the point that I made which I will repeat:  I think
neutrality is really important.  Don’t misunderstand what I’m
saying.  But being neutral doesn’t mean that you don’t care, and
I think that there have been instances in which judges have
been afraid to show the community that they care about the
problems that appear before them.
MS. McQUEEN: I would just add one element to that, and I
think it’s defendant accountability.  I think that one of the
aspects also of the judges that participated in the early prob-
lem-solving courts is they held defendants personally account-
able.  It wasn’t that you showed up for one judge for a pretrial
motion and another judge for the plea and then a final judge if
there was some kind of revocation.  There was an individual
judge who showed an individual interest, as Judge Burke said,
and we’ve had a lot of research on settlement conferencing and
whether or not settlement conferences are effective or not, and
we know because of judicial involvement that they are, so I
would say that one of the other aspects of problem-solving
courts is that sense that there’s judicial follow-up.
JUDGE McADAM: A question from the floor.
JUDGE MARK FARRELL:  Judge Mark Farrell from the
Buffalo, New York, area.  I’ve been running a drug court for the
past eight years and a domestic-violence court for six and now
a gambling court for two years, and one of the things I would
agree with the judge’s comments about is the fact that initially
when these courts were formulated and brought about, they
were brought about with an element of china-breaking and cre-
ativity and spontaneity, which I’m going to pose the question
as to whether the tenor of problem-solving courts now has
changed since judicial bureaucracy has overlaid them and now
we have bureaus of people at state levels saying, well, you can’t
graduate someone from drug court until they do X, Y, and Z,
and we now have standards and goals as to what they are. . . .
But the concern I have after running these for eight years
and being involved in a number of different areas is that the
judicial independence is sponsored and fostered more by
allowing the judges to be creative without an excessive amount
of bureaucratic overlay, and I just would like your response.
MS. McQUEEN: I agree a hundred percent.  I think that that’s
why when I talk about judicial triage, I think that it’s the attend-
ing physician who evaluates that client when they come into
the emergency room, and I absolutely think that that is the one
thread on problem-solving courts and judicial independence
that are, I guess, barriers that are established by these funding
bodies and/or legislative, either state or local, on entrance or
exit criteria, and so I think that’s why when I talk about prob-
lem-solving courts, I’ve tried to—and I think Chief Justice Kaye
has as well—tried to move the discussion away from boutique
or specialty courts to more of a discussion about the way that
we do business and hold us accountable for the way that we do
business and let the laboratories of the trial courts and the state
courts find the best way to deal with these defendants.
JUDGE BURKE: I, too, agree with you.  I think that one of the
problems that we have had, though, in problem-solving courts
is our reluctance to figure out how we are going to measure or
hold ourselves accountable, and that becomes difficult.
I’ll give you my experience in our drug court.  We did not
say that our goal was abstinence.  We said we were going to
reduce drug usage, and the reason that we said that is ours was
largely a crack cocaine court.  If you take a crack cocaine
addict of ten years and get them simply to smoke marijuana, is
that failure or progress?  I think that you can make an argu-
ment it’s progress.
So I think some of the difficulty for people who are in the
trenches like I think you and I have been is that we recognize
that that’s progress or we believe it’s progress, and I think if you
look in drug courts 29% of the people who go to Hazelden,
which is one of the premier drug programs in the country, are
there on their fifth admission.  So the difficulty, it seems to me,
for people who are doing drug courts is that if 29% of the peo-
ple can go to Hazelden for their fifth time, then three strikes
and you’re out of my drug court doesn’t quite work.
I would go back for the comment I made before, though, to
say that there should be some universal measures of program
effectiveness.  I believe that no matter what court you have,
you ought to be able to measure and assess whether or not peo-
ple felt like they were being listened to and that when they left,
they understood what was going on.
I think that is what Mary indicated:  People only being held
accountable.  For the most part, the problem-solving judges
were good, if not great, at making sure that people understood
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what the expectations were and that the expectations were, by
and large, reasonable.
MS. McQUEEN: I would add one thing because I know that in
every panel that we’ve heard today, I think the “A” word has
come up, accountability.  I would, if I could take a moment,
put in a paid political announcement.  Ncsconline.org is the
National Center’s website, and the National Center has done
an excellent job on developing workload measures as well as
trial performance standards. . . . 
[W]hen I was working in Washington State, we had a pilot
project of unified family courts, basically one judge/one family
but trying to pull together dependency/juvenile-delinquency/
family-violence issues under one judge, and so the discussion
there was what do we measure?
Well, the ability for the judge to have better information to
apply when making that decision I think is a valid measure of
success and I don’t think that we should back away from the
court system establishing what we think the measures of suc-
cess are.
JUDGE McADAM: Any other questions?  
JUDGE RICHARD KAYNE:  Richard Kayne.  I’m a municipal
court judge from eastern Washington, and I have a question for
Mary.  I will preface it by saying Washington State’s loss is the
National Center’s gain, and this is not a parochial question to
Washington State, but in addressing the lack of state funding
for trial courts in the state of Washington, especially courts of
limited jurisdiction, Washington State is, through the court-
funding task force, seemingly trading court reform or nominal
court reform for funding, and it seems to Washington State
judges that we’ll probably get nominal court reform, but no
funding, and it will result in a great deal of centralization.
Mary, do you think that this trend will limit the ability of
courts to innovate in areas that we’re talking about now?
MS. McQUEEN: I think it makes a difference in the definition
of centralization, and you’ve worked with me long enough to
know that my position on that is that the role of the judicial
counselor of the supreme court is to provide the trial court
with the tools they need, not to direct how they do their work.
I know that there’s been a lot of discussion over the years
about court reform and the trial-court-funding task force in
Washington.  Washington, by the way, is fiftieth out of all 50
states in the amount of money that the legislature provides for
the trial courts.  It’s basically a locally funded system and I say
that to preface my response.  So when we were talking to leg-
islators about what the nexus is between the state’s interest and
what goes on in the trial court, it was kind of like what’s going
to change?  Is there going to be major judicial reform?
Well, those of you who have been visionaries in looking at
unified court systems were, I guess, the testing ground for
those of us who came later to look at that, but all the efficien-
cies that have been gained, I think, in unification have been
through the consolidation of administration, not through the
change in subject-matter jurisdiction.  So I think at least what
I know is going on in Washington at this point in time is that
there is probably going to be effort to look at consolidation of
the administration, which I don’t think will interfere with an
individual judge’s ability to develop and handle the way that
they would handle cases, but probably not a consolidation of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
JUDGE McADAM: Any other questions from the audience?  
JUDGE DARVIN ZIMMERMAN:  Darvin Zimmerman from
Clark County, Washington.  That’s across the river from
Portland, Oregon.
I was wondering how many jurisdictions have problem-
solving courts.  In Clark County we have a domestic-violence
court; we have a substance-abuse court and a substance-abuse
judge; we have the mental-health court, sort of a newer court;
and we have a homeless court.  With five judges it gets a little
bit tough to run all those courts and those on specialty dock-
ets like for non-support [of children].  With so many other sta-
tistics, I’m wondering how many or what jurisdictions or what
percentage jurisdictions in the United States or whatever actu-
ally have problem-solving courts, is my question.
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Resoundingly, when you ask questions about
the types of services that problem-solving
courts provide, there was overwhelming 
support on the part of the public that, yes,
courts should be providing those services . . .
because you are the face of justice and the
courts are where defendants look for an open
and fair forum.
– Mary Campbell McQueen
JUDGE BURKE: The National Center would know that.  I guess
my flippant answer, and it’s not actually that flippant, is I don’t
think there’s probably a court in the country that doesn’t have
some form of a problem-solving court.  If you start with juve-
nile court[, which] was originally identified as a problem-solv-
ing court, there is one of those everyplace in some form.
There’s a family court in some form all around the United
States.  There are then a lot of the smaller things that you have
mentioned, homeless courts and mental-health courts and
drug courts, and to a certain extent even probate court is a
problem-solving court for the recently passed, so my guess is
that there probably is no court that isn’t.  I think that some part
is just the rhetoric has taken over. . . . 
JUDGE McADAM: Next question, front row.
JUDGE SAMUEL LEVINE:  [Samuel Levine, Nassau County,
New York.]  I was very involved in disability law before going
on the bench and my question to the panel is shouldn’t every
judge in every courtroom be a problem-solving judge, espe-
cially on the criminal side?  Whether it’s an arraignment and
you see that there’s a health-related problem, shouldn’t you be
ordering some health treatment when they get over to the jail,
and especially in the sentence where you’re asking your proba-
tion department not only for recommendations about punish-
ment?  [B]ut I’ve had the experience of asking for a treatment
plan as to what will be done while they’re incarcerated or when
they get on the street, how are they going to be corrected in
their health-related problems?
MS. McQUEEN: Couldn’t say it any better.
JUDGE McADAM: When we had the conference call for this
committee, one of the things I pointed out was that I don’t
really see the difference between what I do as a judge in what
is called the general docket, the limited jurisdiction docket
in a city, and these particular modalities of treatment and
identification of what the course of action should be taken
with any one individual person.  I mean we’re relying on
probation reports.  We’re relying on providers to let us know
if someone has failed and why and we have to deal with why
that is.  We find out from family members who may attend
court that there are problems and elements that we didn’t
know about.
I mean these are not new skills that we’re learning here, I
don’t think, and I agree.  I think this is something that we don’t
recognize as being what we’ve always done in the past because
it has this label of problem-solving courts.  It sounds like it’s
something new and different even though, as Judge Burke
pointed out, we’ve had juvenile courts for a hundred years
now. . . .
JUDGE RAYMOND PIANKA:  I’m Ray Pianka from the
Cleveland Municipal Court Housing Division and we were set
up in 1980 as a specialized court by an act of the state legisla-
ture, and so we handle all the housing-type issues/health issues
in the city of Cleveland.  There’s 13 judges on the municipal
court, but I just handle the housing docket.
It’s interesting on judicial independence if you go on the
City of Cleveland website, “Community Relations,” they’ve set
up a program called “Court Watch,” which if you go into that
section, it says send criminals and judges a message that you
won’t tolerate crime in your neighborhood and join Court
Watch to come and watch the judges in the courtroom.
I have been on the bench about eight years, and so I’ve
taken that as a challenge to turn things around, and those peo-
ple who are court watchers, we have trained court watchers so
once they get in a courtroom, they know what they’re watch-
ing and they know what the judge is doing.
Then every quarter I meet with code-enforcement advo-
cates, those people who want their neighborhoods to be
upgraded through code enforcement, just to talk about in an
informal way what the state of the art is in code enforcement.
I handle about 16,000 cases a year—6,000 criminal, 10,000
civil in the housing court—and one of the things, there are
only three courts in the state of Ohio that have housing/health-
type jurisdictions, and it would be helpful if the [National]
Center for State Courts could help weave together those type
of courts throughout the state and then also the municipal
courts.  Each municipal court has a docket that handles 
housing-type issues.  It’s not the favorite part of most judges’
dockets.  In fact, I go to judicial conferences and they say,
“Well, you’re with rat court,” and of course I specialize in a
type of rats.  In fact, I have a video program on how to keep
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out of housing court, one of them devoted to rodent infesta-
tion, so it plays about six times a week on access video.
So trying to weave together these specialized dockets for peo-
ple that may have problems with them and also talk about state
of the art, vacant abandoned property, foreclosed property, all
those type of issues that are of importance to cities and even sub-
urban and rural areas, I think would be helpful, but identifying
the people that are involved would also be helpful, so maybe the
[National] Center for State Courts might be of assistance.
MS. McQUEEN: I think one of the things that I’ve seen that has
changed, too, is that in the past where we were kind of look-
ing at a pyramid with the court sitting up here and then, you
know, different layers down, starting maybe with social service
agencies and prosecutors and public defenders, now you have
more of a wheel where the judiciary is in the middle and we’re
almost the air traffic controller trying to coordinate all these
partners in the process, and I think housing courts have been
an excellent example of that.
Even when I talk to judges who [work in] mental-health
courts, housing is a very important issue in helping the defen-
dants in those cases develop a treatment plan.  In Washington,
the new issue that I found kind of interesting that the legisla-
ture adopted as a problem-solving court is water courts.  Now
there’s legislation being considered of creating a water court.
So I think that part of it is accountability, I think part of it
is people wanting to see that there’s actually some benefit for
the dollars that are spent, but given the issues that Judge Burke
and most of you have identified, I think it can be balanced
within an independent judiciary.
JUDGE JAY DILWORTH:  I’m Jay Dilworth, of Reno, Nevada.
We have the municipal court and we also have a fund for three
counties for a drug court.
I have two things that concern me.  They aren’t really ques-
tions.  They’re concerns.  One, I don’t see myself as solving
somebody’s problems.  In fact, I wrote that down here.  I do not
solve problems.  I try to provide tools so somebody else can
solve their own problem because if I solve the problem, that’s
easy, but then it will come back to me again when we have new
problems.
And the other is, as you spoke of before, a lot of folks go
through treatment five times.  We can’t give up on them.  At
the same time, we have an offender who continues to buy [ille-
gal drugs] and I can’t say, “Well, okay, go back to drug court
and just do better.”  At some point I have to say, “I don’t care
about drug court anymore.  You’re going to jail because you
continue to violate the law.”
We have a felony drug court and they get around it by . . . no
longer . . . doing cocaine.  They’re smoking marijuana or they’re
doing methamphetamines or something like that.  They’re still
dealing on the streets and as soon as they get arrested [say,]
“Well, I’m in drug court and I go to see Judge Williams.”
And I say, “No, you don’t.  You go to jail.”
And so I have this problem with how many times do you
give a person a chance.  At some point I have to say, “No.  I
don’t care.  Jail won’t help you, but I’m going to do it.”
And the other is I don’t see myself as solving somebody
else’s problem.  I just put out tools that they can possibly use.
JUDGE BURKE: Let me try to answer real quickly.  I actually
respectfully disagree with part of what you say.  Let’s take fam-
ily law as an example.  A judge who is effective in dealing with
a family who is going to reorganize themselves by getting
divorced is not encouraging them to enjoy the experience and
come back for a second divorce, and so I do think that judges
can end up doing things to people in the family-court example
that will prohibit them or discourage them from coming back
again, so I think that there are instances in which undeniably
judges are in a position to help people solve their problems.
The second thing is you’re right:  You’ve got to hold people
accountable.  The drug offender is a very good example.  On
the other hand, almost all states look at intervention for treat-
ment and use the least expensive intervention that they can,
and so as between putting somebody in outpatient treatment
or letting them quit on their own, they say quit on your own.
As between outpatient and inpatient, they say outpatient.
When that doesn’t work, no one holds the assessor account-
able and says to the defendant, “Well, we’re going to hold you
accountable and put you in jail.”  That may be appropriate, but
I do think that there are public policies that have contributed
to people’s inability to get straight.
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Footnotes
1. John Russonello, Speak to Values: How to Promote the Courts and
Blunt Attacks on the Judiciary, COURT REVIEW, Summer 2004, at 10.
The fourth panel discussion at the National Forum on Judicial
Independence explores the way the public thinks about judicial
independence and ways in which the media and members of the
bar may affect judicial independence.  The discussion was led by
then-AJA secretary Steve Leben, a state general-jurisdiction trial
judge from Kansas.  Panelists were John Russonello, a pollster and
consultant to nonprofit organizations, political campaigns, and
other clients, and Malcolm Feeley, professor at the Boalt Hall
School of Law at the University of California-Berkeley. The
National Forum on Judicial Independence was supported by a gen-
erous grant from the Joyce Foundation of Chicago, Illinois.
JUDGE STEVE LEBEN: John Russonello and Malcolm Feeley are
going to talk about the ways in which the public can be mobi-
lized to assist us in preserving judicial independence and the
ways in which the public may have different views than we do.
They will also talk about ways in which the organized bar may
be either a help or a hindrance to the goal of judicial indepen-
dence. . . .
In the [Summer 2004] Court Review, there’s a short article
by John Russonello with some of his thoughts about public
opinion and the courts. . . .1 We want to start off with John
Russonello telling you some of his thoughts from the various
polling he’s done and the focus groups he’s done over the years
about the way in which the public thinks about judicial inde-
pendence. 
MR. JOHN RUSSONELLO: This panel I noticed in the program
is entitled “Friends of the Court? The Bar, the Media and
Public.”  Well, I don’t know much about the bar because my
practice is in public opinion, but I know something about the
public and the press, and one might say that they’re fair-
weather friends.  You might say that their attitudes are situa-
tional rather than faith-based in the coming message.
So if they are situational as opposed to faith-based, the ques-
tion is how do we meet the public and the press and cross that
river of skepticism and doubt onto the other side of trusting
the courts and having faith in the courts?
Well, one thing that we should establish right off the bat,
and that is no matter what we do, there’s nothing we can do to
avoid rulings that will create hurt feelings and heated debate.
It’s just the nature of the courts and what you all have to deal
with every day, but there are steps that the courts can take,
court advocates can take, to minimize the impact that contro-
versies have on long-term attitudes toward the courts.
Where are most Americans on the courts?  Most of the pub-
lic doesn’t follow the day-to-day workings of the courts, but
they hold a basic understanding of how the system should
work.  For instance, most cannot recite the Constitution, but
they know that the Constitution protects their rights and they
know that the courts protect the Constitution.  They know
what their rights are.  They can’t tell you who Miranda was, but
they can tell you what the police officer has to say to you if you
get arrested.
A lot of this comes from popular culture.  Americans have
been taking weekly courses in kind of court procedure, you
might say, civics lessons in the judicial system, by watching
television from shows as far back as the FBI with Efrem
Zimbalist, Jr., to Hill Street Blues to Law and Order. When I do
focus groups with people about the courts, those are the things
they recite.
They also recite things like the woman who burned herself
on McDonald’s coffee as the reason why lawsuits are out of
control, but that’s a whole ’nother topic.
The public generally has favorable attitudes for the courts
despite all the criticisms.  When you ask them favorable or
unfavorable, it’s consistently favorable, so it’s positive.  They
have positive expectations, but they have a lot of ignorance
and distress as well.
For instance, a survey of ours in Pennsylvania recently
showed that in a state that elects its judges, 69% of the public
either believes that the state judges are appointed or don’t
know, and nationally, where federal judges are appointed, 55%
of the public believes judges are elected or don’t know.
Attitudes are grounded in four values.  By values I mean the
core beliefs that are rock bottom and determine our attitudes
and our behavior and everything that we do.  There are a lim-
ited number of values that really motivate people and on
courts there are four:  Fairness, we’ve heard a lot of about that
today; independence, obviously; accountability; and adherence
to community norms.
Those are the four values that come up over and over again
as the foundation of how people form their attitudes about the
courts, and as you know, these altitudes conflict from time to
time.  People say judicial independence is important and they
need it.  Sixty-eight percent say that federal judges should only
consider the Constitution and the facts of a case without any—
the word “any” was put in the question—any attention to pub-
lic opinion.  That’s 68%, but we know that when a controver-
sial case comes up, the dedication to principle which I just out-
36 Court Review - Fall/Winter 2005 
Friends of the Court?
The Bar, the Media, and the Public
Steve Leben, John Russonello, and Malcolm Feeley
[ P A N E L
 
lined, that principle of independence, sometimes bends to the
application of independence, and you’ve got many instances,
I’m sure, to attest to that.
These values conflict often.  People want accountability.
They want independence, but they also want accountability.
How do they resolve that?  Well, it’s hard.  Seven in ten oppose
lifetime appointments.  They tell us they oppose lifetime
appointments because they think there’s not enough remedies
for correcting bad decisions by judges.  The majority say that.
The majority also says that lifetime appointments will result in
judges who are out of touch with the world of people.  Sixty-
one percent nationally say that judges’ decisions are more
likely to reflect their personal political views than independent
judgment.
Critics of the judiciary play on these attitudes, play on these
public sentiments of judges not being fair and not being
responsive to national norms.  These turned into criticisms, so-
called liberal judges or activist judges.  Our research suggests
that these labels stick and can do damage if they’re not coun-
tered with another point of view.
That other point of view—to bolster public appreciation for
the judicial system—should have four basic elements.  First,
the public must hear a constant drumming of messages from
court advocates about how the courts defend the rights of all
Americans.  It’s not about judges.  It’s about the rights of peo-
ple, which is why people think the courts are valuable.
I’d ask you to pretend that the courts are a candidate—not
judges—but pretend the courts as an institution are a candi-
date and you’re all political consultants now and you’ve got to
figure out how to present that candidate in a way that has
meaning and value to people.  Why is your candidate more
qualified than his or her opponent?
With the courts it would be stories of individuals.  This is
what you would put on the air for your candidate:  individuals
who have been wronged by big institutions—government,
industry, business—who use the courts as the last resort for
justice.  Stories of an elderly woman getting her right to stay in
her apartment; the veteran using the court to obtain health
care that was denied by government bureaucrats; communities
like Woburn, Massachusetts, or Anniston, Alabama, who held
corporations accountable for the poisons dumped on their
ground, to actions that prevent the same things from happen-
ing to other communities.  These are the type of affirmative
cases and stories that make the case to fairly defend the courts.
The second element of the four is to make your stories con-
temporary.  We do a lot of work for the civil-rights community,
and they’re always wanting to harken back to Brown v. Board of
Education and other important milestones in the civil-rights
struggle and other areas.  Americans remember historical allu-
sions, but we’re a society that believes that things are con-
stantly changing and that yesterday’s solutions should not be
expected to fit today’s problems.  Using historical references
doesn’t usually connect with the public.
Third, and this is a tough one to say to this crowd, always
remember that your cause is not to defend judges, but to
strengthen the faith in the courts.  The public’s point of
salience is that the courts defend individual rights.  That’s why
you’re important.  Protecting the institution that’s the defender
of rights is more important than focusing on individual judges.
And, fourth, we found in our polling that building long-term
public support for a strong judiciary will require a better
informed public.  In our research we’ve done a lot of questions
of people over the years and running through different statisti-
cal analyses, and we found that the correlation between
strongly supporting the courts in the face of attacks and knowl-
edge of the courts is very high.  Having an understanding of the
role of precedents, appeals, constitutional review, and other
aspects of the courts reinforces an appreciation for the courts
and their role as guardian and protector of individual rights.
These things can be woven into programs by state judges
associations, state bar associations, civil-rights organizations,
and other organizations.  If we tell the stories of courts as
champions of fairness, they can only be fair if they’re indepen-
dent.  This will not prevent individuals or interest groups from
protesting specific decisions or vilifying specific judges.  What
I said at the outset will always be true.  You’ll always get criti-
cized.  You’ll always get hit.  These four elements aren’t going
to protect you from that, but they will provide a more informed
public that will see more clearly how the system benefits them
that will withstand the courses in the future. . . .
JUDGE LEBEN: . . . John Russonello has given you a view on
how to improve public respect for an independent judiciary as
seen from someone who has been a political consultant and
who works now in polling and focus-group research and works
as a consultant to a variety of organizations.
For a different perspective on the same idea, what’s neces-
sary for [a] public support system of judicial independence,
Professor Feeley will discuss things that are related to what’s
important in a society and what’s important in a governmental
system. . . .
PROFESSOR MALCOLM FEELEY: . . . I want to explore with you
or share with you a problem that I’ve been puzzling over for the
past several years and then my tentative solution to the problem
that is posed.  For the past 20 years, 25, 30 years, I’ve been writ-
ing books about folks like you.  I’ve been teaching at the
National Judicial College in the master [of] judicial studies pro-
gram up at Reno. . . . I know what you think.  I know how you’re
selected.  I’ve watched you in benches across the country.
Now, for the past 20 years I’ve been going to Japan on and
off a number of times.  I’ve spent time sitting on the bench.  I
haven’t understood much, but I haven’t understood much
when I’ve been sitting in your courtrooms as well.
I’ve talked to prosecutors, defense attorneys giving talks to
the bar in Japan, and learned something about the Japanese
judiciary as well as here.
Here’s the problem:  Japanese judges are selected by vigor-
ous competition.  Only 3 percent of the people that take the
state-sponsored bar exam pass it.  Out of that tiny group, only
the best and the brightest are selected for the two-year intern-
ship in the judicial school run by the Supreme Court of Japan.
Some of those are weeded out.  So it’s a highly selective, pro-
fessional, merit-based judiciary, the best and the brightest
across.  It’s well paid—better than you all, by and large—and
high prestige—better than you, by and large.  It is the ideal
judiciary:  well paid, high prestige, merit selection or profes-
sional career advancement, and the like.
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You all know what your prior backgrounds were, you all
know how much training you got between the day you were
selected to be a judge and you put on that black robe, so it’s a
world of difference.
Well, here’s my problem.  Why is it?  Why is it do I think
that American state, not federal, but state trial court judges are
more independent than Japanese judges given everything I’ve
said about it?  I do think that, and then I set about trying to
convince myself or explain.  I came to the conclusion first and
then I wanted to work backwards and figure out why that was
the case, and I want to share with you some of my tentative
thoughts. . . . 
I think we can understand a lot about us if we know some-
thing about them.  We can see us clearly in contrast to them,
so I think the comparative enterprise is useful, but let me iden-
tify some things.  I’m going to dramatically simplify, but bear
with me.
Let me suggest that there are two types of law.  I mean
there’s a variety, but let me identify two polar opposites.  One
I’ll call bureaucratic law.  The term “bureaucratic” gives part
of what I want to convey.  Its distinctive features are the
source of the law is the state and the cast of the judge is to
apply the rules.  There’s limited discretion, there’s . . . a high
degree of effort to maintain consistency, procedural regularity
is important, and judges can even be selected and trained to
be able to follow in this tradition.  They can be like profes-
sionalized civil servants, as it were.  Independence can be
maintained as bureaucrats everywhere maintain indepen-
dence, keeping their eyes averted and their nose to the paper
in front of them and narrowing their horizons, crossing the T’s
and dotting the I’s and hoping that controversy will sail over
their head.  So that’s one view of law.  It’s a very common view
of law.  It’s a view of law that begins to look a little bit like law
in Japan.
Now the challenges to this, of course, are the converse.  If
there’s limited discretion and procedure is paramount, that
means there’s not a lot of discretion, there’s not a lot of auton-
omy to move and adjust and, in the terms of the previous
panel, solve problems.  One is bounded by the rules, as it were.
Secondly, it fosters a type of civil-service-like mentality that is
not especially creative and it emphasizes procedure over sub-
stance.  In short, it’s not a very creative and not a very exciting
enterprise, although we all value bureaucracy and see the val-
ues of those sorts of things in a lot of ways.
Let me contrast that with another view of law and I think
you’ll begin to recognize this.  I call it, because I steal from a
colleague, I call that responsive law.  Let me identify some of
the distinguishing features.  
First, the sources of law.  [I]n bureaucratic law, the source
of law is the state:  If the legislature passes it, my job is to
enforce it, to apply the rules.
In responsive law, the source of law can be vague.  It can be
the state, obviously, but it can be general principles.  It can be
natural law.  It can be aspirations, constitutional aspirations.  It
can be one’s fidelity to a sense of justice that is more than the
sum total of all the rules.  It’s a vague or an ambitious enter-
prise, but it suggests that law is something more than the
subtotal of those rules passed by the state.  It’s anchored out
there somewhere.  You’ll remember this from civics lessons in
undergraduate days if nothing else.
This view of law also embraces the discretion of judges.  It
suggests that the judges should be responsive not only to the
rules, but to the sense of justice that is behind those rules that
gives them a fair degree of flexibility and some discretion, at
least invites that.  It invites a concern with the effectiveness of
outcome.  In the previous panel, we heard problem solving.
Responsive law generally and I think the common-law tradi-
tion, certainly the American common-law tradition, invites
problem solving and concerns with outcome and substance
and effectiveness in a variety of ways.  The function of the law
is not to apply the rules narrowly, but to fulfill aspirations.
Now these two are not mutually exclusive, and I don’t mean to
suggest they are.
It also suggests that judges, courts—and I like John’s
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emphasis on courts rather than judges, the individual judges—
the institution of the judiciary more generally, I’m saying the
institution of law, is designed to reflect in some way and cap-
ture and express and give substance and meaning to social val-
ues, so law is consistently changing in a variety of ways.
Now the problem, the challenge of responsive law, strikes
me as this:  If it embraces expansive aspirations and identifies
substantive concerns to address, it also invites . . . public con-
troversy.  It’s going to be linked with public controversy
because it’s dealing with substantive social issues, and as soci-
ety changes, the effort to work through those is going to gen-
erate a variety of controversies.  That’s going to play out in a
variety of ways, including the process of selecting judges.  It
just strikes me it’s a feature of what I would call responsive law.
It’s not abnormal.  It’s not weird.  It’s not inconsistent with.  It’s
just an aspect or a feature of what I call responsive law.
Now obviously these challenges need to be met.  They need
to be moderated.  We can’t have the distinction between legis-
lator and judge disappear, and law means something more and
something different than what legislatures are, so let me iden-
tify two institutional arrangements that I think go some way to
foster judicial independence and to gain an excessive amount
of accountability, I suppose you might characterize it, in terms
of public oversight of judges.
Now these two features I suggest are sort of counterintuitive
on the face but will become, I think, obvious after reflection.
One is a competitive party system.  A competitive party system,
I maintain, is a necessary condition for an independent judi-
ciary.  Now we think of competitive party systems often as
leading to competitive judicial selection processes and the like,
but let me identify why I think competitive party systems are
important for independent judges, and by a competitive party
system I mean a party system in which the reins of government
shift from one party to another in the two-party system or 
multiparty system—in which there is some rotation in office
by different parties, is what I mean by that.
Look everywhere and always.  Those who control the reins
of government want to harness the judiciary to their purposes.
If you control the reins of government, one important engine
or one important horse pulling that is the judiciary, and it
makes sense, and everywhere all these parties want to.  Parties
in control want to use the judiciary to advance their causes.
I invite you to think of any.  You name a one-party state any-
where in history you can think of that’s been in power for some
time that has had an independent judiciary—that is a one-
party country, I mean, and I think you would be hard pressed
to find one.
Why is that?  Well, I suggest this.  In competitive-party sys-
tems everybody who is in power can anticipate at some point
they will be out of power and they will quickly agree, for all
sorts of reasons that I will skip over right now, that there are
certain institutional arrangements that make sense to be inde-
pendent.  The judiciary is one of those.  Those who pass legis-
lation or adopt laws when they are in power would like some
guarantee that they would be enforced when they’re out of
power, and an independent judiciary is one way to do that.
Fall/Winter 2005  - Court Review 39
Now, it’s a lot more trouble.  I mean they can repeal the legis-
lation, obviously, but it takes some considerable effort, more
than simple majorities, usually, to repeal legislation.  So that’s
one of the reasons.
So I suggest that a two-party competitive party system, two
parties normally, creates an incentive to keep the judiciary
independent and I think that goes a long way—a long, long
way—to explaining why the American judiciary is as indepen-
dent as it is, but there’s a second factor and that’s more prob-
lematic and I’m not going to dwell on it, but I’ll hit it fast.
The second factor enhancing independence is what I’ll call
an economist legal system.  I want to shift now and not talk
about judicial independence, but I want to talk about some-
thing broader that incorporates independence, but I’ll call it an
autonomous legal system.  I’ll go back to my idea of responsive
law and suggest that by responsive law I mean a legal system
that responds to a quest for justice not simply as applying par-
ticular rules embraced by the state.
Now the two-party system goes some ways to protecting
that, but let me suggest another necessary feature of a robust
economist system, and that is a strong and robust bar.  The law
as it belongs to anybody, it belongs to us all and it belongs to
the people, yes, but there are two institutional stewards that
are necessary to protect a robust autonomous legal system.
That’s the bench and that is the bar.  They work in concert to
protect the autonomy of that universe, the autonomy from
takeover by the state, as it were, on one hand and the auton-
omy for being overly responsive to the public on the other.
That is you two together, the bench and the bar, have this stew-
ardship obligation.
Now the reason, the reason that I’ve concluded that the
judiciary in Japan, for all its professionalism, is not indepen-
dent is that it lacks a two-party tradition—the liberal
Democratic Party has been in power since World War II—and
it lacks a robust and independent and large bar that is joined
in partnership with the bench.  You’re either a lawyer or you
are a judge [or] a prosecutor, in Japan.  The idea that you can
be a judge and a lawyer or lawyer/judge is not heard.  You’re
either a lawyer or a judge.  They don’t fraternize.
The American Bar Association has a section, a division for
judges.  Judges move in and out.  You guys, some of you guys
will go back, maybe even unwillingly, to practice law at some
point.  There is a connection between bench and bar and it’s
that connection, I think, with a large and robust bar that goes
a considerable way to make the American judiciary as inde-
pendent as it is.
Now I don’t want to suggest that I think everything is okay,
but I do want to make several sort of concluding remarks with
regard to this.  One, to the extent that there are problems of a
lack of judicial independence in the United States, let me sug-
gest that the most egregious examples of those, I think—this is
a hypothesis—are found in those regions, in those communi-
ties, in which there is not a robust competitive party system.
Think of Chicago, old Chicago.  Maybe not new Chicago.  You
tell me.  That is one.
A second thing I want to suggest is that I think that the bar
in recent years, preoccupied as it is with getting rich and pro-
tecting its monopoly, has failed in its stewardship responsibili-
ties to protecting the autonomy of the law.  Now one important
way to do that is to protect the autonomy of the court system
and judges.
The bar has failed to speak out enough—adequately, loudly,
vigorously, frequently enough—when crazy complaints have
been made against judges.  They have failed to endorse enough
people and vigorously support the judges—the judiciary at
times—and they have failed to speak out in the face of outra-
geous claims.  The bar, I think, has failed and one of the things
you might think about is asking yourselves institutionally how
you can revive a more vigorous and robust connection between
bench and bar.
The final thought I want to pass is that to some extent con-
troversy, vast amounts of controversy, are just inherent in what
I have termed a robust autonomous responsive legal system
because a robust responsive autonomous legal system is one in
which the judiciary takes new issues, tries to formulate new
policies, new rules facing those, and is likely to get caught in
the controversy about those issues generally. . . .
JUDGE LEBEN: I want to start with a question to both of you.
Professor Feeley has noted with respect to the bar that in some
respects they may have failed in their obligation to really be a
defender of the judiciary in recent years, and one reason for
that may be the increasing segmentization of the bar, that you
have a plaintiffs’ bar with one set of interests, a defense bar
with another set of interests, and other splinter bar groups that
are working.
So my question to Professor Feeley would be, from your
prospective how do we get around that, and to John
Russonello it would be, as a consultant who works with groups
like that that want to have a particular message, how do we get
them to focus a little bit differently?
PROFESSOR FEELEY: It’s a hard problem.  Tony Kronman, the
former dean of the Yale Law School, has written a book called
The Lost Lawyer, and he laments the decline of the public-
regardingness of lawyers and the bar.  In the law schools we are
trying to revive that spirit that says as a lawyer you wear two
hats.  You are a provider for your family and an advocate for
your client, and the other one is that you are a steward for the
legal system, and you guys might in your various talks at vari-
ous local bar functions remind the lawyers that there can be
heated differences, but at some level they ought to come
together to protect the institution of the judiciary. . . .
MR. RUSSONELLO: Lawyers can help the judiciary if they have
more credibility themselves, and let me say two things about
that.  The first is we’ve done a lot of work for lawyers and for
legal services and what we found is when people criticize
lawyers, you hear it in the campaign:  “Lawyers are responsi-
ble for frivolous lawsuits that are clogging the courts.”  People
agree with that, but it doesn’t affect their opinions on things
like support for legal services, support for the courts, because
they see through it.  They can agree with that but still take the
right position, the aggressive position about supporting the
courts and supporting programs for the people.  That’s number
one.  That’s what you have going for you.
Number two, the number-one thing you find that you can
do to improve the opinion of lawyers is to do pro bono work
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and let the public know about it because the charge that sticks
is not so much that you’re clogging the courts with frivolous
lawsuits.  It’s that you charge too much and that you make too
much money, and there’s no way to tell people no, we don’t
make too much money because when you tell them what you
make, they get even more enraged.
The way you counteract the money thing for the bar is to
get them to do more pro bono work that shows that they care,
so (a) the bar should not pay attention to the noise about friv-
olous lawsuits because it’s just noise, and (b) they can help
themselves and the courts by doing more pro bono work and
letting the public know about it.
JUDGE LEBEN: John Russonello, let me ask you this question.
Professor Feeley has described a complicated legal system, one
in which judges have discretion, one in which the law comes
from multiple sources, one in which the judge is clearly exer-
cising discretion and making choices that may be policy
related.  On the other hand, the public would prefer or might
react more easily to a judge who has no discretion and is sim-
ply applying the law fairly and impartially.  Is there a way to
defend the more nuanced legal system or is it necessary to
dumb it down in public presentations, as if there weren’t as
much policy choice in the development of common law as
there really is?
MR. RUSSONELLO: This goes to the heart of mandatory mini-
mums because for years it was assumed that the public sup-
ported mandatory minimums because they thought it was fair to
have judges be locked in so that one person that commits a
crime gets the same penalty as another person who commits a
crime, which is why the liberals proposed mandatory minimums
in the first place.  It didn’t turn out that way.  What we found five
years ago was that the public is starting to turn on mandatory
minimums because they’ve started to see they’re unfair. 
So you can explain nuances to people when we put it before
the public and say this doesn’t allow judges to take into con-
sideration the circumstances in which a crime was committed.
That made them understand and it went from 65% for the pub-
lic supporting mandatory minimums to 68, 69% opposing
mandatory minimums.
JUDGE LEBEN: Professor Feeley, any comment on presenting a
nuanced view of the system to the public?
PROFESSOR FEELEY: One is, as I said, you’re just going to have
a fair amount of controversy, and certainly during an era of
“Get Tough on Crime” you’re going to have to weigh that.
What has been really disappointing certainly here in
California, the years I’ve been here, is the bar organization has
not stepped forward to run interference for the courts, has not
come forward to say, look, it’s complicated.  Stand back.
Simple solutions don’t work.
It has remained silent and let the legislature run over us and
institutionalized terrible sentencing mandatory minimums, as
it were, to the Constitution, making it really difficult.
JUDGE LEBEN: Are there members in the audience who have
a public-relations issue in your own court, [or are] having any
difficulty with the public understanding what you’re doing,
understanding decisions or types of decisions, any area in
which you would like to get the advice of a consultant on pub-
lic opinion and how to improve public opinion of your court?
. . . .
MR. LARRY HANSEN:  I’m with the Joyce Foundation.  I live
in Cook County.  It never occurred to me until this moment
that we were so close to the Japanese model.  We have neither
a competitive party system in Cook County and the bar asso-
ciation is not particularly vigorous in defending the courts,
although at times it could hardly be faulted for that, given the
behavior of our courts on occasion.
I have just have a question for John.  One reason the Joyce
Foundation got involved with this issue five or six years ago
was partly the advertisements we saw coming out of Ohio and
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– Malcolm Feeley
other jurisdictions, but I was particularly shocked by I think
it was a 1999 poll that had been done by the Texas Bar
Association and by the Supreme Court of Texas, and one of
the questions that was asked of lawyers and the general pub-
lic and court personnel and judges was whether or not cam-
paign contributions had any effect on the decisions that
judges made.
Not surprisingly, the public by a very substantial margin
said yes.  Court personnel said yes, but at a lesser level.  Even
lawyers, in excess of 50 percent, said that campaign contribu-
tions made a difference, but what astonished me the most was
that 49 percent of the judges who were surveyed said that this
was a problem.
John, in your polling [what] have you seen?  Have you
raised this issue with the general public?  I think the merits
poll for Judith Kaye’s commission raised it last year.  I think in
Ohio and perhaps in Pennsylvania, it’s been raised in some
polls as well.  You and I come out of political backgrounds.  I
would just say that I think the public and the judges actually
may have an exaggerated view, but in politics perceptions
count a lot and people very often act on perceptions, not just
the facts.
MR. RUSSONELLO: We haven’t done polling specifically on
this, but our research suggests that what you’re saying could be
a strong campaign with the public if one wanted to cut down
on the contributions or have some tougher reporting on con-
tributions of judges.  The public is usually loath to do away
with election of judges because they see it as giving themselves
a voice that they wouldn’t have without the funding process.
JUDGE LEBEN: Earlier, in several of the presentations, there
was discussion about judges being accountable to the public.
How would either of you suggest either from a public-opinion
standpoint or from a systems standpoint judges could best
both hold themselves accountable and be publicly perceived
for being so?
MR. RUSSONELLO: I think that’s a long-term issue.  There are
some issues that are short term that you can do.  Short term is
focus on individual rights, show how you help.  Those exam-
ples I gave in my talk, show how you help to better people’s
lives, and give them you’re the institution of last resort when
you’ve got a problem against an institution.  That’s short term.
You can do that right away.
The accountability thing is a long-term issue that has to be
done with education in the schools about all the checks and
balances on judges.  You can’t do that in the short term.  That
has to be ingrained in public education because you can’t go
out and tell people you’re accountable.  It’s just nothing that
you can sell, yourself.  They’re just going to have to understand
over the more long-term education. . . .
PROFESSOR FEELEY: . . . The one thing that I don’t think you
should do, and I think it’s consistent with the polling he found,
and that is the more people know about how your court oper-
ates, the lower their estimation of you is.
One of the reasons they hold you in such high regard is they
don’t know the great details.  There is something odd about
that.  You know judges are held in very high regard in this
country, but the more you tell, the more they know about the
operations of your courts, the less they know, and that’s not
totally surprising to me.
So you have a good rep.  I think you need to build institu-
tional alliances, as John said, for the court system, for the legal
system, to embrace the enterprise and not a particular judge,
and so I would echo many of the themes that he’s spoken of.
JUDGE LEBEN: Professor Schotland, did you have quick point
you wanted to bounce off this panel?  
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: It is about the lightning rod called
the Ten Commandments.  A rising number of people in a ris-
ing array of states are of the view that it’s wrong to insist you
not have the Ten Commandments in the courthouse.  In
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[A]lways remember that your cause is not to
defend judges, but to strengthen the faith in
the courts. The public’s point of salience is
that the courts defend individual rights.
That’s why you’re important. Protecting the
institution that’s the defender of rights is more
important than focusing on individual judges.
– John Russonello
Alabama in the primary this year, somebody known as for the
former chief justice beat others who wouldn’t speak to it.
What should be done to try to educate people who certainly
are far, far from aware of what some of us would think is clear
as clear, First Amendment religion?  What approach would
you suggest? 
PROFESSOR FEELEY: I would say that’s a good case where the
bar ought to be front and center, and you ought to be goosing
them to get front and center and say what the judge did in that
case was ordinary, first-year constitutional law, and they ought
to be out there running interference for you, rather than you
doing it yourself.
MR. RUSSONELLO: I think people need to see, put themselves
in other people’s shoes.  I think that people revere the
Constitution, but when you use the Constitution as your rea-
son for why something shouldn’t be done, it lacks salience.  If
you say don’t do that, it’s unconstitutional, people say, “So?”
Now they revere the Constitution because they revere
what’s in it for themselves, so I would say if I was going to run
a campaign on this, I would show what would happen if we
applied this to all religions and how it would be a power bat-
tle in terms of religious artifacts in the courtroom, because this
is a tough issue in the long run, and the moral of it is to get
people to step inside someone else’s shoes. . . .
Steve Leben is a state general-jurisdiction trial judge in Johnson
County, Kansas.  He was secretary of the American Judges
Association in 2004.  He has been the editor of Court Review
since 1998; he received the Distinguished Service Award from the
National Center for State Courts in 2003.
John Russonello is a partner in the public-opinion research firm
Belden, Russonello & Stewart in Washington, D.C.  He does pub-
lic-opinion research, polling, and focus-group studies for groups
such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Open Society
Institute on topics related to the judiciary and judicial indepen-
dence.  Before joining his present firm, he had a political consult-
ing practice; before that, he was a press secretary and speech
writer for U.S. Rep. Peter Rodino (D-N.J.).
Malcolm Feeley is a professor at the Boalt Hall School of Law at
the University of California-Berkeley.  He is the author of several
books, including The Process Is the Punishment: Handling
Cases in a Lower Court, and Court Reform on Trial: Why
Simple Solutions Fail, and the editor of the book, The Japanese
Adversary System in Context: Controversies and Comparisons.
Fall/Winter 2005  - Court Review 43
The fifth panel discussion at the National Forum on Judicial
Independence explored the intersection between judicial indepen-
dence and public accountability.  The discussion was led by
Michael W. Manners, a circuit judge on the Jackson County Circuit
Court in Independence, Missouri.  Panelists were Michael L.
Buenger, Missouri state court administrator, Kevin S. Burke, a dis-
trict judge in Hennepin County District Court in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, Bobby B. DeLaughter, a circuit judge on the Hinds
County Circuit Court in Jackson, Mississippi, Malcolm Feeley, pro-
fessor of law at the University of California-Berkeley, Michael R.
McAdam, judge on the Kansas City (Mo.) Municipal Court, Mary
Campbell McQueen, president of the National Center for State
Courts, Jeffrey Rosinek, a circuit judge on the Miami-Dade County
Circuit Court in Miami, Florida, John Russonello, a pollster and
consultant, Roy A. Schotland, professor of law at Georgetown
University, and Robert Wessels, court manager for the county crim-
inal courts at law in Harris County (Houston), Texas.  The
National Forum on Judicial Independence was supported by a gen-
erous grant from the Joyce Foundation of Chicago, Illinois.
JUDGE MICHAEL W. MANNERS: Mary [McQueen] said earlier
that the word “activist” had become the “A” word when applied
to judges.  I can tell you I practiced law for 24 years and when
I applied the “A” word to judges, I was talking about the body
part and nothing to do with their political leanings, but times
change.  Times change.
Let me tell you, and Judge McAdam alluded to this earlier in
talking about Missouri, the home of the nonpartisan merit
selection plan for judges, that there’s been a threat to that.  Let
me give you a little bit more context about that because it
maybe provides context for the first question I want to ask of
the panel.
The way that that controversy came about, very briefly, was
this, and perhaps it’s coincidental, but Missouri a few years ago
had a referendum election on whether or not its citizens should
be permitted to carry concealed firearms, and that referendum
failed.  Political times changed and last year the state legislature
adopted a law allowing people in Missouri under certain cir-
cumstances to carry concealed firearms.  The law was so broad
it would have permitted, in the absence of some special local
regulation, carrying of concealed weapons in courthouses.
Many of us on the bench were not crazy about that aspect of it,
but there were other constitutional challenges raised to that
statute.
A judge in St. Louis City struck the law down as being
unconstitutional and in violation of a particular section of the
Missouri Constitution.  It went up immediately by a special writ
to the Missouri Supreme Court, and while the case was pend-
ing in the Missouri Supreme Court, 53 members of the House,
all members of one particular political party that supported the
legislation, introduced a resolution that would call for the 
popular election of members of the Missouri Supreme Court,
the court of appeals, and those circuit judges, judges of general
jurisdiction like me, who were appointed rather than elected.
Now, Judge Burke, how does that kind of legislation impli-
cate judicial independence?
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[W]e live in an era in which all sectors of the
public are asking government agencies to be
accountable, and I think that it’s important
that we define what it is that we’re willing to
be held accountable for as opposed to letting
other people or the legislature or executive
branch define what issues are important.
– Kevin S. Burke
 
JUDGE KEVIN BURKE: For the soon-retired members of the
Missouri Supreme Court, probably not very much.
I think there have been a number of instances around the
country in which legislative bodies have been rather blatant in
their attempt to intimidate or direct what the judiciary is doing,
ranging from the federal court’s jurisdiction-stripping bills. . . .
[I]n my state Judge Rosebaum made comments to the House
Judiciary Committee and incurred the wrath of the chairman of
the committee, and he’s been suffering from it ever since.
I think that some part of the reason that it has been so suc-
cessful is that we in the judiciary and our natural allies—or
unnatural allies—have not been very effective in speaking up
against that or showing dangers to the public of that happening.
I think that was the professor’s comment, that it becomes the
sport, the present-day sport, now:  picking on judges. . . .
JUDGE MANNERS: Let’s talk about judicial accountability for a
minute because that has been posed as at once the opposite of
judicial independence, but also the antidote to claims that we
need to limit judicial independence.
Let me give you an example of a bill that was introduced in
our legislature and if you have similar situations in your indi-
vidual states, I’d like to hear about it.  But we had a bill intro-
duced by a pretty good senator, one that I’ve known for a num-
ber of years, who had a complaint from one of her constituents
about how long it was taking to get motions to modify decided
in family court cases, so she came up with this solution.  She
introduced a bill that would have said that if a judge does not
decide a motion to modify within 90 days after the evidence is
completed, that judge would be stripped of his or her health-
insurance benefits.
That is a form, I guess, of judicial accountability to make sure
that we perform expeditiously.  Judge Rosinek, would that make
you perform expeditiously?
JUDGE KEVIN BURKE: I hate to tell you this, but Minnesota
already has that law.  It passed 20 years ago.
JUDGE JEFFREY ROSINEK: Is that a full literal rule or some-
thing?
JUDGE BURKE: It goes to our entire salary.
JUDGE MANNERS: The entire salary?
JUDGE ROSINEK: Well, apparently they keep them coming.  I
thought I was having problems . . . . 
Absolutely.  Absolutely.  It’s the Golden Rule and he who
controls the gold rules, and that’s the legislature, has the control
of the dollars and if they were going to strip us of a meager
thing like our health insurance, let alone our whole salary, I
think that would cause us to act.  Obviously, the major problem
there is:  Is that the right type of accountability to have?
Now we’re supposed to have this concept of three coequal
branches of the government.  The only branch that thinks that
way is the judicial branch, because I sure as hell don’t believe
that the executive or legislative branches believe that, but if the
legislative branch would come up with some type of enactment
like that, it would force judges to make [rulings on cases].  It
doesn’t mean they were ruled well.  It just means they were
ruled, and so that’s the concern I have.
JUDGE MANNERS: Judge Burke, you wrote extensively about
accountability in the article that is in the most recent Court
Review on why accountability is a good thing and that we ought
to welcome it.1 Tell me, from a practical standpoint, for those
of us who are in the trenches trying cases every day . . .,  what
does accountability mean for a trial judge?
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[T]here is an institutional interest that the bar
has . . . in having competent judges, and they
are our natural allies and there’s a lot more of
them than there are of us. For the most part,
a lot of us can’t make political contributions.
They can. They can influence their legislators
in ways that we never can.
– Michael W. Manners
Best Strategy for Preserving Judicial Independence, COURT REVIEW,
Summer 2004, at 4.
JUDGE BURKE: I think the reason that I think it’s important now
is that we live in an era in which all sectors of the public are
asking government agencies to be accountable, and I think that
it’s important that we define what it is that we’re willing to be
held accountable for as opposed to letting other people or the
legislature or executive branch define what issues are impor-
tant.
So put another way, if you’re going to get run out of town,
get it up front and announce it’s a break, and I do believe that
the judiciary, the trial court, does need to do that.  I think there
are some simple principles.
I think that even though I joke about not getting paid after
90 days, prompt disposition of cases is important.  We can be
held accountable for that, and we should be held accountable
for that.
The thing I alluded to earlier . . . is I think that we should
have courts, trial courts, that people feel that they were listened
to.  It’s not that I’m overworked.  It’s that the effects of budget
cuts are too many people coming in too fast through court and
they’re not being given an opportunity to be heard.  If legisla-
tors understand the effect of their decision on simple principles,
then I think we have a better chance of fighting these issues
about judicial independence and budget.
JUDGE MANNERS: Is it practical, though, for that to occur?
And maybe my state is unique in this regard.  Let me know if
some of you have this experience, but when I was on family
court, which I was for the last two years, I was faced with a
huge docket.  Being able to make quick decisions would have
been a luxury.  I wish I could have done it, but the practical
reality was I had a huge docket.  I tried 590 contested divorces
of one kind or another last year.  Some of those were pretty sim-
ple cases.  Others involved a lot of property, child-custody
issues, things like that, that invited reflection on occasion and
being able to listen to evidence and give people a complete
hearing.
Isn’t there an inherit tension between saying you have an
arbitrary time standard that you have to meet and being able to
give people the kind of attention that they deserve?
JUDGE BURKE: Sure, there’s a tension, but I remember going
before the legislature right before the reapportionment decision
came down and I presented our budget and what I told them
was that there may be some delay in your getting your decision
on reapportionment, so that’s going to mean that you’re going
to have to decide which of two places you might have to live.
We’ll get a decision out shortly before the election, but it won’t
be too difficult for you to figure, generally speaking, where
you’re going to live.
And they looked at me like I was from the moon and I said,
“No.  Actually, we will get that decision out.  It’s a fifth-grade
child who is not going to know which parent they’re going to
live with until the seventh grade.  That’s the effect of under-
funding courts.”
So I do think that people in the public and legislators can
understand what it is that’s at stake for people.  Everybody
understands in education that huge class sizes and social pro-
motion have hurt kids.  Why is it that they can’t understand
that huge courtrooms and social promotion of defendants into
just recycling them isn’t an unacceptable public policy?
So that goes back to my argument about accountability.  I
think that we have to have simple measures of accountability
that the public can understand and that legislators can be forced
to deal with because I think right now it’s amorphous, and they
can kind of get away with things—that you can do more with
less when actually, in many instances, you can only do less with
less.
JUDGE MANNERS: Judge DeLaughter, earlier today a lot of our
focus has been on the current-day problems with judicial inde-
pendence and the assaults on it, but some of our speakers
reminded us today that this goes back to the founding of the
republic, that there are long periods of time in our history when
this has been a controversy, and through the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
Let me ask you about a practical problem, and I have no idea
what the answer to this is, but you prosecuted a case in 1994
that had been tried once or twice before in 1964, 30 years ear-
lier—a vastly different time than when you tried the case,
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involving the prosecution of the man who allegedly—and I
guess finally was proven to have—murdered Medgar Evers.  In
your review of that case, and I realize you were, what, in the
third grade at the time that the case was originally tried, but
what you know about the original trial of that case, how was
judicial independence upheld at that time, in 1964 in Jackson,
Mississippi?
JUDGE BOBBY B. DeLAUGHTER: Well, the very fact that there
was a trial or two trials in 1964.  We had a hard time in 1994,
so you can imagine, given the times and given the setting, the
pressure that would have been exerted upon the district attor-
ney, for one player, not to prosecute the case, and the pressure
on the trial judge in allowing the case to proceed on and vari-
ous rulings that he was called upon to make during the course
of the trial, so just the very fact that there was a trial, when you
consider the times and the place, I think showed tremendous
courage and independence involving the rule of law.
If the players involved strictly had been playing to account-
ability only, and every official in Mississippi is elected—judges,
district attorney, everybody involved—if it was just account-
ability that was the primary concern, then you wouldn’t have
seen two trials.
JUDGE MANNERS: So maybe this isn’t an intractable problem.
If judges could withstand pressure in Jackson, Mississippi, in
1964 of that nature, maybe we can stand being called activist
judges in 2004.  Do you think that’s possible?
JUDGE DeLAUGHTER: I think so.
JUDGE MANNERS: How does that square with public-opinion
polls?  I mean we just heard about a case that 40 years ago was
tried in Jackson, Mississippi, by judges who had to be at least
cognizant of the possibility that they were making unpopular
decisions by even permitting a trial to take place.  Does that
give us some hope for the future of being able to shape public
opinion, to recognize the importance of judicial independence?
MR. JOHN RUSSONELLO: The public has a strong commitment
to an independent judiciary, but like its commitment to civil
rights and the right to privacy and all the other rights that go
along with the Bill of Rights, the application, sometimes they
fall off in terms of how it’s applied even though they’re for the
basic principles.  So what we need to do, what the bar needs to
do and the rest of us [as] advocates for the courts, is to give
them the examples, the applications that reinforce the impor-
tance of judicial independence.
Your very first comment about the concealed-weapons legis-
lation, which was a way to hurt the independence of the
courts—an answer to that would not be this is going to hurt the
independence of the courts.  An answer to that would be to
show to the bar, to show the motivation of the people who are
bringing that particular piece of legislation.
In other words, when you get attacked it’s better not to have
to defend.  It’s better to show that the other side has motivations
beyond judicial activism—that that’s only a label, but they have
another agenda as to why they’re doing it, why they’re propos-
ing curbs on the courts’ independence.
JUDGE MANNERS: Professor Feeley, I might follow up on that
comment by pointing out that I don’t think anybody who intro-
duced that legislation would have said, well, we’re doing this to
try to focus the court on a particular path, but it is interesting
the members of the same political party that introduced that
also made sure—I shouldn’t say made sure—that bill didn’t go
anywhere, and we have a contested governor’s election coming
up this year in which the political party in control of the gov-
ernor’s mansion may change so that the governor who appoints
judges may be of the other party.
Does that validate your idea that as long as we have a strong
two-party system, we will continue to have strong support for
judicial independence?
PROFESSOR MALCOLM FEELEY: Well, my argument wasn’t quite
that strong.  One of our problems is that our party system has
weakened as well.  We now have lots of prima donnas running
on their own and running their own campaign and the party
systems have declined, and so there’s a certain virtue not only
of building up the bar, but building up the party structure as
well. But it does seem to me possible that candidates and lead-
ers of the parties can sit down in advance of certain campaigns
and try to structure the rules of the game that will proceed and
to try to keep some things off the agenda.  They can’t always
succeed, but it’s probably an effort to start.
I think there’s one other issue that’s even more threatening to
judicial independence, and some of you guys are going to par-
ticipate in it, and that’s the rent-a-judge movement.  I think the
rent-a-judge movement, to the extent that it takes off—and it
has taken off here and is going to continue to take off in
California—is going to allow the best and the brightest in the
bar, particularly in commercial litigation, go to an alternative to
the public courts, select a judge, often a retired judge, to decide
the case and have a streamlined trial.  And, as is the case in
California, this can be a trial of record and if you don’t like the
outcome, you can go to the appellate court.
If it takes off, the judiciary is going to be the same way that
public schools are in this state and lots of states. . . .  .  Imagine
if the best and the brightest of the bar opted out of concern with
the public judiciary.  We would be in a real big fix, and I think
that’s what’s going to happen over the next few years.  It’s cer-
tainly a threat.
JUDGE MANNERS: Professor Schotland, you made a comment
during your remarks about the purpose of a system or at least
the purpose of judicial—and I’m paraphrasing and if I mess up
your statement, I don’t do so intentionally.  Tell me if I’m wrong
on this, but I believe your statement was that the function of
judicial independence ought to be to ensure that the very best
possible people want to be judges, want to go on the bench.
Am I correct in that and is that one of the principal imperatives
of judicial independence?
PROFESSOR ROY A. SCHOTLAND: That’s certainly a happy
amendment of what I said, which was actually the purpose of
general reform is to get the best possible people to come to the
bench and to stay on the bench, but I think judicial indepen-
dence very slightly in that we’re very concerned about the jus-
tice produced by the judges.
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I’m just so struck by what was just said about 1964 and I was
about to give you a note with a footnote from history.  The
Scottsboro case of the 1930s, the Scottsboro Boys, the United
States Supreme Court overturned the verdicts of guilty and sent
it back for retrial . . . and that judge was defeated the next time
he was up, and I think there are times when you have to do
what your judge in ‘64 did.2. . .
JUDGE MANNERS: Let me change gears a little bit, and I see my
role as being as partially, at least, a devil’s advocate.  There is a
school of thought that is that this whole concern about judicial
independence is more an effort to try to cover up or insulate
judges from valid, legitimate public criticism, and I know I’m
not a perfect judge.  The Court of Appeals has told me that on
several occasions.  I honestly try to do what I think is right, but
I’m frequently wrong in my thoughts about that.
There are some members of our profession, and we all know
of bad instances where judges have done things that are contrary
to the Canons of Ethics, who do things that they shouldn’t do,
who maybe don’t work the hours that they should and they get
caught by members of the media.  Is judicial independence sim-
ply a way to try to deflect valid criticism of judges? . . . .
JUDGE ROSINEK: No.  I think that judicial independence is
more than just making decisions.  I think that along those same
lines we have to have judicial accountability.  If a judge decides
to pay golf at eleven o’clock every single day, then that judge
should be called a former judge because that individual
destroys it for all of us.
I think independence is you have the independence in deci-
sion making and you have judicial independence as an institu-
tional thing for retention selection, so you have lots of mecha-
nisms of independence, lots of concerns for independence, but
without accountability, then judicial independence dies.
We just cannot be a profession just to make decisions for
ourselves or by ourselves.  There will be, as you found out,
somebody telling you that you made the wrong decision.  I
don’t know if you really believe that, but at least they ruled last
and you went along with it, whether you liked it or not.  It
doesn’t make you less accountable, though, for what you have
done.  I think that you have to take both in mind.  I think an
individual judge has to have the independence of thought and
the independence of processing, the independence of running
his or her court, but also we must be accountable to what we
do.
I think that judges should be thrown off the bench that do
not follow.  I think it’s unfair for judges to spend three or four
hours a day in their job while others are spending eight or ten
hours a day.  I think it’s wrong for judges to get money when
they’re not performing and I think that accountability is impor-
tant, too, so I think that independence goes along with account-
ability.
JUDGE MANNERS: . . . Is there anybody in this room who has
not seen some kind of exposé on television or read it in a news-
paper about judge so-and-so who plays golf every day at eleven
o’clock or something of that nature?  We’ve sure seen them in
our area of the country.  Anybody who hasn’t seen those kind of
articles or TV programs, things of that nature?
Given that premise, let me tell you a concern I’ve got, and
tell me how we can address this.  You were talking about the
importance of publicizing the good things that we do, and I
think that is absolutely critical.  I don’t know that the media
particularly cares about it, to be honest with you, but I can tell
you for every good article there is out there about judges doing
something or members of the bar doing something that’s good,
pro bono work, things of that nature, my impression is it’s
wiped out in a heartbeat when you have the kind of negative
articles, the sensationalist TV programs that we see from time
to time.
Can we counteract those with stories about good things that
judges do and members of the judiciary in doing their duties?
MR. RUSSONELLO: Unfortunately, you may not like my answer,
but this is the reality that exists:  You can’t do much about the
bad stories about judges.  They’re going to always be there, and
you can’t get people, journalists, to do good stories, happy-
faced stories about you and what you do every day.  That’s not
what I meant.  You’re just going to have to live with that.
What you need to do is get the stories out about the impor-
tance of the courts, because the people believe the courts.  If
they’re educated about the courts from high school, about the
role that they play, and they believe that, that education is rein-
forced with stories that are newsworthy because they are stories
about people who have been victimized by big institutions and
they’re controversial.  They’re not Pollyanna stories.  They’re
not happy-faced stories.  These are grim stories about people
who got their water poisoned or were thrown out of their hous-
ing or other instances where the courts have done something to
help somebody get justice.
It’s not exactly about you, but that will help to reinforce what
they learn about the importance of keeping the courts indepen-
dent.  You’re still going to have to put up with the negative sto-
ries on judges, but they will have less meaning for people if peo-
ple have a respect for the courts.
JUDGE MANNERS: Mike Buenger, I want to change gears a lit-
tle bit.  We spoke a little this morning about problems in deal-
ing with the legislature in convincing them of the importance
of judicial independence, and in your position you deal on a
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regular basis with people in our General Assembly in Missouri,
correct?  . . . And, I think, Bob, you and Larry, to one degree or
another, deal with elected officials, lay people. . . . 
And I don’t know if this is true in your states or not.  In
Missouri, every year it seems like we have fewer lawyers in the
legislature.  Is the decreasing number of lawyers in the legisla-
ture a problem in being able to communicate with people about
the importance of judicial independence?
MR. MICHAEL L. BUENGER: I think the issue of lawyers in the
legislature cuts two ways.  We have certainly seen in Missouri a
decline in the number of lawyers in the legislature, and the
defeat of what Judge Manners referred to, House Joint
Resolution 50, that sought to undo the Missouri nonpartisan
court plan, ultimately was set aside because of some of the
lawyers in the legislature.
The flip side of it is in my experience, sometimes the lawyers
in the legislature can prove to be as problematic as they can be
helpful, and what I attribute that to is they are familiar with the
system and they know what they want to change in the system,
whereas oftentimes with lay people, if you sit down, you can at
least have what I call an education session.
I have found with some lawyers in the legislature that the
openness to understanding the judiciary from a larger perspec-
tive than “I try civil cases” or “I try criminal cases,” there isn’t
the openness to have that kind of education session.  There isn’t
the openness to want to wrap one’s mind around some of the
issues that the branch of government faces, not a court in St.
Louis or a court in Kansas City or a court in Joplin, but the
branch, and so I certainly think that lawyers in the legislature
can be helpful, but as with anything, it depends on who they are.
Barbara Tuchman, the historian, has a wonderful line when
she says, “History is formed by personality,” and I think very
much the relationship that the judiciary has with lawyer legis-
lators or any legislator is a function of relationship and person-
ality more than it is anything else.
I like to see lawyers in the legislature.  I like to encourage
that.  Certainly our [bar] president before, our immediate past
president, was very active in trying to get lawyers in the legis-
lature, but it’s not a panacea.  It’s not a magic bullet.  It doesn’t
solve all problems and, as I said, in certain circumstances they
can prove to be more of a challenge than other legislators. . . .
MR. ROBERT WESSELS: I concur with what Mike said.  That is
exactly our experience and it goes to something that we talked
about this morning, and that is it’s all about relationships.  It’s
all about understanding and understanding how courts impact
the responsibilities of particular elected officials that you’re
dealing with [and] are interested in, and the time to meet them
is not five minutes before the budget hearing begins or when
there’s a crisis.  The time to start developing those relationships
is months and years before, because sooner or later when the
mechanics of the budget process are completed and the forms
are filed and all of that is done, people have gone through the
motions of the hearings.
Those of us involved in the process know that sooner or later
it comes down to a visit between the presiding judge or the lead-
ership judge, the court administrator in someone’s office having
a conversation about okay, what are we going to really do?  What
are the impacts?  What are the implications of funding X pro-
gram or Y or taking a cut?  If you want us to take a cut, we don’t
want it, but let us decide where the cut is going to go.  Don’t go
in and line-item it for us.  Do you realize if you cut this, it’s also
going to impact you in three or four or five other areas?
Which means you have to know an awful lot about and be
prepared to talk about how court operations impact other areas,
particularly in social service and mental health, jail popula-
tions, prison populations, and those types of areas. . . .
JUDGE MANNERS: How have term limits affected this?
MR. BUENGER: I think term limits are probably one of the most
ill-conceived ideas that we’ve come up with, and the reason I
say that is in 2002 we had about a 65% change in the legislature
in Missouri.  Somewhere in the neighborhood of a third of the
Senate left and well over 60 percent of the House was term-lim-
ited out, and there was an enormous amount of institutional
history between our branches of government and within the
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legislature itself that suddenly evaporated.
No one knew why the budget process was the way it was, no
one knew why the Judiciary Committee process was the way it
was . . . . [W]hat I saw in Missouri, a very young crop of people
came in.  Our appropriations chairman that handled the judi-
ciary budget was 26 years old and quite literally got elected and
then became chair of the Appropriations Committee.
And so to some extent, I think, going to what Bob said, the
effect of term limits has been the destruction of relationships
that for many years was the foundation by which government
operated, and the effect of term limits and Missouri changing
every eight years now leaves that whole area of relationships and
processing history and procedure constantly in flux.  There’s no
predictability to the process.  You don’t know who is in leader-
ship this year and who is in leadership next year.  Getting back
to one of the other comments, the effect of that has, I think,
been a lack of what I would term “party and legislative disci-
pline.”  There is no more discipline in that particular body of
government.  It’s a free-for-all and it’s very difficult to work in
that environment.
JUDGE MANNERS: Judge McAdam, we have all these problems.
A lot of people say we’re in a crisis in terms of the independence
in one of our three coequal branches of government.  What can
AJA do about this?  What’s the magic plan?  Do you have the sil-
ver bullet?
JUDGE MICHAEL R. McADAM: No, I do not.  I do not have the
silver bullet or a golden wand or a magic wand.  Here’s what I
think AJA can and has started to do.  First, what we did today is
the beginning.  I think that the process of going through the
organization and planning on this day actually is a help also
because what we’ve done is we’ve forged these links with other
organizations and either the linkage was rather weak before or
nonexistent, and so now we have relationships with the
National Center.  They’re obviously stronger than they were
before, even though they were strong before.  We also have the
relationship with the Joyce Foundation that we had never had
before.  We have the relationship with the Justice at Stake cam-
paign that we mentioned throughout the course of the day.
These kinds of group inter-organizational, common-purpose
kinds of activities I think are very helpful because that’s the way
you get the word out.
We don’t have all the answers and sometimes people would
say, as you kind of implied earlier, “You’re talking about judicial
independence, Judge, but that’s just a cover for your areas and a
cover for your golf game that you play every day or a cover for
a bad decision that you made,” and so coming from a judge, it
may not have the impact that it would have if it came from what
would be considered perhaps a more neutral source and a more
respected source, quite frankly, and so I think those kind of link-
ages are very important.
The other thing that I was going to suggest, too, that we’re
also working on, and we hope to have this become a feature of
our conferences and it’s something that our president-elect,
Gayle Nachtigal, has been working on for a long time, . . . is the
judicial leader symposium.
What that is, it’s kind of a high-fallutin’ phrase, but what it
really is talking about are presiding judges.  Presiding judges are
not trained to be presiding judges.  Lord knows, judges aren’t
trained to be judges unless they go to the Judicial College, and
so a presiding judge is even less so, particularly when you con-
sider that what they’re being asked to do, as Bob and Larry have
talked about, and Mike, deal with state legislators, deal with
county legislators and executives, deal with mayors and city
councils on issues of budgets that the average judge is not even
worried about.
The only time I worried about the budget before I became
presiding judge of my court was when my paycheck was a day
late.  Then it became a real big issue, but until then I never really
gave it a second thought.
And so the leadership symposium. . . , and we hope to have
it be a regular feature of our training program, is for presiding
judges to get involved in these kind of ancillary issues that our
legal training certainly doesn’t prepare us for, but nonetheless, if
we’re going to be presiding judges or are presiding judges or
hope to be presiding judges, then we would need to know these
things and get this training.
So that’s just two things I can think of off the top of my head,
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but I really think that it’s important that AJA, regardless of what
tool it uses, that the AJA take a leadership role in this process.
We have to become the voice of the judiciary in this country.  I
feel that we sometimes let our brothers and sisters—and the
other big organization that we probably all belong to that’s also
a three-letter organization, that we’ve let them carry the load for
us.  And I feel that it’s a great organization.  I belong to the ABA,
but the ABA is a lawyers’ organization, and while we need to
have relationships with lawyers, we still need to speak as judges,
and I think that the AJA provides that vehicle, and my goal in
starting this process was to reach that goal.  That was what I had
in mind.  We’re not going to get there yet, but we’re getting
there.
JUDGE MANNERS: All right.  We’ve talked to you.  We need to
hear from you.  We’ve talked about ways that the AJA can
become more involved—Judge McAdam has, as president—but
this is your organization ultimately, not just ours.  What can we
do for you to help you maximize judicial independence to pre-
vent the decline in judicial independence?  Let’s hear from some
of the people in the audience, either questions or comments
about how about AJA can help you.
JUDGE JOHN CONERY:   I’m John Conery from Louisiana.  I
want to know from Professor Feeley where I can get one of those
rent-a-judges for a juvenile court.
I’ll tell you basically that’s a court problem and it will proba-
bly work itself out.  It’s a cycle.  But certainly there’s no demand
for rent-a-judges in the domestic docket or criminal and juve-
nile work, as we all know.
But my question basically for the panel is in Louisiana, as in
most of the country, Louisiana just passed an amendment to its
constitution, a gay-rights amendment, which prohibited gay
marriage.  A courageous trial court judge in Louisiana declared
the state statute unconstitutional.  Ironically, it was a Republican
judge from Baton Rouge, . . . and he was attacked and lambasted
by those who were affected.
The particular amendment in Louisiana sought to do two
things:  ban gay marriage, plus it impacted civil unions.  So the
judge’s decision was based on the fact that the constitutional
amendment dealt with two issues instead of one and it should
have been separate, separate constitutional amendments on
each issue for the people to decide.
But in not responding to the attacks on the judge, we, as the
Louisiana judiciary, seem to have dropped the ball.  We’re pro-
hibited by our judicial commission from commenting on pend-
ing cases.  The bar didn’t step up to the plate.  A lot of the things
you talked about today, the weaknesses in our system, were
demonstrated in that case.  Here you have a judge with . . . a no-
brainer constitutional problem, a two-issue thing but it was
unconstitutional, being attacked.
And I hate to see what’s going to happen to him, Judge
DeLaughter, when he comes up for reelection unless this issue
is handled properly.
So how do we respond?  How do we get a rapid response, tak-
ing the ball and play?  How is this thing handled the correct
way?  Perhaps the public-relations person or Professor Feeley or
others might have some suggestions.
MS. MARY CAMPBELL McQUEEN: I just want to give you an
example of a similar type of case that happened in Washington
State with an absolutely opposite response, and I think as judges
you have an opportunity, and I think Judge Burke has said this
over and over again, for the people that appear before you to
understand why you make decisions.
Similar issue, different topic.  Subject matter was tax reform.
The initiative that was on the ballot in Washington State passed
overwhelmingly, close to 70 percent of the vote, as I recall.  The
issue came up before a trial court judge in Seattle, which is King
County, so he decided, first of all, that he would issue a written
opinion, which sometimes I think as trial judges you don’t con-
sider, but even if [it] had been an oral opinion, he spent one and
a half pages of that opinion explaining his role and the rule of
law and why this was not a decision by one individual against
majority rule.
And he was overwhelmingly congratulated by every editorial
board, got probably every best-judge-of-the-year award I think
that any group in Washington could take, and had a television
interview on two of the local national affiliates explaining that
in the judiciary we are the only branch of government that has
an institutionalized review process, and so in this situation
where it was the same issue, single issue versus multiple issue,
[which] was the reason it was stricken down in Washington, he
explained why that was not his decision as an individual judge
and pointed out as to why he made his decision.
And so I think you as judges can be some of the best advo-
cates.  I think what Judge Burke was trying to say is rather than
wave the standard of judicial independence, explain what this
means to a fifth-grade child if this type of legislation or this
intrusion into the discretion of judges passes.
When I speak to high-school groups and they say, “Well,
what makes a good lawyer?” one of the things I tell them is you
have to be a good storyteller because when you get before a jury,
it’s about telling a story and having people do something that
they might not personally want to do but are compelled to do
because of the rule of law, and I think what we have to do are
take these issues that come up that attack judicial independence
and turn them into real live personal stories that this is how it’s
going to affect you.  Judicial independence isn’t just a concept
that the framers of the Constitution thought up.  It has real
implications for the public today.
And even though we’ve talked about today all the gloom and
doom and the lack of respect of the judiciary, the judiciary is still
held in higher esteem than any other branch of government.
People still view you as the truth finders, the seekers of the
truth, and so I think as judges when you speak to civic organi-
zations or classrooms or from the bench, you’re the ones who
can tell that story best.
MR. RUSSONELLO: I would strongly encourage you to get a
copy of those interviews that Mary mentioned.  I’ve seen them,
and this judge was brilliant in his interview with the press
because he never talked about the merits of what he decided.
He talked about the process and he was brilliant in those inter-
views, and so I think that certainly given the fact that it was the
same exact issue, it was single subject, putting two things in a
referendum, I would encourage you to get that . . . .
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JUDGE MANNERS: Who else has questions or comments?
JUDGE WILLIAM O. ISENHOUR, JR.:  I’m from Kansas, and as
I’ve sat here all day today, I think this has been a wonderful expe-
rience for us, but I wonder if we’re doing a lot of preaching to the
choir here.  I don’t think anybody here has to be convinced about
the importance of the topic that we’re talking about.
My question is where does the AJA go from here and how do
we reach out to other segments of the community?  Do we
include bar associations in forums like this?  Do we invite mem-
bers of the media to forums like this?  Do we invite those politi-
cians that like to complain about activist judges?  Do we maybe
even invite the cowboy that’s in the White House right now?
I think just to persuade ourselves is only the first step.  I’m
fired up and I’m excited from today’s forum, but I think we need
to have a plan to go from here. . . .
JUDGE McADAM: Bill, an excellent question, and here’s what I
have in mind.  First of all, the program that we’re going to tape
tomorrow . . . that will appear on Inside the Law, . . . probably
next spring, early summer.  This will actually be on television,
on PBS.  So the first thing I can tell you is that the result of that
program will have some kind of a national ripple effect.  It may
be minimal at first, but it’s going to have some kind of an effect
and some kind of impact.
Now the other thing that we need to do is not rest on our
laurels.  That’s not the end product, at least not that I had in
mind.  What I have in mind, and I think the leadership of the
AJA that will follow me is in agreement on this, and that is that
we need to pursue a relationship with, and you mentioned bar
associations.
I think that’s the next logical step, is to get involved, to
maybe have a summit meeting that the AJA sponsors and hosts
maybe within the next six months or year, using the program
as kind of an introductory card to invite commentary, to invite
the various national bar associations such as the ABA, obvi-
ously, but also ATLA, the criminal defense lawyers and the
prosecutors, and come up with group strategies, and we can
expand that to other organizations that are more segmented,
such as the National Association of Women Judges.  I say that
because I see their president, Judge Thompson, still sitting here
and participating. . . .
And so I think that is something we can do, and I think then
we gain strength by having more disciplines in this process, but
we also have to, as judges, control the process.  As I said earlier,
we can’t have lawyers telling the courts how to operate, but we
can have the bar association provide some amount of educa-
tional function that doesn’t appear to be, as I said earlier, defen-
sive, because if it comes from us, it will appear to be that way.
It’s got to be a positive thing.
I’ve been on the negative side.  Trust me.  I was attacked last
year when I got back from Montreal with an article about my
court that was like a kick in the gut, and some of it was
deserved and some of it wasn’t, and of course the part that
wasn’t was emphasized, and this is life.  This is the way it is.
But what I learned from it was you can’t be negative about your
reaction and your response.  You have to be positive.  A nega-
tive reaction only causes people to think that you really are as
bad as the paper said you were, and of course that’s not true,
at least in most cases, and the one that we were involved in
with our court—it wasn’t just me, but our court—it was not
true.
So that’s the best I can come up with, Bill, but I think pursu-
ing some kind of a summit meeting with bar associations is the
next logical step for us to take.
JUDGE ROSINEK: I have a comment I’d like to make on that,
too.  I think there is another avenue that we could take, and I
think it’s a future avenue.  Every year millions of high-school
kids learn about the Supreme Court.  They learn about the fed-
eral courts.  They do not learn anything about the state courts.
Ninety-seven percent of all the cases that are heard each year
happen in state courts.  These kids will be affected more by their
municipal court, the traffic court, a divorce court, than they will
by Supreme Court decisions.  I think what we can do, there are
organizations, and we did some years ago, but I think what we
can do, too, is to take this message maybe on a more simplified
basis and bring it to the high schools.
All of us have to be advocates.  All of us can go back to our
communities and become advocates for what we do every single
day.  We don’t have to give a decision, we don’t have to discuss
decisions, but we can talk about the process, “What is that
process?” so that people feel more comfortable, so as kids go on
from high school to college and they are voting, then they
understand the concepts that we deal with every single day, and
I think it behooves us to get involved on that level, not only
work with our peers, which is sort of a bit easier than working
with . . . middle-school or high-school kids, but I think that we
have to do that to get our message across.  If we do not get our
message across to those kids, then we’ll never get our message
across to the next generation of voters, our next generation of
lawyers, our next generation of judges.
JUDGE BURKE: I think that before you go to the Rotary Club,
you ought to go to your own employees.  I think there are a
huge number of employees around the country, and I had an
experience at the time that O.J. Simpson was tried.  I had given
a number of talks around the country and so I asked people,
“Have your neighbors asked you about what Lance Ito was
doing?”  And every single court employee everyplace in the
country raised their hand.  Even though they were a probate
clerk in Falls River, Massachusetts, their neighbor knew they
worked in court and so they had some belief that somehow that
person knew what Lance Ito was doing.
And so I think before we go out to the Rotary Club and all
the other good things we should do, it’s about making sure that
we have organizational lessons in your court, that your own
court employees know what’s at stake and that they’re engaged
in that, because when you make a mistake or I make a mistake,
which we will, I want that court employee to say Kevin Burke
cares about what’s going on in this courthouse and give me the
benefit of the doubt when they’re at their Rotary Club or they’re
at their church or they’re at whatever event.  They will
absolutely be asked about what’s going on, and I think in some
instances judges have not used that base of a large number of
employees who either can become allies or bystanders in mak-
ing sure that the judiciary is supported by the public.
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JUDGE MANNERS: I’d like, if I may, to amplify on something
that Judge McAdam said, and that is the importance of reaching
out to the Bar.  I can tell you I practiced law for 24 years as a
trial lawyer and I tried cases in front of all kinds of judges, some
good, some bad, and obviously I was an advocate for my client
and I wanted to win, and so if I had judges who viewed things
the way I did, you know I was always pleased with that, but,
quite frankly, that didn’t happen very often.  And what I really
would be pleased and satisfied with—and I think most trial
lawyers would, too—is a judge who is competent, who is going
to be fair, who is going to listen to both sides, and there is an
institutional interest that the bar has, both the defense bar and
the plaintiffs’ bar and the criminal bar and all other kinds of
bars, in having competent judges, and they are our natural allies
and there’s a lot more of them than there are of us.  For the most
part, a lot of us can’t make political contributions.  They can.
They can influence their legislators in ways that we never can.
So when Judge McAdam says we need to reach out to all seg-
ments of the bar, that is absolutely true because it is in their
interests to see to it that judicial independence is protected.
Otherwise, you’re not going to have the best and brightest on
the bench. . . .
Michael W. Manners is a circuit judge on the Jackson County Circuit
Court in Independence, Missouri.  While a trial lawyer for 24 years
before taking the bench, he was president of the Eastern Jackson
County Bar Association and the Missouri Trial Lawyers Association.
Michael L. Buenger is the state court administrator in Missouri.  He
is a past president of the Conference of State Court Administrators.  
Kevin S. Burke is a district judge and past chief judge of the
Hennepin County District Court in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  He
received the 2003 William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence from the National Center for State Courts.
Bobby B. DeLaughter is a circuit judge on the Hinds County Circuit
Court in Jackson, Mississippi.  A former district attorney and past
president of the Mississippi Prosecutor’s Association, he handled the
1994 prosecution of Byron De La Beckwith for the 1963 murder of
Medgar Evers, a case portrayed in the movie, Ghosts of
Mississippi.
Malcolm Feeley is professor of law at the Boalt Hall School of Law
at the University of California-Berkeley and the author of several
books about the court system.
Michael R. McAdam is a judge and former presiding judge on the
Kansas City (Mo.) Municipal Court.  He served as president of the
American Judges Association in 2003-2004 and organized the
National Forum on Judicial Independence.
Mary Campbell McQueen is president of the National Center for
State Courts.  Previously, she served as the state court administra-
tor in Washington for 16 years.
Jeffrey Rosinek is a circuit judge on the Miami-Dade County Circuit
Court in Florida.  He is a past president of the American Judges
Association.
John Russonello is a partner in the public-opinion research firm
Belden, Russonello & Stewart in Washington, D.C.  He does public-
opinion research, polling, and focus-group studies for various
groups on topics related to the judiciary and judicial independence.  
Roy A. Schotland is professor of law at Georgetown University in
Washington, D.C.  He is an expert on judicial selection, including
elections, and teaches courses on administrative law, campaign
finance, constitutional law, and election law.
Robert Wessels has served since 1976 as the court manager for the
county criminal courts at law in Harris County (Houston), Texas.
He is a past president of the National Association for Court
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I think that judicial independence is more
than just making decisions. I think that along
those same lines we have to have judicial
accountability. If a judge decides to pay golf
at eleven o’clock every single day, then that
judge should be called a former judge
because that individual destroys it for all of us.
– Jeffrey Rosinek
The final panel discussion at the National Forum on Judicial
Independence was moderated by Jack Ford, host of the syndicated
Public Broadcasting System program, Inside the Law. The discus-
sion explores topics of judicial independence in a manner designed
for use with the public at large and formed the basis for the one-
hour PBS program, “Judicial Independence: The Freedom to Be
Fair.”  Panelists were Leo Bowman, chief judge of the District Court
in Pontiac, Michigan, Kevin Burke, district judge and former chief
judge of the Hennepin County (Minn.) District Court, Michael
Cicconetti, judge of the Painesville (Ohio) Municipal Court,
Malcolm Feeley, professor of law at the University of California-
Berkeley, Steve Leben, district judge in Johnson County, Kansas,
Michael R. McAdam, a judge and former presiding judge on the
Kansas City (Mo.) Municipal Court, Gayle Nachtigal, circuit court
judge in Washington County, Oregon, Tam Nomoto Schumann,
superior court judge in Orange County, California, and William C.
Vickrey, state court administrator in California.  The National
Forum on Judicial Independence was supported by a generous grant
from the Joyce Foundation of Chicago, Illinois.
JACK FORD: Whether judges are elected or appointed, as they
say, at the trial level or at the appellate level, they’re sworn to
decide cases based solely on their merits, but is it naive of us for
us to believe that judges’ personal or political beliefs might not
enter in some fashion into that decision-making process?  Well,
Inside the Law has put together a panel of distinguished judges
and other experts to take a look at that and other issues that are
important to the administration of the justice system. . . .
We hear often nowadays the term “judicial activism” and
when we hear it, it’s not often as a compliment and it comes
from a variety of different points of view.
Professor Feeley, let me ask you this:  What does judicial
activism mean?
PROFESSOR MALCOLM FEELEY: Activism can be interpreted in
several different ways. . . . The most prevalent one is if a judge
decides in a way you don’t like him to decide.  More generally,
though, it is a term that means that judges breathe new mean-
ing into old, old doctrine that substantially moves it forward.
MR. FORD: Is it, then, a concept that the public should fear?
PROFESSOR FEELEY: Well, in the common-law tradition it’s a
concept that is inevitable in the evolution of law.
MR. FORD: So it’s something, then, as you said, in the common-
law tradition we . . . shouldn’t be surprised that it exists?
PROFESSOR FEELEY: We should be surprised if it doesn’t exist.
MR. FORD: Judge Burke, how about that?  In your experience is
there validity to the claim of judicial activism?
JUDGE KEVIN BURKE: I think it’s an overstated case.  I’ve been
a judge for 20 years.  There are very few cases that I see that are
great, monumental things in which I’m going to try to redefine
what marriage is about or other kinds of issues that really have
driven that [claim].
I think the large part of judicial activism is simply this:  There
are a hundred million cases in the state court system.  There are
very few judges.  You need people who are going to be innova-
tive in looking at how to solve today’s problems.
Family court needs to be reformed.  Judges need to be active
in looking at how you can deal with it.
So the social things that really drive the politicians to criticize
judges are a very, very small part of what happens with state
court judges.
MR. FORD: Judge Bowman, we’ve all heard the expression about
the perception becoming the reality.  I suspect if you stop peo-
ple on the street and say to them, “Do you believe that this judi-
cial activism exists, that judges incorporate their personal and
political beliefs into their decisions?” I suspect there are an
awful lot of them who are going to say yes.  What would you say
to those people?
JUDGE LEO BOWMAN: I would say that in fact it is not the case
that judges, for the most part, incorporate personal views into
their decisions. . . . I’ve been a judge for 16 years and I cannot
think of one instance where personally I have incorporated it.
In my discussions with colleagues who’ve served fewer years, as
well as longer, I haven’t seen that.  As the judge here, there may
be instances where a judge looks at the law in a fresher or newer
way. That may be called activism, but that is not a factor.
JUDGE MICHAEL McADAM: I was just going to say, Jack, that
judicial activism is not a legal term, it’s a political term, and
therefore I’ve never heard someone who won their case describe
their judge as a judicial activist.  It’s usually, as Professor Feeley
says, the person that’s on the losing side of a case that will use
that term, but it’s usually in a political context, not a legal one.
MR. FORD: What about the idea that so many of our judges
nowadays are actually selected through an election process?
Some can be nonpartisan, others can be in partisan elections,
and again a member of the public would say, “Well, here is a
judge running for election and has answered and said this is
what my beliefs are about certain issues.”  
Judge Leben, let me ask you this question:  Why shouldn’t a
member of the public think that that judge who has said this is
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what I believe as part of my campaign for election here is going
to vote that way no matter what the facts of a particular case
might be?
JUDGE STEVE LEBEN: Well, if the judge has given their views on
a legal issue, I think that’s probably appropriate at some broad
level.  If they’ve tried to get to a microlevel where they are really
deciding a specific case, then they’ve gone too far and in some
states—for example, Missouri has adopted rules which say that
judges will have to recuse and disqualify themselves if that case
ultimately comes before them if they made too specific a
promise during an election campaign.
So you’re entitled to know something about what a judge’s
views are about the way they approach the law, but not neces-
sarily as to a specific case.
Statutory interpretation would be an area.  If a judge is going
to be consistent on whether they look at legislative history to
interpret a statute, that’s perfectly appropriate and they should
tell you in advance, as members of the U.S. Supreme Court
have, as to whether they will or won’t consider it.  But if they
consider it only in the cases in which they want the outcome to
come out a certain way but in other cases they won’t consider it,
then they are judicial activists, kind of a threatening sort.
MR. FORD: . . . And, Mr. Vickrey, let me ask you this, as some-
body who administers the largest court system in the country.
Once we are in a situation where we are electing our judges and
they’re making promises to be elected, doesn’t the voting pub-
lic then have a right to ask of them how would you vote if
indeed you had to decide a case dealing with the existence of
abortion, if you had to decide a case about flag burning, if you
had to decide one of these real hot-button issues? Why is the
public not entitled to find that out before they cast their vote
for you?
MR. WILLIAM C. VICKREY: Well, the public isn’t entitled to know
that, because what we want out of a judge is someone who has
integrity, who is fearless in ruling on the most difficult case
based on the facts and the law in that case.  We’re not electing
representatives.  The judicial branch of government does not
reside in the representative branch of government.  We leave
that role to the legislative and executive branch, and I think
that’s why the election of judges causes such tremendous con-
fusion and conflict.
And as to the word “judicial activism,” I think the public
ought to be concerned about it because in spite of what the his-
torical background of that term may be, it is a term used today
meant to intimidate politically judges on how they might rule
on some of the most intractable problems that the public brings
to the courts for solutions.
MR. FORD: But if a judge is elected, and let’s weave in another
concept here.  If a judge, as part of that election process, has
received contributions from various sources and then that judge
is up for reelection and that judge knows that there is a contro-
versial case coming before them that a group that contributed to
that judge’s campaign has a real hard-and-fast interest in, does
the judge owe any allegiance to those people that helped that
judge become elected? Judge Schumann? 
JUDGE TAM NAMOTO SCHUMANN: The Canons of Ethics are
quite clear on that.  If you receive a contribution, a political con-
tribution of any source . . .—there is really no bright line.  The
standard rule is a two-year recusal period.  The Judicial Council
and the Commission of Judicial Performance has even extended
it to longer periods of time, depending upon the amount of the
contribution and the closeness of the relationship to the candi-
date, and we have had judges in California that have been disci-
plined who have taken cases where contributions were made to
that judge even beyond that two-year period.
MR. FORD: Does the public understand that?
Judge Nachtigal, let me ask you.  Does the public understand
there’s a Canon of Ethics or is the public just going to say, “You
know what?  You asked for my vote.  You asked for my ballot.  I
gave you my ballot, I gave you my vote, and I’m entitled to
expect something from you”?
JUDGE GAYLE NACHTIGAL: No, the public doesn’t under-
stand.  The public views us in many ways the same way they
would their local legislature, who they should expect that
kind of response from.  The understanding that a judge’s role
is to decide a case on its merits, no matter how I might have
voted in the privacy of the voting booth, which may be very,
very different—in fact, in some cases in my case have been
different.  How I voted and how I ruled ultimately on the
issue were diametrically opposed because when presented
with both sides of the issue and both sides taken into consid-
eration along with the laws and the Constitution applied, it
was clear to me what my judicial duty was . . ., and the pub-
lic doesn’t understand that.
MR. FORD: . . . Judge Cicconetti, how can we help the public to
understand that just because you may well have been elected
judge, just because somebody might have contributed to your
campaign, and just because in running for your new judicial
seat you offered some thoughts about your judicial viewpoints,
that the public is not entitled the way they believe they’re enti-
tled to a vote from a politician?
JUDGE MIKE CICCONETTI: Well, Jack, here’s the irony.  We are to
be the safeguards of the First Amendment rights of the individ-
uals that come before us, yet we are prohibited from stating our
beliefs.  We are not permitted to give our view on issues, on
social issues, or, “What if this case came before you?”  So it’s
really almost a blind vote to the public when they go to the polls
and vote for a judge.
Now you can’t strip your personality when you go on the
bench.  You always have that.  But you have to follow the law,
like it or not.  If somebody contributed to your campaign and if
they really believed in you, then they should know that you will
make the right decision based on the law, and if it’s against them,
well so be it.
JUDGE BURKE: See, I think that the public doesn’t have the right
to win in a courtroom.  They have a right to be listened to, and
we have an obligation to make sure that anybody who comes
before me is listened to and can understand what the decision
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or why the decision was made when they leave.  That’s the oblig-
ation that we have.
The corrupting influence of money or other kinds of stuff
like that interferes with the first thing, which is you aren’t being
listened to because you made up your mind before, and horri-
bly corrupts the second thing, which is people will leave the
courthouse not understanding why that decision was made.
Those two things judges can be held accountable for:  Are you
listened to and do you understand why that decision was made
when you leave?
MR. FORD: What, then, would we say to a member of the pub-
lic?  You said before that term “judicial activism” is often uti-
lized by somebody who just lost in the courtroom.  What then
do we say to members of the public if they feel as if they have
lost . . . ?  What sort of recourse do they have?  What do we tell
them to do and where do they go?
JUDGE NACHTIGAL: The obvious answer is you go to the
court of appeals, the next court up.  That’s why we have mul-
tiple levels.
MR. FORD: But suppose they have lost at the court of appeals?
Suppose they lost at the highest level of the appellate court in
that state?
JUDGE NACHTIGAL: . . . Go back to one of your first, your ear-
lier questions.  I said that we don’t always explain.  We don’t go
to the public very often and explain how the system works.
This is part of the process that we’re making here today, but not
everybody watches public television, so it’s a matter of going out
in the community and explaining how the system really works.
We don’t teach civics the way we used to, and judges have
not been good at tooting their horn, in a sense, and going on
and explaining the value of an independent judiciary in spite of
what I may think about a particular topic.  We need to be better
at going out and explaining the process. . . .
PROFESSOR FEELEY: There’s a huge amount of research that sug-
gests that if judges, police officers, other public officials that are
forced to apply the law act with procedures that are fair, open,
honest, and give an opportunity for those that are before them
to speak their minds, speak their peace, that people will accept
losing.  There are not lots of sore losers in a fair legal process.
They can be disappointed, but they’re not angry and they don’t
delegitimize the process.
MR. FORD: . . . Let’s take a look at another question about the
operation of our courts.  You like to believe that as a litigant you
walk into a courtroom and there will be a level playing field,
you’re anticipating, but the reality, Judge Leben: Is there always
a level playing field inside a courtroom?
JUDGE LEBEN: Of course not.  There’s not a level playing field
in most areas of society because if you have wealth, you can get
things that you can’t without wealth.  Are public defenders as
good as the best criminal defense attorney?  No.  Are pro se 
litigants, people who self-represent themselves, getting the same
level of justice that others are?  No.
On the other hand, there are many things that can be done to
improve their situation.  Many courts today are providing assis-
tance centers to self-represented litigants to make sure they have
a reasonable chance to get most of the types of things they want
to handle in court taken care of:  simple divorce cases, landlord-
tenant cases, consumer cases.  Those things we are in many
parts of the country providing a lot of help to the self-repre-
sented litigant, because they do have a right to access to our
court system.
MR. FORD: Well, what happens, then, to the person who is on
the other side of the self-represented litigant?  I’ll tell you, one
of the most difficult cases I ever tried as prosecutor was when I
had a pro se defendant who decided he was going to represent
himself—and throughout the course of the trial my trial judge,
who’s a wonderful judge and even a friend, was killing me as a
prosecutor, just bending over backwards, clearly because this
judge truly believed that if justice is going to be served in this
courtroom, it can’t work because this person is so inadequate
representing himself.
But is that right, Judge Bowman?  Was that right for the state
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[A]s to the word “judicial activism,” I think the
public ought to be concerned about it because in
spite of what the historical background of that
term may be, it is a term used today meant to
intimidate politically judges on how they might
rule on some of the most intractable problems
that the public brings to the courts for solutions.
– William C. Vickrey
that I’m representing, that once this person made his decision
“I’m going on my own,” that they basically got the judge on
their side, too?
JUDGE BOWMAN: Well, I don’t know so much as it was a judge
on their side as much as it is a judge’s responsibility to make
sure that the proceeding is fair, and that sometimes requires the
judge to, with pro se litigants and otherwise, to explain more, to
give some direction to, so that the process is just that:  fair.
MR. FORD: But don’t we find ourselves in a situation where by
the judge attempting to be fair, and essentially helping out the
one who is, for whatever reason, not qualified, not capable, or
just not handling it well, that it can have an impact on the other
side?
Aren’t there situations where you have, all of a sudden, a
lawyer—a not very competent lawyer—fails to ask an important
question and I, as the adversary, am sitting there thinking, “This
is great.  This is great.  Missed the whole point.  Let’s get this wit-
ness off the stand and let’s get out of here because I’m in great
shape now.”  And, all of a sudden, the judge asks, “Let me ask
you a question, sir, before I let you go from the stand,” and I’m
sitting there going, “No!”
Is that fair to me?
JUDGE LEBEN: Jack, you’ve got two contexts you’ve brought up.
One is the criminal situation and you, as a prosecutor, probably
in the end result would appreciate what the judge did.
MR. FORD: . . . Because it provides me with a fairly appellate-
proof case?
JUDGE LEBEN: Exactly.
MR. FORD: I still like to win.
JUDGE LEBEN: But we have to make sure we protect that defen-
dant’s rights, and doing so will make sure that he will only have
one trial and that the conviction is certain.  The trial court has
to be fair to both parties.  You don’t have to make an evidentiary
objection on their behalf, but you do have to explain things.  We
are a branch of government.  We have to be accessible to the
people.
PROFESSOR FEELEY: With all due respect, that’s hardly a big
problem in the unfair, the problem of unfairness, is the judge
bending over to help a pro se litigant.  The problem, the big
problem, is the one shot, the occasional person that comes in to
file a consumer complaint or the tenant trying to manage a bat-
tle against a landlord where the other side are repeat players.
The real problem is the one-shotters that are at the mercy of the
frequent repeat-player litigants.
MR. FORD: Why is that such a problem and what should we be
doing about it?
PROFESSOR FEELEY: Well, the problem is obvious that one gains
a great deal of knowledge through experience.  If one side is
more experienced than the other, the experience is a great
resource.  It benefits you.  The obvious answer is to make sure
the one-shotters are represented by adequate counsel.
MR. FORD: Do we see that, for instance, in municipal court, in
your court?
JUDGE CICCONETTI: Sure.  When we have a defendant who
comes in represented by perhaps an inferior attorney, this isn’t a
ball game.  You can’t spot the other team two touchdowns from
the bench, but you have to ensure that that defendant has a fair
trial, so you tend to bend over a little more backwards to assist
that defendant.  I think most of us do.
JUDGE BURKE: I think the truth is this is hard.  It is very hard 
. . . when you have a good lawyer on one side and a not-so-good
lawyer on the other side.  And we’ve talked here about it being
the defendants’ rights, but I’ve seen some prosecutors who
weren’t as good maybe as you were, and all of a sudden, you see
here’s a slick defense lawyer and you have a victim who’s saying,
“What happened?”
This is hard for judges, on how you end up giving them a bal-
ance, and when you intervene and when you don’t is not an easy
decision judges that make.
JUDGE BOWMAN: I think in the great majority of the cases,
judges stay out of it.  It’s generally the rare circumstance, espe-
cially when both parties are represented.  They don’t have a
judge that helps any of them.  It’s generally the case where it’s a
pro se litigant and she’s questioned . . . [with an] attorney . . . on
the other side where a judge does get involved, [but] that’s still
a rare circumstance.
MR. FORD: But is there, then, inherently some obligation on the
part of the judge to make it fair, to step in if they have to?
JUDGE SCHUMANN: If you’re talking about the criminal-law
context, which is very important, you have to be fair.  I think
we’ve forgotten one area  . . . and that is in the area of family law.
We have a large percentage [of self-represented] people, and the
stakes are so high.  The stakes are not only financial, but the
well-being of our children, and every one of us, unfortunately,
may have exposure . . . to family-law courts.
That’s the real headache.  That’s the real heartache that a
judge has—how we see this fairness to that pro per [self-rep-
resented] party who is looking at—because they don’t know
the procedures, the dotting of I’s, crossing of T’s in the case—
may lose visitation and custody of their child.  That is the
heartbreak.
MR. FORD: And what is the answer to that question?
JUDGE SCHUMANN: You know, at least in my state it is not a
jury trial.  It is a court trial, and that gives me some flexibility,
some flexibility to ask important questions and get to the heart
of the issue.
MR. FORD: How do you know as a judge where the line is,
where one side of the line says all right, you’re helping the
process, but when you cross over that, you’ve begun to help a
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litigant, not the process?  How do you know where that line
is? . . .
JUDGE NACHTIGAL: Sometimes that’s hard to say.  It comes with
experience.  Certainly where I jumped in at the beginning, and
where I may jump in now are at different points in the continu-
um of learning to be a judge.
I think that the answer is that you are responsible for the fair-
ness of the trial.  I’m not necessarily responsible for the ultimate
outcome of the trial, but was the trial done fairly?  If there are
two attorneys involved, my response is very different than if
there’s an attorney and a pro se or two pro se’s, where I jump in
and what my responsibility is.
MR. FORD: So the process, you may help ensure that the process
is fair, yet the result might not necessarily be fair?  Is that accept-
able?
JUDGE NACHTIGAL: If the process is fair, then the outcome
should be fair.  One side is not going to think it’s fair.  That’s
where you get the disgruntled party from.  But if the process is
fair, you can understand maybe not winning everything that you
want.  If the process is not fair, the outcome cannot ultimately
be fair.
JUDGE BURKE: I think that’s what the professor was trying to
say. A lot of people come into court knowing—look, they’re not
necessarily going to win.  But their expectation is that they’re
going to understand what that process is.  If they get leave frus-
trated with the process, even the winner can be dissatisfied.  I
mean, the idea that 50 percent of the time is the maximum level
of satisfaction, a bad process can have both the winner and loser
going away from the courthouse saying we’re idiots and we can’t
afford that.
JUDGE McADAM: I’m on a high-volume municipal court in
Kansas City, Missouri, and there’s been many a time when I’ll
have a short trial, a traffic violation,  let’s say, where the defen-
dant will come away and say thank you after I’ve found . . . them
guilty because what they wanted was their day in court.  They
wanted to be heard, they wanted to be treated with respect, and
when they found that, and they didn’t expect it necessarily, but
when they found it, they were grateful, and so even though the
result may not have been what they wanted, I think it was a
favorable result and fair nonetheless.
JUDGE SCHUMANN: I think an important part of the process is
demeanor. . . .  In other words, if you are respectful, courteous,
and attentive and don’t look like, you know, this is a bunch of
nonsense:  “Why am I here?  Why are you taking up the time?
I’ve got 30,000 cases behind it.  Move it.”  With that kind of atti-
tude and demeanor, they have people who lose total respect for
the court system and the judiciary. So it’s demeanor.  I think
that’s critical.
MR. FORD: So as long as the litigants are satisfied that the
process was fair, including all of these factors, then even though
they might not be happy, justice has been served?
JUDGE McADAM: I would say so, and . . . these cases are not just
concepts of law in a vacuum.  They are fact-based and because
of that, every case has their sets of facts, and therefore you may
think that your case is equally worthy of one you just heard that
day or read about in the newspaper, but because of a difference
in facts, the judge may have to go a different direction, or if it’s
a jury-tried case, the jury does.  So that becomes the change of
result that could be justified because of facts. . . .
PROFESSOR FEELEY: We’re discussing this as if most cases are
adjudicated at the end of trial.  The fact of the matter is most
cases settle, and I think one of the reasons they settle, and are
negotiated, is that leads to a win-win situation while an adjudi-
cated case is likely to lead to a zero sum, a win or lose.  Ninety
percent, 95% of your dockets are resolved through negotiated
settlements rather than trial, and I think that facilitates the win-
win situation.  That maximizes the likelihood that everyone
goes away happy.
MR. FORD: We know that fairness, integrity are all essential to
the administration of justice, but we also know that there is a
financial cost to operate the justice system.
Mr. Vickrey, how much does it cost to operate California
courts per year?
MR. VICKREY: It costs about $2.7 billion a year to operate the
trial and appellate system in this state.
MR. FORD: How does that compare to other systems around the
country?
MR. VICKREY: Well, I don’t know how the costs compare,
roughly.  California has fewer judges per hundred thousand
compared to states like New York, New Jersey, Florida, and
Arizona next door to us, Washington State even more, so the
cost in California I would assume is probably about, in equal-
ized dollars for cost of living, is probably about the average
spent around the country.
MR. FORD: Obviously when you’re talking costs, you’re talking
about a wide array of items, ranging from judges’ salaries to sim-
ple supplies in the courtroom.  Have we reached a point—with
all the budget battles that are going on in the jurisdiction, have
we reached a point where the justice system can actually be
damaged because of a lack of financial resources? 
JUDGE BOWMAN: I don’t know that we’ve reached the point,
but I say without question that that potential is there.  In
Michigan where I sit as a district judge, in our court, because of
budget issues that are at the state level, funding has been
reduced and it gets down to practical problems in court of:  Are
you going to have enough personnel?  Is the judge going to be
able to open the court up on a given day to process the cases that
people are waiting to have processed? And while we haven’t
reached that point, the potential and the danger is there.
JUDGE BURKE: I don’t think that courts have been very effective
in explaining this issue to the people.  People understand that if
you have a large class size and you get too big, kids can’t learn,
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and that social promotion is a bad idea, and yet when it comes
to the justice system, if I have a courtroom that’s too full and
people don’t have an opportunity to be listened to and they leave
the courthouse not understanding what happened, we’ve done
damage to the justice system that may be irreparable for the peo-
ple who were in that day.
Most people are only going to end up in court once or twice
in their life. . . .  That experience is really critical for them.  If it’s
the divorce and the family that you say is affected—I [may have
to get] it done real fast and you leave and can’t figure out why
[you] can’t see [your] kids as much is a big issue for us, but I
don’t think the judiciary has been very effective in explaining
that issue generally to the public and more particularly to the
legislature. . . .
MR. VICKREY: I was just going to offer maybe a slightly differ-
ent view.  I don’t disagree with the fact that the courts have not
been effective, perhaps, in making their case with the public
about funding, but I do think we cross the line in terms of harm-
ing the court system and even placing in jeopardy the under-
standing of the judicial process in terms of how we fund our
courts, and I think we need to do more than be better advocates
and better public educators.  We clearly need to do that, but I
think we need to redefine the system of checks and balances
between our branches of government and the relationship to
our branches of government.
A hundred years ago, the courts basically were funded with
the judges’ salaries.  Today they are very complex operations and
the courts depend on technology and they depend upon the
staff in the operations.  They depend upon resources for special
courts, for the drug courts and complex-litigation courts, and I
think we need to redefine accountability in the court system as
we relate to the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment.
It is not appropriate today to have a governor to decide what
level of funding for a balanced budget and to decide substan-
tively this is the area where funding will go, “I will fund busi-
ness courts,” “I will fund drug courts,” or wherever the issue
may be; or for a legislature, either through benign neglect
because of the pressure from other strong interest groups that
are pushing money for other activities or because they’re upset
about a decision, to not fund adequately the courts in a manner
that will allow equal access for every citizen, regardless of what
area is seen, in which their case comes to court.
MR. FORD: . . . You touched on an important point and,
Professor Feeley, let me ask you about this.  What about the idea
that here we have supposedly three independent branches of
government, the executive and legislative and judicial, and yet
it’s the legislature that essentially says, “I’m going to tell you
folks in the judicial branch how much money you’re going to
make, what your salary is going to be.  I, as the legislative
branch, am going to tell you what you can use your money for
and how much you’re going to get for any programs you want.
Basically I’m going to tell you how many staples and papers and
pens you can have in your system.”
What’s wrong with that?
PROFESSOR FEELEY: Well, in a sense, nothing is wrong with it.
We ought to have the legislature as being the possessor of the
purse, but I would certainly agree with the point that was just
made.  That is, the appropriation ought to go to the judicial
branch and the judiciary in turn ought to figure out how best to
spend the money.  We don’t need the legislature trying to micro-
manage the courts because in a sense that’s micromanaging jus-
tice and the judicial councils are better equipped for doing that
than are the people in the legislature.
But I see nothing wrong with the budget being set by the leg-
islature.  In fact, it’s hard for me to imagine who else would set
it.
MR. VICKREY: Well, let me offer a different point of view. I think
surely that’s a concept we all think about, the power of the
purse, and that responsibility belongs to the legislative branch.
I think as it relates to a neutral, independent judiciary, that
system no longer works today in the United States and I think
some other mechanism, whether it is providing by constitution
a mechanism that provides for the funding of the courts or the
process that our legislature and governor supported this last
year in California—to have a mechanism that adjusts the base of
People understand that if you have a large class
size and you get too big, kids can’t learn and that
social promotion is a bad idea, and yet when it
comes to the justice system, if I have a courtroom
that’s too full and people don’t have an opportu-
nity to be listened to and they leave the court-
house not understanding what happened, we’ve
done damage to the justice system that may be
irreparable for the people who were in that day.
– Kevin S. Burke
the budget of the courts automatically each year, trying to treat
the judiciary as a coequal branch of government, because the
judiciary at the state level, across the United States, are, for the
most part, only in theory a coequal branch of government.  In
reality, they are not a coequal branch of government that can be
held accountable for how effectively and how efficiently and
how fairly they’re handling the administration of justice in their
respective states, and that’s where the accountability needs to
be:  How timely is the justice?  How responsive is it?  Is it han-
dled in a way that’s perceived as being fair, as being fair in real-
ity to the parties in the process?  Material when you file it—if a
warrant is recalled, is it recalled a day or three weeks?
There’s been a case in California about resources in the last
several years in the operations of the courts, and so I believe we
need to do something to protect an independent judiciary in
this process.  When judges are worried about whether or not a
pay raise will go through, they’re worried about whether or not
the courts are going to have shorter hours of operation, which
they have here today, the clerks’ offices are cut back, so some-
body goes in for a protective service order and they may not be
able to get it in a day, that isn’t right.  That isn’t an independent
judicial system.  The public have—should have the right to
access to resolve their disputes.
MR. FORD: When we talk about the quality of justice, obviously
an enormous number of factors into it, into this, but ultimately,
ultimately when we’re talking about justice, we’re talking about
the judge on the bench.  That’s where it all comes in.  It funnels
through.  You need the staff.  You need the resources.  You need
the programs.  Ultimately it’s the judge, and when we talk about
budget battles here or the legislature as being unhappy with the
courts’ decisions or just saying we don’t have the money, we’ve
got to cut it someplace, how damaging is it to the justice system
that we now have a scenario where judges have to leave the
bench because we can’t afford to stay on the bench and put their
children through college; people who would [be] capable, qual-
ified, wonderful additions to the bench have to deny the invita-
tion because they say, “You know what?  I can’t afford to do
that,” because the judge’s salary is so different from what they
would make in the [private] sector.
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Is there real damage being done to the justice system because
of those financial constraints?
JUDGE BURKE: The hard part for judges is the delay in getting
regular salary [increases], so you go four or five years and noth-
ing happens.  That’s a big issue for judges.
The second issue is there are a number of places in the coun-
try where judges’ salaries are not competitive with other public-
sector employees.  It’s not about whether they’d make more
money in private practice, but in the school system they get
paid more than the chief justice of the state, and so I think those
inequities are as troublesome as the fact that, sure, if I’m in pri-
vate practice I’m going to make more money.  I like public ser-
vice, but I do think that it’s appropriate for judges to regularly
have a compensation package that is appropriate.
MR. FORD: Does the public share that view?  Does the public
understand that it can be a financial hardship for somebody
willing to engage in public service? . . .
PROFESSOR FEELEY: Oh, yes, I think so.  Most capable public
servants are well underpaid for what they would get in the pri-
vate sector, and that’s part of the challenge of public service . 
. . . Like the judge said, we certainly wouldn’t want to peg judi-
cial salaries to the incomes of successful lawyers.  What we
need to do is pay them to the salaries of other successful public
servants, which, as he suggested, is not the case in many places.
JUDGE BOWMAN: I don’t think that the public understands
that judges’ salaries are not competitive.  I believe that actually
they view judges as being well paid and don’t appreciate that if
a judge chose to leave the bench, that they probably could make
two to three times more in the private sector.  I think that the
general view is that we’re well paid, and hopefully, in the minor-
ity view, overpaid, but I think they don’t understand.
MR. FORD: How do you get the public to understand that?
JUDGE CICCONETTI: The public perception of judges, they may
say, “Well, Judge, you chose to run for this office.  You knew
In my county we have 450,000 residents and 21
judges. They can’t know me by name; they don’t
know the cases I handle. But they need some way
to evaluate whether as a public official I’m doing
a good job.
– Steve Leben
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what the salary was when you took your petitions out to run,
and then two or three years later you’re out there with your
organization lobbying legislators to have a pay increase.”
So they look at us and say, “What are you doing?”  And I
understand that.
MR. VICKREY: I do think that the issue that Judge Burke raised
is an important one, and that is when judges come to the bench,
their salaries are less than other public sectors.  I think that is a
matter that is demoralizing to judges in terms of both stature
and in the judiciary, probably, in the first place, but more impor-
tantly, the process for setting the salaries.  The public may not
understand the level of salaries.  I think they do understand
when the process is politicized.  I think they also understand—
you look at the opinion polls that that has an effect on the inde-
pendence and the neutrality of the trial judges, so I think in the
states, some 15 states, they have set up independent compensa-
tion commissions, [which] is one step that could be taken to
reform that area.   
And another issue is I think at least when we have asked the
judges in this state, certainly they’re concerned about salaries
and retirement, but they’re more concerned about having ade-
quate professional staff to support them, reasonable caseloads
so they have time to prepare for the hearings, so they have time
to contemplate and rule on the cases, and those types of things,
so I think there are people who come with the spirit of public
service; and we have been fortunate, I know, in this state, in
looking back at the appointments in the last five or six years,
that tremendous pull coming out of the partnership ranks of
the best firms in the state, the senior positions of the public sec-
tor for the district attorney and county counselor’s office, . . .
but it certainly becomes a challenge to keep them on the bench
when you go through these episodes of six years without a pay
raise or political warfare just to get a pay raise in which all of
the issues of unpopular decisions are brought forward when we
look at the complaints they have.
MR. FORD: One of the things we’re talking about here today is
the need for the public to better understand what happens
inside a courtroom.  The last decade or so, we’ve seen an enor-
mous explosion of media.  There are any number now of 24-
hour news cable networks.  We’ve seen that people have a real,
genuine, and compelling interest in trials that are taking place.
Do we see too much media focus and attention on trials now or
not enough media focus and attention on trials now? . . .
PROFESSOR FEELEY: Well, I tell my students that the courtroom
drama has replaced the superhero and the Lone Ranger of my
generation.  When I was a kid, the Lone Ranger used to ride
into town to save, to save the vulnerable folks, and now it’s the
Super Lawyer who rides into town, and so, as one that doesn’t
own a television and doesn’t watch television, I can’t give you
too much of an answer other than—other than the belief that
the lawyers have replaced the solve-it-all role of superhero in
popular culture.  I don’t think that’s really bad.
MR. FORD: If you ask a poll, a group in a room, whether or not
cameras in the courtroom during the course of a trial are a good
thing or bad thing, chances are you’re going to get more people
saying that they’re not a good thing.  What do you think about
cameras in the courtroom? . . .
JUDGE SCHUMANN: I have had them in my courtroom on 
relatively high-profile cases and I’ve noticed there is a definite
change in behavior of participants in the trial.  With all due
respect to you, Jack, the attorneys do start to “posturize” a bit
and they tend to be a little bit more flamboyant in their lan-
guage.
The jurors are very self-conscious and have to be constantly
reassured that their faces will not be photographed.  And I
know that cameras can go without the red light, without any
light indication on, but people are very conscious of that.
And I think the witnesses also are very uncomfortable, par-
ticularly if it’s a high-publicity trial or there’s some sort of spice
in it—for example, it’s a homicide or it’s a sex-related crime—
and so generally it is a very unnatural atmosphere in the court-
room.
MR. FORD: Understanding that and understanding the impact
that cameras have on people in everyday life, is that a small
price to pay, to allow literally millions of people to understand
exactly what’s going on inside a courtroom, to see the role of a
prosecutor in a criminal case, to see the role of a defense attor-
ney, to see how a judge handles that all, and to walk away say-
ing even though I might disagree with the verdict in that case,
I really appreciate now the process of the administration of jus-
tice?
JUDGE BOWMAN: I think that if it gets to the point of affecting
the way that the trial proceeds and ultimately has an adverse
effect on the outcome, particularly in a criminal case, then it is
not a small price to pay because the first responsibility is to
have the case and the trial occur fairly and have justice be
served.
JUDGE BURKE: I don’t think it’s our call.  I think that when
Jefferson and the Founding Fathers said you come in with your
quill pen, today’s modern equivalent is the camera, and so it’s
not our call.  We are in the tradition of saying we are going to
have open courtrooms, and the fact is technology shouldn’t
interfere with the way the courtroom goes on.
If you look at the most visible case in the country, O.J.
Simpson, I can make an argument, or would make an argu-
ment, that the public understood that much better because of
the cameras—that had that not been televised and you had talk-
ing heads standing outside and saying what was happening in
the courtroom, there would have been much more revulsion as
to what that verdict was than when people saw it on TV and
they said, “I understood why that verdict occurred.”
MR. FORD: Even though they might have disagreed with it—
JUDGE BURKE: Right.
MR. FORD: —they can say they understand? . . .
JUDGE NACHTIGAL: I don’t think it’s a problem if a camera in
the courtroom is there from the beginning of the trial to the end
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of the trial, showing the trial of what’s happening, protecting
the people.  The problem with the camera in the courtroom is
when they come in for two minutes and take that 30-second
sound byte out of context and that becomes the case.  That’s the
problem, not with the camera in the courtroom showing the
entire trial.  I think that’s a very good thing.
MR. FORD: And do judges then have the ability if we’re talking
about those concerns that Judge Schumann mentioned?  Do
judges have the ability to say, “I’m going to handle that prob-
lem.  I’m going to talk to the lawyers.  I’m going to make sure
they understand it.  If I have a witness who is reluctant to
appear, then I’ll make a decision that this witness will not be
shown”?
Are those issues that are manageable in order to accomplish
both things, justice in the courtroom and the public under-
stands about justice in the courtroom?
JUDGE LEBEN: They’re definitely manageable, and I agree com-
pletely with Kevin Burke that the camera is the equivalent of
the notebook today.  On the other hand, we also have to keep
in mind we’re dealing with human beings.
I had a very simple civil case in which we were just dealing
with whether a neighborhood association could force some-
body to get their fence down from 6 feet to 4 feet because that’s
what the subdivision regulations required.  To the surprise of
the young woman attorney who was on her last day of working
at the law firm she was at and was forced to go to trial even
though she didn’t want to be a trial lawyer, a camera showed up
because one of the parties wanted publicity for the case, and
there was a television camera man there and the woman attor-
ney was in tears immediately before the case.  I talked with her,
I talked with the camera man, and I got both of their interests
accommodated—and we went on and had the trial in a positive
manner.
On the criminal side, most judges will sit down in a high-
profile case with the defense attorney and the prosecutor at the
start, talk about what’s going to be done and how it’s going to
work, and work that out as it goes along.  I think it can be
accommodated.
MR. VICKREY: Jack, I think there is one other issue that needs
to be considered in this.  There’s one that we’re talking about,
criminal and civil cases, but if we’re not careful, one of the
implications, if there is no discretion, is we inadvertently, I
think, create a two-tiered justice system:  Those individuals
who want to a divorce and want their privacy go out into the
private sector, and those individuals who have their civil dis-
pute and they want privacy go out to the private justice system,
and those who can’t afford to go to the private justice system
end up in the public justice system.
And so I think just as we’re dealing with the issue about
making records available electronically, that the same kind of
debate about cameras in the courtroom needs to go on as we try
to adjust the public’s access to their justice system and, at the
same time, recognize and try to respect a respectful environ-
ment for those who come to the courts to resolve their prob-
lems.
MR. FORD: Clearly, when you’re talking about a justice system
and how it functions, you need to focus on the judge.  The
judge is the centerpiece of that justice system.  People need to
have confidence in the honesty, the integrity, and the compe-
tence of their judges.  What standards should we use as mem-
bers of the public to determine if a judge is doing a good 
job? . . .
PROFESSOR FEELEY: The fact of the matter is it’s hard to know,
for a member of the public to know whether a particular judge
is doing a good job, unless they’ve seen them directly, but one
of the values of elections is endorsements.  And if judges are
endorsed by organizations that are well regarded, that should
give members of the public some considerable confidence . . . .
I think we’ve seen a failure of public agencies and private agen-
cies and organizations to do enough endorsing of judges.
MR. FORD: Various states and bar associations have groups,
committees that are designed to make sure that judges are func-
tioning properly, to step in if there are complaints, to handle
complaints, to determine what sort of result, if any, is necessary
based upon the complaints . . . .  What role should the public,
members of the public, have in determining whether judges
have made mistakes, have erred, have not been judge-like in
their demeanor, and then what consequences of that?  Should
the public have any role in that? . . .
JUDGE BOWMAN: In Michigan, there are public representatives
on our judicial review commission. And I think that is a good
thing.  Judges are also involved, and lawyers are involved on
commissions.  It’s a balance and I think ultimately it works well.
MR. FORD: Why does it work well?  The argument can be made
that you know what?  I’m a member of the public who hasn’t
gone to a law school, who hasn’t been under the pressures of
practicing law or administering justice.  While it’s nice to have
them on the panel, you can argue they don’t understand what’s
going on, the pressures that a judge might be under.  Why isn’t
it a good thing to have them?
JUDGE BOWMAN: I think the balance of ideas that flow—
because people, citizens, have good common sense, and in the
end, with judges involved on the panel and lawyers involved
and the citizenry, that the citizenry is able to use their good
common sense and the result is fair.
MR. VICKREY: The majority of the complaints involve the
demeanor and the behavior of professionals, and I think it’s
important for the public to be involved in that process.
In California, the lay citizens represent the majority of the
individuals on the panel; the hearings are open to the public, as
well as, obviously, the final results of the decisions, and I think
it is important that that system of accountability be strength-
ened, just as we want to have a strong appellate review process.
We shouldn’t be focusing on the ballot box as a way to
address behavior that falls outside of the norm—the behavior
by 2 or 3% of the judges that falls below the expectations of the
judges, members of the bar, [and] the appointing authorities for
a jurist in any jurisdiction.  So I think it’s important that the
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public is educated to know what’s available to them so they can
file complaints.  It is also important they be a part of the inves-
tigating and hearing process to make decisions about  specific
judges.
JUDGE LEBEN: Jack, we’re really talking about two different
ways of evaluating judges.  What I’m talking about here and Bill
is talking about is the judicial discipline process in which there
is a complaint against a judge or a serious problem involving a
judge.  But the public also wants another way to evaluate the
function of their judge, and they need one.
In my county we have 450,000 residents and 21 judges.
They can’t know me by name; they don’t know the cases I han-
dle.  But they need some way to evaluate whether as a public
official I’m doing a good job.
The American Judicature Society a few years ago looked at
the four states then that were having formal judicial evaluation
programs, and they have surveys not only of lawyers, but other
court participants—jurors, police officers, probation officers—
to look at what the judge is doing, look at the statistics on how
quickly they’re handling their cases, whether they’re appropri-
ately handling their cases, and then give a public report before
the judge comes up either for retention or reelection, and I
think that’s something that’s important for us to try to get in
more states because the public needs that type of information.
MR. FORD: Last question, then:  How can we best assure the
members of the public that judges are doing their job and that
the justice system for the most part is working fine? 
PROFESSOR FEELEY: . . . . I’m going to confess.  Professors have
tenure, and I don’t think one professor at my university . . . has
been removed for incompetence in the past 20 years.  I wonder
how many judges here in their states one, at least one judge in
the past 20 years, has been removed for incompetence.  My
hunch is that most of these procedures or these institutions for
discipline and removal don’t work very well in the universities,
in the bar, and on the bench.  But I may be wrong.  I’d be inter-
ested in hearing.
JUDGE BURKE: I disagree.  I think that the experience is that,
one way or the other, we’re pretty good at getting rid of the
worst, at least, in the judiciary.  In most states, one way or the
other, either the public or the judicial commission, is going to
get their reports.
I think it is a challenge, though, for how you can balance a
person who can improve and how we end up dealing with the
person who is not so bad that it’s so obvious to everyone to get
rid of them, but that they need to improve, and that is a big
challenge for the judiciary.
MR. FORD: When you say it’s a challenge, part of the challenge
is communication, to get the public to know that, yes, there are
mechanisms in place to deal with judges who are not compe-
tent, but also part of the challenge is to get the public to know
the flip side of that is there are an enormous number of talented
and competent judges out there that are working very hard and
they’re trying to make this justice system work and, for the
most part, it does work.  So how do you tell the public?  How
do they know that?
MR. VICKREY: Jack, I think there are things.  We want the judi-
ciary to be insulated, but I don’t think it has to be isolated, and
there are things that the court system can do to get the public
invested in the well-being or the health and vitality of their jus-
tice system.
In California, programs like having members of the public
participate with the local courts on planning for the future of
that court system, making it a responsibility of every judge in
the state as part of their responsibilities as jurists to participate
in public outreach activities.
For the court system to assume some responsibility for pub-
lic education—we’ve got to get over blaming the public educa-
tion system for doing a poor job on civics because the public
doesn’t understand our court system, and we need to assume
some responsibility for that.
Out of the 35 million people in California, 8 million have
some contact with the court system as a direct party to a case or
a traffic offense or some other activity every single year, and
when we add the jurors to that and we add the witnesses and
Out of the 35 million people in California, 8 
million have some contact with the court system
as a direct party to a case or a traffic offense or
some other activity every single year, and when
we add the jurors to that and we add the 
witnesses and other people in court, half the
population can have involvement inside the walls
of our courthouses.
– William C. Vickrey
64 Court Review - Fall/Winter 2005 
other people in court, half the population can have involvement
inside the walls of our courthouses.
We ought to be able to do a better job at some of the things
that Judge Burke and others talked about:  educating those who
come into our courthouse, having people treated respectfully,
giving them an opportunity to critique the system.
We need to be willing to openly evaluate and criticize our-
selves, and I think things like race and ethnic bias studies, . . .
studies on how fast the cases are being resolved, which courts
are effective and which ones aren’t.  We should be sharing every
bit of information we have and involving the public in all of
that, because I don’t think that information is going to threaten
the trial-court system or threaten any individual judge.  It’s
being aware of his or her constitutional responsibilities.
I think those are the things that will help the public invest in
our system.  It’s not the headline or the sensational case that is
dictating the opinions in the public.  I think it’s their direct per-
sonal involvement with our courts, or that of family or friends,
so we have to look at ourselves and address that population that
we do have contact with.
Leo Bowman is chief judge of the District Court in Pontiac,
Michigan, where he has served since 1988.  He is a past president
of the Michigan District Judges Association.  Before his election to
the bench, he served as a legal advisor to the Pontiac City Council.  
Kevin S. Burke is a district judge and past chief judge of the
Hennepin County District Court in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  He
received the 2003 William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence from the National Center for State Courts.
Michael Cicconetti is judge of the Painesville (Ohio) Municipal
Court.  He was vice president of the American Judges Association
in 2003-2004.  He is known for creative sentencing practices with
misdemeanor offenders.
Malcolm Feeley is professor of law at the Boalt Hall School of Law
at the University of California-Berkeley and the author of several
books about the court system.
Jack Ford is moderator for the syndicated Public Broadcasting
Company program Inside the Law and an anchor for Court TV.
He previously has worked in network news, including as co-anchor
of the Today show’s weekend edition and as NBC’s chief legal cor-
respondent.  He has a law degree from Fordham University and
worked as an assistant prosecutor in Monmouth County, New
Jersey.
Steve Leben is a judge on the Johnson County (Kan.) District
Court.  He received the Distinguished Service Award from the
National Center for State Courts in 2003.  He has been the editor
of Court Review since 1998 and was the secretary of the American
Judges Association in 2003-2004.
Michael R. McAdam is a judge and former presiding judge on the
Kansas City (Mo.) Municipal Court.  He served as president of the
American Judges Association in 2003-2004 and organized the
National Forum on Judicial Independence.
Gayle Nachtigal is a circuit court judge in Washington County,
Oregon, where she has served as the presiding judge.  She has
served as a member of the board of directors of the National Center
for State Courts and was president-elect of the American Judges
Association in 2003-2004.
Tam Nomoto Schumann is a superior court judge in Orange
County, California. She has served as a judge for 26 years, first
as a municipal judge and later on the superior court. She was rec-
ognized as a Pioneer of Judicial Administration and Education by
the California Judicial Council and was named Judge of the Year by
both the Orange County Trial Lawyers Association and the
Orange County Women Lawyers Association.
William C. Vickrey is the administrative director of the Judicial
Council of California’s Administrative Office of the Courts. In that
position, which he has held since 1992, he directs the operation of
most services to the California state court system. He is a past
president of the Conference of State Court Administrators and in
1995 received the Warren E. Burger Award, one of the highest hon-
ors given by the National  Center for State Courts, for his signifi-
cant contributions to the field of court administration. Before tak-
ing his present position in 1992, he served as the administrative
director of the courts of Utah from 1985 to 1992.
I don’t think the public understands that judges’
salaries are not competitive. I believe that actu-
ally they view judges as being well paid and don’t
appreciate that if a judge chose to leave the
bench, that they probably could make two to
three times more in the private sector.
– Leo Bowman
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Editor’s Note:  There are about 8,500 state general-jurisdiction
trial-court judges in the United States; of those, 77% stand for
some sort of contestable election and 87% stand for some form of
election.  There are about 1,250 state appellate judges in the
United States; of those, 53% stand for some sort of contestable
election and 87% stand for some form of election.  (See Court
Review, Summer 2004, at 21.)  In addition, there are thousands of
additional, limited-jurisdiction judges also subject to election.
Thus, the rules governing election-campaign conduct by judges are
of great significance.
In 2002, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the
United States Supreme Court held a broadly written provision of
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that prevented judicial
candidates from “announcing” positions on issues violated the
First Amendment.  On remand in that same case in August 2005,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held two
more provisions of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct—the
partisan-activities and solicitation clauses—unconstitutional.   
Whether the United States Supreme Court again takes the case
to provide its guidance or not (a request for review is pending), the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion will have broad impact, at least for the
near term.  State supreme courts will continue their struggles to
rewrite codes of judicial conduct to meet both the state interests
perceived to apply and the limits being placed upon those codes by
the federal courts.  And judicial candidates will continue their
efforts both to succeed in contested elections and to comply with
the codes of conduct.
Therefore, we reprint here substantial excerpts from the Eighth
Circuit’s opinion, as well as from the dissenting opinion of three
members of that court.  We have deleted all of the footnotes and
most of the citations. For the few Supreme Court cases cited by the
court to which we have retained the reference, they are simply
noted by name and year.  
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Republican Party of Minnesota, et al.,
vs.
Suzanne White, et al.,
416 F.3d 738 (Aug. 2, 2005).
[*744]  BEAM, Circuit Judge.  
This case is before us en banc upon remand from the United
States Supreme Court. We briefly outline what has occurred in
this matter since its inception, believing that it will be helpful
in analyzing the issues presented.
The dispute commenced in the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota. At issue were the so called
“announce,” “partisan-activities,” and “solicitation” clauses of
Canon 5 of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s canons of judicial
conduct. The district court rejected Appellants’ First and
Fourteenth Amendment claims, Republican Party of Minn. v.
Kelly (D. Minn. 1999), and granted summary judgment to
Appellees: the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards, the
Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, and the
Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility. On
appeal, a divided panel of this court affirmed the district court.
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly (8th Cir. 2001). We denied
Appellants’ en banc suggestion. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held, Republican Party of Minn. v. White (2002),
that the announce clause violates the First Amendment,
reversing our holding in Kelly. The Court remanded the case
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Upon
remand, the same panel, divided as before, again affirmed the
district court’s ruling on the solicitation clause and remanded
for further consideration in light of White of the partisan-activ-
ities clause. We granted Appellants’ request for en banc review,
vacating the panel opinion. Today, we find that the partisan-
activities and solicitation clauses also violate the First
Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and
remand the case with instructions to enter summary judgment
in favor of Appellants.
The Supreme Court’s remand requires us to consider two
issues in light of White: the constitutional viability of the parti-
san-activities and solicitation clauses of Canon  [*745]  5. . . .
I. BACKGROUND
Canon 5A(1) and 5B(1), the partisan-activities clause, and
B(2), the solicitation clause, rein in the political speech and
association of judicial candidates in Minnesota. The partisan-
activities clause states, in relevant part:
Except as authorized in Section 5B(1), a judge
or a candidate for election to judicial office shall
not:
(a) identify themselves as members of a political
organization, except as necessary to vote in an
election;
. . . .
(d) attend political gatherings; or seek, accept or
use endorsements from a political organization.
Section 5B(1)(a) provides that “[a] judge or a candidate for
election to judicial office may . . . speak to gatherings, other
than political organization gatherings, on his or her own
behalf.” (emphasis added). The solicitation clause states,
A candidate shall not personally solicit or accept
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campaign contributions or personally solicit
publicly stated support. A candidate may, how-
ever, establish committees to conduct campaigns
for the candidate through media advertisements,
brochures, mailings, candidate forums and other
means not prohibited by law. Such committees
may solicit and accept campaign contributions,
manage the expenditure of funds for the candi-
date’s campaign and obtain public statements of
support for his or her candidacy. Such commit-
tees are not prohibited from soliciting and
accepting campaign contributions and public
support from lawyers, but shall not seek, accept
or use political organization endorsements. Such
committees shall not disclose to the candidate
the identity of campaign contributors nor shall
the committee disclose to the candidate the iden-
tity of those who were solicited for contribution
or stated public support and refused such solici-
tation. A candidate shall not use or permit the
use of campaign contributions for the private
benefit of the candidate or others.
[*746]  The facts of this case demonstrate the extent to
which these provisions chill, even kill, political speech and
associational rights. In his 1996 bid for a seat as an associate
justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, appellant Gregory
Wersal (and others working on his behalf) identified himself as
a member of the Republican Party of Minnesota, attended and
spoke at the party’s gatherings, sought the endorsement of the
party, and personally solicited campaign contributions. In
response to Wersal’s appearance at and speech to a Republican
Party gathering, a complaint was filed with the Minnesota
Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, alleging that
Wersal’s actions violated Canon 5A(1)(d). Although the
Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility
(OLPR) ultimately dismissed the complaint, the complaint
accomplished its chilling effect. Wersal, fearful that other com-
plaints might jeopardize his opportunity to practice law, with-
drew from the race.
Wersal made a second bid for a seat on the Minnesota
Supreme Court in 1998. In 1997 and 1998, Wersal asked the
OLPR for advisory opinions regarding the solicitation and par-
tisan-activities clauses. The OLPR’s response was mixed, stat-
ing it would not issue an opinion regarding personal solicita-
tion, in light of proposed amendments to the Canon and the
fact that there were no judicial elections scheduled that 
particular year. It also stated that it would enforce the partisan-
activities clause. Wersal then initiated this litigation. In the
meantime, he was forced to write several letters to individuals
who had indicated they would speak on his behalf at
Republican Party conventions across the state, asking them not
to do so in order to avoid violating Canon 5 and imploring
them to “please be patient. I hope for a decision from the
Federal Courts soon.” He also had his campaign’s legal counsel
advise the chairman of the Republican Party of Minnesota that
Canon 5 would prohibit Wersal from accepting or using any
endorsement from the party. There is no question that Wersal
sought to work within the confines of Canon 5 even as he
sought to challenge it—confines that in the most direct of ways
restricted his political speech and association, compelling him
at one point to end a political campaign.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Judicial Selection in Minnesota
Minnesota has chosen to elect the judges of its courts.
. . . Some thirty-three states employ some form of con-
tested election for their trial courts of general jurisdiction,
their appellate courts, or both. As federal judges, we confess
some bias in favor of a system for the appointment of
judges. Indeed, there is much to be said for appointing
judges instead of electing them, perhaps the chief reason
being the avoidance of potential conflict between the selec-
tion process and core  [*747]  constitutional protections. In
promoting the newly drafted United States Constitution,
Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 78 that if the people were
to choose judges through either an election or a process
whereby electors chosen by the people would select them,
the judges would harbor “too great a disposition to consult
popularity to justify a reliance that nothing would be con-
sulted but the Constitution and the laws.” Arguably, con-
cerns about judicial independence and partisan influence,
posited by Minnesota as grounds for regulating judicial
election speech, are generated, fundamentally, not by the
exercise of political speech or association, but by concerns
surrounding the uninhibited, robust and wide-open
processes often involved in the election of judges in the first
place. As Justice O’Connor noted in her White concurrence,
“the very practice of electing judges undermines [an] inter-
est” in an actual and perceived impartial judiciary. 
Yet, there is obvious merit in a state’s deciding to elect its
judges, especially those judges who serve on its appellate
courts. It is a common notion that while the legislative and
executive branches under our system of separated powers
make and enforce public policy, it is the unique role of the
judicial branch to interpret, and be quite apart from making
that policy.
But the reality is that “the policymaking nature of appel-
late courts is clear.” Courts must often fill gaps created by
legislation. And in particular, by virtue of what state appel-
late courts are called upon to do in the scheme of state gov-
ernment, they find themselves as a matter of course in a
position to establish policy for the state and her citizens. “At
the [state] appellate level, common-law functions such as
the adoption of a comparative fault standard, or the deter-
mination of a forced spousal share of intestate property dis-
tribution, require a judiciary that is sensitive to the views of
state citizens. The courts’ policy-making power is, of
course, ever subject to the power of the legislature to enact
statutes that override such policy. But that in no way dimin-
ishes the reality that courts are involved in the policy
process to an extent that makes election of judges a reason-
able alternative to appointment.
Without question, Minnesota may choose (and has
repeatedly chosen) to elect its appellate judges. . . . [*748]
If Minnesota sees fit to elect its judges, which it does, it
must do so using a process that passes constitutional
muster.
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B. The First Amendment and Political Speech
Within this context, Minnesota has enacted Canon 5 in
an effort to regulate judicial elections. In White, the Court
held the announce clause of Canon 5, which prohibits judi-
cial candidates from stating their views on disputed legal
issues, unconstitutional. It falls to us now to determine
whether the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses of
Canon 5 are acceptable under the First Amendment. . . .
Protection of political speech is the very stuff of the First
Amendment. . . .  It cannot be disputed that Canon 5’s
restrictions on party identification, speech to political orga-
nizations, and solicitation of campaign funds directly limit
judicial candidates’ political speech. Its restrictions  [*749]
on attending political gatherings and seeking, accepting, or
using a political organization’s endorsement clearly limit a
judicial candidate’s right to associate with a group in the
electorate that shares common political beliefs and aims.
C. The Strict Scrutiny Framework
Political speech—speech at the core of the First
Amendment—is highly protected. Although not beyond
restraint, strict scrutiny is applied to any regulation that
would curtail it. The strict scrutiny test requires the state to
show that the law that burdens the protected right advances
a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. Strict scrutiny is an exacting inquiry, such that
“it is the rare case in which . . . a law survives strict
scrutiny.” 
1. The Requirement of a Compelling State Interest
Precisely what constitutes a “compelling interest” is
not easily defined. . . . [*750] In general, strict scrutiny
is best described as an end-and-means test that asks
whether the state’s purported interest is important
enough to justify the restriction it has placed on the
speech in question in pursuit of that interest. As one
commentator has said, “the Court’s treatment of govern-
mental interests has become largely intuitive, a kind of
‘know it when I see it’ approach.” . . . . A clear indicator
of the degree to which an interest is “compelling” is the
tightness of the fit between the regulation and the pur-
ported interest: where the regulation fails to address sig-
nificant influences that impact the purported interest, it
usually flushes out the fact that the interest does not rise
to the level of being “compelling.” . . . .  [*751] 
2. The Need for Narrow Tailoring
Once a state interest is found to be sufficiently com-
pelling, the regulation addressing that interest must be
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. As with the com-
pelling interest determination, whether or not a regulation
is narrowly tailored is evidenced by factors of relatedness
between the regulation and the stated governmental inter-
est. A narrowly tailored regulation is one that actually
advances the state’s interest (is necessary), does not sweep
too broadly (is not overinclusive), does not leave signifi-
cant influences bearing on the interest unregulated (is not
underinclusive), and could be replaced by no other regu-
lation that could advance the interest as well with less
infringement of speech (is the least-restrictive alternative).
In short, the seriousness with which the regulation of core
political speech is viewed under the First Amendment
requires such regulation to be as precisely tailored as pos-
sible.
D. Minnesota’s Purported Compelling State Interest
In Kelly, Minnesota argued that Canon 5’s restrictions on
judicial candidate speech served a compelling state interest
in maintaining the independence, and the impartiality, of
the state’s judiciary. Minnesota continues to argue that judi-
cial independence, as applied to the issues in this case,
springs from the need for impartial judges. Apparently, the
idea is that a judge must be independent of and free from
outside influences in order to remain impartial and to be so
perceived. Thus, in Kelly, the panel majority understood the
two notions, independence and impartiality, to be inter-
changeable, as the Supreme Court promptly noted in White.
[*753]  In Kelly, the panel majority analyzed the announce,
partisan-activities, and solicitation clauses in light of impar-
tiality as a compelling interest, but failed to define “impar-
tiality.” On appeal, the Supreme Court filled that void by
fleshing out its meaning. Justice Scalia reasoned that impar-
tiality in the judicial context has three potential meanings.
One possible meaning of “impartiality” is a “lack of pre-
conception in favor of or against a particular legal view.”
Quickly discounting this uncommon use of the word, the
Court said it could not be a compelling interest for a judge
to “lack . . . predisposition regarding the relevant legal
issues in a case” because such a requirement “has never
been thought a necessary component of equal justice.” The
Court reasoned, first, that it is “virtually impossible” to find
a judge who lacks any “preconceptions about the law,” and
second, that it would not be desirable to have such a judge
on the bench.  “Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he
joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of
constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of
qualification, not lack of bias.” We follow the Court’s direc-
tion and likewise dismiss the idea that this meaning of
impartiality could be a compelling state interest.
A second possible meaning is a “lack of bias for or
against either party to [a] proceeding.”  Calling this the tra-
ditional understanding of “impartiality” and the meaning
used by Minnesota and amici in their due process argu-
ments, the Court explained that this notion “guarantees a
party that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to
him in the same way he applies it to any other party.” The
Court implied, and we find it to be substantially evident,
that this meaning of impartiality describes a state interest
that is compelling. . . . [*754] 
Being convinced that protecting litigants from biased
judges is a compelling state interest, we turn to the “narrow
tailoring” examination of the partisan-activities clause
under this particular meaning of judicial impartiality.
Because this meaning directs our attention to parties to the
litigation rather than to ideas and issues, we analyze the reg-
ulation in this context before turning to other possible def-
initions of impartiality. We consider whether the partisan-
activities clause actually addresses this compelling state
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interest and, if so, whether it is the least restrictive means of
doing so.
In White, the Supreme Court found that the announce
clause failed the narrow tailoring aspect of the strict
scrutiny test, holding “indeed, the clause is barely tailored
to serve that [lack of bias] interest at all, inasmuch as it does
not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but
rather speech for or against particular issues.” Thus, the
Court found that clause was not narrowly tailored because
it failed to advance a compelling interest. The same is true
for the partisan-activities clause.
1. Unbiased Judges and the Narrow Tailoring
of the Partisan-Activities Clause
In one sense, the underlying rationale for the partisan-
activities clause—that associating with a particular group
will destroy a judge’s impartiality—differs only in form
from that which purportedly supports the announce
clause—that expressing one’s self on particular issues will
destroy a judge’s impartiality. Canon 5, in relevant part,
forbids a judicial candidate from identifying with a politi-
cal organization, making speeches to a political organiza-
tion, or accepting endorsements from or even attending
meetings of a political organization, all of which are the
quintessence of political associational activity. And beyond
its importance in bringing about those rights textually
protected by the First Amendment, association, as earlier
noted, is itself an important form of speech, particularly in
the political arena. . . .  Inasmuch, then, as the partisan-
activities clause seeks, at least in part, to keep judges from
aligning with particular views on issues by keeping them
from aligning with a particular political party, the clause is
likewise “barely tailored” to affect any interest in impar-
tiality toward parties. Thus, the Supreme Court’s analysis
of the announce clause under this meaning of “impartial-
ity,” to wit judicial bias, is squarely applicable to the parti-
san-activities clause. . . . [*755] 
We recognize that the difference between the direct
expression of views under the announce clause and
expressing a viewpoint under the partisan-activities clause
through association, is that the latter requires the aligning
of one’s self with other like-minded individuals—that is,
the members of a political party.
Political parties are, of course, potential litigants, as
they are in this case. Thus, in a case where a political party
comes before a judge who has substantially associated
himself or herself with that same party, a question could
conceivably arise about the potential for bias in favor of
that litigant. Yet even then, any credible claim of bias
would have to flow from something more than the bare
fact that the judge had associated with that political party.
That is because the associational activities restricted by
Canon 5 are, as we have pointed out, part-and-parcel of a
candidate’s speech for or against particular issues
embraced by the political party. And such restrictions, we
have also said, do not serve the due process rights of par-
ties. . . . .
And in those political cases where a judge is more per-
sonally involved, such as where [a] redistricting case is a
dispute about how to draw that judge’s district, and even
in those cases discussed above that merely involve a politi-
cal party as a litigant, recusal is the least restrictive means
of accomplishing the state’s interest in impartiality articu-
lated as a lack of bias for or against parties to the case.
Through recusal, the same concerns of bias or the appear-
ance of bias that Minnesota seeks to alleviate through the
partisan-activities clause are thoroughly addressed with-
out “burning the house to roast the pig.” . . . .
Therefore, the partisan-activities clause is barely tai-
lored at all to serve any interest  [*756]  in unbiased
judges, and, at least, is not the least-restrictive means of
doing so. Accordingly, it is not narrowly tailored to any
such interest and fails under strict scrutiny.
2. Impartiality Understood as “Openmindedness,”
and the Partisan-Activities Clause
The third possible meaning of “impartiality” articulated
by the Supreme Court in White, and the one around which
its analysis of the announce clause revolved, was
“described as openmindedness.” The Court explained,
This quality in a judge demands, not that he
have no preconceptions on legal issues, but
that he be willing to consider views that
oppose his preconceptions, and remain open
to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pend-
ing case. This sort of impartiality seeks to
guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to
win the legal points in the case, but at least
some chance of doing so.
The Court stopped short, however, of determining
whether impartiality articulated as “openmindedness”
was a compelling state interest because it found that,
even if it were, the “woeful[] underinclusiveness” of the
clause betrayed any intended purpose of upholding
openmindedness. 
We conclude that the partisan-activities clause is like-
wise “woefully underinclusive,” calling into question its
validity in at least two ways. First, it leads us to conclude,
before even reaching a compelling interest inquiry, that
like the announce clause, the partisan-activities clause was
not adopted for the purpose of protecting judicial open-
mindedness. Second, under a compelling interest analysis,
the clause’s underinclusiveness causes us to doubt that the
interest it purportedly serves is sufficiently compelling to
abridge core First Amendment rights. We conclude that
the underinclusiveness of the partisan-activities clause
causes it to fail strict scrutiny.  [*757]  
a. Underinclusiveness Belies Purported Purpose
Underinclusiveness in a regulation may reveal that
motives entirely inconsistent with the stated interest
actually lie behind its enactment. . . . The underinclu-
siveness manifests itself in the inherently brief period of
speech regulation during a political campaign relative
to the many other instances in which a judicial candi-
date, especially an incumbent who is a candidate, has
an opportunity to speak on disputed issues. The Court
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reasoned that if the purpose of the announce clause
were truly to assure the openmindedness of judges,
Minnesota would not try [*758]  to address it through
a regulation that restricted speech only during a cam-
paign since candidates’ views on contentious legal
issues can be and are aired in the many speeches, class
lectures, articles, books, or even court opinions given
or authored before, during or after any campaign.
The same is true of the partisan-activities clause. The
announce clause bars a judicial candidate from stating
his views on disputed issues though “he may say the
very same thing . . . up until the very day before he
declares himself a candidate.” The partisan-activities
clause bars a judicial candidate from associative activi-
ties with a political party during a campaign, though he
may have been a life-long, active member of a political
party (even accepting partisan endorsements for non-
judicial offices) up until the day he begins his run for a
judicial seat. A regulation requiring a candidate to
sweep under the rug his overt association with a politi-
cal party for a few months during a judicial campaign,
after a lifetime of commitment to that party, is similarly
underinclusive in the purported pursuit of an interest
in judicial openmindedness. The few months a candi-
date is ostensibly purged of his association with a 
political party can hardly be expected to suddenly open
the mind of a candidate who has engaged in years of
prior political activity. And, history indicates it will be
rare that a judicial candidate for a seat on the
Minnesota Supreme Court will not have had some
prior, substantive, political association. In sum, restrict-
ing association with a political party only during a judi-
cial campaign, in supposed pursuit of judicial open-
mindedness, renders the partisan-activities clause “so
woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that pur-
pose a challenge to the credulous.” 
As for the appearance of impartiality, the partisan-
activities clause seems even less tailored than the
announce clause to an interest in openmindedness.
While partisan activity may be an indirect indicator of
potential views on issues, an affirmative enunciation of
views during an election campaign more directly com-
municates a candidate’s beliefs. If, as the Supreme
Court has declared, a candidate may speak about her
views on disputed issues, what appearance of “impar-
tiality” is protected by keeping a candidate from simply
associating with a party that espouses the same or simi-
lar positions on the subjects about which she has spo-
ken?  . . . .  Given this “woeful underinclusiveness” of
the partisan-activities clause, it is apparent that advanc-
ing judicial openmindedness is not the purpose that
“lies behind the prohibition at issue here.” [*759]  
b. Underinclusiveness Betrays “Compelling” Claim
While it is not necessary for us to reach the question
of whether judicial openmindedness as defined in
White is sufficiently compelling to abridge core First
Amendment rights, we note that the underinclusive-
ness of Canon 5’s partisan activities clause clearly estab-
lishes that the answer would be no. Whether Minnesota
asserts a compelling state interest in judicial open-
mindedness is substantially informed by the fit between
the partisan-activities clause and the purported interest
at stake. A clear indicator of the compelling nature of
an interest is whether the state has bothered to enact a
regulation that guards the interest from all significant
threats.
We are guided on remand by the law enunciated in
White, and the Court’s words bear repeating: “[A] law
cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the high-
est order, and thus as justifying a restriction upon
truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to
that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.” By its own
terms, Canon 5’s restrictions on association with “polit-
ical organizations” apply only to “associations of indi-
viduals under whose name a candidate files for partisan
office”—political parties. Yet, if mere association with
an organization whose purpose is to advance political
and social goals gives Minnesota sufficient grounds to
restrict judicial candidates’ activities, it makes little
sense for the state to restrict such activity only with
political parties. There are numerous other organiza-
tions whose purpose is to work at advancing any num-
ber of similar goals, often in a more determined way
than a political party. Minnesota worries that a judicial
candidate’s consorting with a political party will dam-
age that individual’s impartiality or appearance of
impartiality as a judge, apparently because she is seen
as aligning herself with that party’s policies or proce-
dural goals. But that would be no less so when a judge
as a judicial candidate aligns herself with the constitu-
tional, legislative, public policy and procedural beliefs
of organizations such as the National Rifle Association
(NRA), the National Organization for Women (NOW),
the Christian Coalition, the NAACP, the AFL-CIO, or
any number of other political interest groups. . . .
[*760] Yet Canon 5 is completely devoid of any restric-
tion on a judicial candidate attending or speaking to a
gathering of an interest group; identifying herself as a
member of an interest group; or seeking, accepting, or
using an endorsement from an interest group. As a
result, the partisan-activities clause unavoidably leaves
appreciable damage to the supposedly vital interest of
judicial openmindedness unprohibited, and thus
Minnesota’s argument that it protects an interest of the
highest order fails.
c. Underinclusiveness Not Indicative 
of a Legitimate Policy Choice
The panel majority in Kelly did not find the under-
inclusiveness of the partisan-activities clause trouble-
some. It viewed it as a legitimate policy choice: “when
underinclusiveness results from a choice to address a
greater threat before a lesser, it does not run afoul of the
First Amendment.” Association with political parties,
goes the argument, is a greater threat to judicial open-
mindedness than association with interest groups
because political parties have more power “to hold a
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candidate in thrall.” But to determine  [*761]  whether
Minnesota has shown that association with political
parties poses a greater menace to judicial openminded-
ness than association with other political interest
groups, it is necessary to do at least some analysis of the
two supposed threats. While the opinion in Kelly pur-
ports to examine the “threat” posed by political parties,
it contains no discussion of any comparable danger
advanced by association with special interest groups,
despite ample record evidence that suggests the influ-
ence of these special groups is at least as great as any
posed by political parties. 
Minnesota has simply not met its heavy burden of
showing that association with a political party is so
much greater a threat than similar association with
interest [*762]  groups, at least with evidence sufficient
for the drawing of a constitutionally valid line between
them. As a result, cases granting some degree of defer-
ence to legislatures who seek to attack one form of a
problem before addressing another form are not applic-
able here. . . . [*763] 
3. The Solicitation Clause
We now turn to an analysis of portions of the solicita-
tion clause. The solicitation clause bars judicial candidates
from personally soliciting individuals or even large gath-
erings for campaign contributions. “In effect, candidates
are completely chilled from speaking to potential contrib-
utors and endorsers about their potential contributions
and endorsements.” And as the majority conceded in
Kelly, such restriction depends wholly upon the subject
matter of the speech for its invocation. Judicial candidates
are not barred from personally requesting funds for any
purpose other than when it is “related to a political cam-
paign.” Restricting speech based on its subject matter trig-
gers the same strict scrutiny as does restricting [*764]
core  political speech. . . . 
Moreover, the very nature of the speech that the solici-
tation clause affects invokes strict scrutiny. This is because
the clause applies to requests for funds to be used in pro-
moting a political message. It bears repeating that “‘it can
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee [of the
freedom of speech] has its fullest and most urgent appli-
cation precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office.’”  And promoting a political message requires the
expenditure of funds. . . .
Since strict scrutiny is clearly invoked, the solicitation
clause must also be narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling state interest. Minnesota asserts that keeping judi-
cial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds
serves its interest in an impartial judiciary by preventing
any undue influence flowing from financial support. We
must determine whether the regulation actually advances
an interest in non-biased or openminded judges.
Appellants challenge only the fact that they cannot solicit
contributions from large groups and cannot, through their
campaign committees, transmit solicitation messages
above their personal signatures.  [*765]  They do not chal-
lenge the campaign committee system that Canon 5 pro-
vides under which candidates may establish committees
that may solicit campaign funds on behalf of the candi-
date. “Such committees shall not disclose to the candidate
the identity of campaign contributors nor shall the com-
mittee disclose to the candidate the identity of those who
were solicited for contribution or stated public support
and refused such solicitation.” [Minn.] Canon 5, subd.
B(2).
a. Unbiased Judges and the 
Narrow Tailoring of the Solicitation Clause
We first consider whether the solicitation clause
serves an interest in impartiality articulated as a lack of
bias for or against a party to a case. Keeping candidates,
who may be elected judges, from directly soliciting
money from individuals who may come before them
certainly addresses a compelling state interest in impar-
tiality as to parties to a particular case. It seems
unlikely, however, that a judicial candidate, if elected,
would be a “judge [who] has a direct, personal, sub-
stantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
[for or] against [a litigant in a case],” based on whether
that litigant had contributed to the judge’s campaign.
That is because Canon 5 provides specifically that all
contributions are to be made to the candidate’s commit-
tee, and the committee “shall not” disclose to the can-
didate those who either contributed or rebuffed a solic-
itation. Thus, just as was true with the announce clause
and its fit with an interest in unbiased judges, the con-
tested portions of the solicitation clause are barely tai-
lored at all to serve that end. An actual or mechanical
reproduction of a candidate’s signature on a contribu-
tion letter will not magically endow him or her with a
power to divine, first, to whom that letter was sent, and
second, whether that person contributed to the cam-
paign or balked at the request. In the same vein, a can-
didate would be even less able to trace the source of
funds contributed in response to a request transmitted
to large assemblies of voters. So, the solicitation clause’s
proscriptions  [*766]  against a candidate personally
signing a solicitation letter or making a blanket solici-
tation to a large group, does not advance any interest in
impartiality articulated as a lack of bias for or against a
party to a case. 
b. Openminded Judges and the 
Narrow Tailoring of the Solicitation Clause
We next consider whether the solicitation clause as
applied by Minnesota serves an interest in impartiality
articulated as “openmindedness.” Put another way,
would allowing a judicial candidate to personally sign
outgoing solicitation letters, or to ask a large audience
to support particular views through their financial con-
tributions, in some way damage that judge’s “willing-
ness to consider views that oppose his preconceptions,
and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in
a pending case”? We think not. Given that Canon 5 pre-
vents a candidate from knowing the identity of 
contributors or even non-contributors, to believe so
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would be a “challenge to the credulous.” Thus,
Minnesota’s solicitation clause seems barely tailored to
in any way affect the openmindedness of a judge.
Accordingly, the solicitation clause, as applied by
Minnesota, cannot pass strict scrutiny when applied to
a state interest in impartiality articulated as openmind-
edness.
III. CONCLUSION
In White, the Supreme Court invalidated the announce
clause and remanded the case to this court. Upon further con-
sideration of the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses in
light of White, we hold that they likewise do not survive strict
scrutiny and thus violate the First Amendment. We therefore
reverse the district court, and remand with instructions to
enter summary judgment for Appellants.
LOKEN, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur in Parts I, II.B, II.C, II.D.1, and II.D.2 of the opin-
ion of the court. I concur in Part IV of Judge John R. Gibson’s
dissent and therefore dissent from the holding that Appellants
are entitled to summary judgment invalidating the solicitation
clauses. I otherwise concur in the judgment of the court.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, with whom GRUENDER and
BENTON, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in Parts I, II.B, II.C introduction, II.C.2, II.D intro-
ductory text, II.D.1, II.D.2.a, II.D.2.c, II.D.3, and III of the
opinion of the court, and in the judgment of the court.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, with whom McMILLIAN
and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
The Court today strikes down the partisan activities clauses
and the solicitation restriction as a matter of law, by summary
judgment, ruling that the interests at stake are not compelling
and that the clauses of Canon 5 are either too broad, or not
broad enough, to justify their own existence. Preserving the
integrity of a state’s courts and those courts’ reputation for
integrity is an interest that lies at the very heart of a state’s abil-
ity to provide an effective government for its people. The word
“compelling” is hardly vivid enough to convey its importance.
The questions of whether that interest is threatened by partisan
judicial election campaigns and personal solicitation of cam-
paign contributions, and whether the measures Minnesota has
adopted were crafted to address only the most virulent threats
to that interest, are in part factual questions, which we should
not decide on summary judgment.  [*767]  Finally, the Court
today adopts an approach to strict scrutiny that would deny the
states the ability to defend their compelling interests, no matter
how urgent the threat. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The partisan activities clauses and the solicitation restric-
tion each serve an interest that is and has been recognized as
compelling—protecting the judicial process from extraneous
coercion.
A.
In the district court, the Minnesota Boards argued that
the state’s compelling interest was in protecting judicial
independence and impartiality, concepts that were not fur-
ther defined, perhaps because the Boards considered their
meaning apparent. When the announce clause was before
the Supreme Court, the opinion authored by Justice Scalia
determined that further definition and analysis were essen-
tial in order to determine whether impartiality was a com-
pelling state interest and whether the announce clause was
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Justice Scalia
divined three possible meanings for judicial “impartiality.”
The last meaning was “open-mindedness.”   . . . .  Because
the announce clause was “woefully underinclusive” to serve
any interest in judicial open-mindedness, Justice Scalia con-
cluded that Minnesota had not adopted the announce
clause in order to further such an interest; he therefore
found it unnecessary to consider whether preserving “judi-
cial open-mindedness” was a compelling state interest.
Since White, the New York Court of Appeals has held that
judicial open-mindedness is a compelling interest because
“it ensures that each litigant appearing in court has a gen-
uine—as opposed to illusory—opportunity to be heard.”  
After White, by order of December 9, 2003, the
Minnesota Supreme Court created an Advisory Committee
to review its Canons 3 and 5 in light of White. . . .
Following the Committee’s report, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held its own hearing and received public comment.
In September 2004, the Minnesota Supreme Court amended
Canon 5 to add a definition of impartiality that explicitly
includes open-mindedness:
“Impartiality” or “impartial” denotes absence
of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, par-
ticular parties or classes of parties, as well as
maintaining an open mind in considering
issues that may come before the judge.
Canon 5E (as amended Sept. 14, 2004).
The Court today discusses open-mindedness as if the
concern were to protect [*768]  judicial candidates from
experiences that would affect their subjective frame of
mind. Thus, the Court holds that the state’s interest cannot
be served by measures that only limit the candidate’s con-
duct during a campaign, not before: “The few months a can-
didate is ostensibly purged of his association with a politi-
cal party can hardly be expected to suddenly open the mind
of a candidate who has engaged in years of prior political
activity.” 
This answers the easy question but ignores the hard one.
The threat to open-mindedness at which the partisan activi-
ties and solicitation clauses aim comes not from within the
candidates, but from without and consists of the candidates
placing themselves in debt to powerful and wide-reaching
political organizations that can make or break them in each
election. This is a fundamental distinction between the par-
tisan activities and solicitation clauses, on the one hand,
and the announce clause, which was at issue in White. A
central tenet of Justice Scalia’s opinion in White was that the
announce clause regulated a candidate’s relation to issues,
not people. The partisan activities and solicitation clauses
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regulate how certain speech affects a judicial candidate’s
relations with people, and organizations of people, not the
candidate’s relations with issues.
Our Court’s concern with temporal underinclusiveness is
largely a result of its failure to address the threat to open-
mindedness from external pressure. The threat to open-
mindedness results from allowing the candidates to incur
obligations during a campaign that can affect their perfor-
mance in office. . . .   Once the partisan activities clauses are
gone, one may expect that party involvement will become
the norm, so that recusal  [*769]  would be pointless, since
all judges would be similarly compromised.
B.
“Open-mindedness,” in Justice Scalia’s terminology, is in
reality simply a facet of the anti-corruption interest that was
recognized in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and subsequent cam-
paign finance cases. . . .  Corruption is a sufficiently serious
threat to our institutions that the government may (1) seek
to prevent it before it happens and (2) act against it in inter-
mediate forms that are more subtle than bribery and explicit
agreements. 
Admittedly, the concern with corruption in the campaign
finance cases focuses on payment of money. While the 
solicitation clause also deals with money-raising, the parti-
san activities clauses do not, which distinguishes them from
the campaign finance cases. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Letter Carriers (1973) demonstrates that the con-
cern with corruption and undue influence is not limited to
obligations resulting from payments of money. Letter
Carriers recognized the danger partisan allegiances posed to
neutral administration of justice. That case upheld
restraints imposed by the Hatch Act on executive branch
employees’ political activities, in part because of the effect
partisanship could have on the performance of their duties
. . . . The need for “neutrality” identified in Letter Carriers
is even more important for the judicial branch than the
executive. . . . . [*772] 
C.
Although in White Justice Scalia observed that the parties
and this Court appeared to make no distinction between the
concepts of judicial “independence” and “impartiality,” in
its September 14, 2004  [*773]  order, the Minnesota
Supreme Court explained its decision not to amend the par-
tisan activities clauses partly by relying on the need for sep-
aration of powers:  . . . .  “As the executive and legislative
branches are inextricably intertwined with partisan politics,
maintenance of an independent judicial branch is reliant on
the freedom of its officials from the control of partisan pol-
itics.” The separation of powers interest is a concern for
institutional independence that is distinct from concern for
impartiality in any of the senses identified by Justice Scalia.
. . . Even the narrowest notion of federalism requires us to
recognize a state’s interest in preserving the separation of
powers within its own government as a compelling interest.
D.
The extent and severity of the threat to the state’s inter-
ests are factual questions that must be proven empirically.
In the proceedings in the district court, the Boards adduced
sufficient evidence of that threat so that summary judgment
for the plaintiffs would not have been appropriate. But
recent events make it far less appropriate that our Court
should enter judgment as a matter of law on questions of
fact as to which there is no record before us.
The record below contained the affidavit of a former gov-
ernor of Minnesota who stated that he had a lifetime of
experience in understanding how Minnesota citizens “think
and feel” and that partisan judicial campaigns would lessen
Minnesotans’ confidence “in the independence of the judi-
ciary.” A former Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated that partisan judicial campaigns would “put
pressure on judges to decide cases in ways that would
impress the judge’s supporters favorably.”
But far more important to our holding today is the fact
that the Minnesota Supreme Court has recently reconsid-
ered the provisions of Canon 5 at issue here, held hearings,
and received public comment. . . . [*775] 
The Court today errs grievously in issuing a ruling that
strikes the provisions based on the 1997 factual record
without considering the September 2004 record before the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Since the holding is based on a
factual record that antedates the most recent version of
Canon 5, one must question whether the Court’s holding
today even applies to the current version of Canon 5, based
as it is, on a 2004 factual determination which the Court
does not take into account.
E.
The Court today holds that Minnesota’s interest in judi-
cial open-mindedness is not a compelling interest because
the solicitation and partisan activities clauses are “underin-
clusive,” meaning that they do not address all “significant
threats” to the state’s asserted interest. The Court today says
that underinclusiveness of a regulation will establish that
the state’s purported interest is not compelling . . . .
However valid that reasoning may be in cases where the
asserted interest is novel or questionable, it is not valid here
because the interests at stake in this case have already been
recognized as compelling. Compelling interests cannot be
negated simply because a particular measure adopted in
their name is deemed ineffective. The Court today acknowl-
edges that avoiding judicial bias that denies litigants due
process is a compelling interest, whether or not a particular
measure furthers it effectively. Likewise, protecting the
integrity of the states’ courts has long been recognized as
compelling, and by the same reasoning, that interest cannot
be negated simply because a particular measure may not
protect it fully. . . . [*776] It is a misreading of the Supreme
Court’s underinclusiveness discussions, and, most signifi-
cantly, a nonsequitur as well, to say that the interest in judi-
cial integrity could be reduced to insignificance because
Canon 5 does not go far enough to protect it. 
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F.
Preserving judicial open-mindedness, and the appear-
ance of it, should be recognized as the same compelling
state interest in avoiding corruption interest that was iden-
tified in Buckley v. Valeo and the campaign finance cases.
Though it is the same anti-corruption interest, the need to
protect that interest is more urgent and vital in the context
of the judiciary because in that context outside influences
threaten litigants’ due process interest in adjudication in
accord with the law and the facts of their case. A further
state interest in preserving the separation of powers
between state branches of government should also be rec-
ognized as compelling. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
recently re-examined Canon 5 and clarified that the
Canon is meant to protect those state interests. Judicial
integrity and separation of powers are interests of the
highest importance in guaranteeing the proper function-
ing of state government and we have no warrant to deny
their importance.
II.
A.
Though the Court today errs in holding that underinclu-
siveness of a regulation can negate the importance of the
state’s interest in the integrity of its judiciary, underinclu-
siveness does indeed point to a different problem—it raises
an inference of pretext. Even where an asserted governmen-
tal interest is undeniably compelling, a failure to fully
address threats to that compelling interest can be evidence
of pretext. The governmental actor may have missed the tar-
get because it was not aiming at it, but was actually seeking
to accomplish some other, impermissible goal . . . 
The Supreme Court has twice upheld speech restrictions
on strict scrutiny review where the measure was tailored to
[*777]  address only the most critical threat to the govern-
mental interest, even where some threat to the asserted
interest remained unaddressed. See Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce (1990), and McConnell v. FEC (2003).
. . . [*778]  
B.
The question at issue in our consideration of the partisan
activities clauses, as in Austin, is whether there is a “crucial
difference” in the threat posed by some entities that justified
regulating them while leaving others unregulated. To rebut
the inference of pretext, the government must show that the
speech it has burdened poses a different, more serious threat
to its asserted interest than the speech it chose not to regu-
late. 
Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the differences
between political parties and other interest groups could
warrant differential regulation of the two kinds of groups.
This distinction between political parties and other interest
groups was at issue in McConnell, where the Court consid-
ered Title I of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which
imposed restrictions on political parties’ fund-raising activ-
ities that were not imposed on interest groups, such as the
National Rifle Association, the American Civil Liberties
Union or the Sierra Club. The plaintiffs contended that the
distinction violated Equal Protection. The Court held the
distinction was permissible, because
Congress is fully entitled to consider the real-
world differences between political parties and
interest groups when crafting a system of cam-
paign finance regulation. Interest groups do
not select slates of candidates for elections.
Interest groups do not determine who will
serve on legislative committees, elect congres-
sional leadership, or organize legislative cau-
cuses. Political parties have influence and
power in the legislature that vastly exceeds
that of any interest group . . . .  Congress’
efforts at campaign finance regulation may
account for these salient differences.
Before the district court, the Boards contended that spe-
cial restrictions on judicial  [*779]  candidates’ reliance on
political parties were necessary to protect Minnesota’s tradi-
tion of non-partisan judicial elections, which dates from the
enactment in 1912 of the statute making Minnesota judicial
elections non-partisan. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court greatly amplified that
explanation when it decided to reject the Advisory
Committee’s proposed revisions to the partisan activities
clauses in September 2004. The supreme court order stated,
“We conclude that the restrictions on partisan political
activity contained in our Code of Judicial Conduct are too
important to undermine based on the possibility that they
may be vulnerable to constitutional attack, particularly as
we are convinced that there are sound bases for their con-
stitutional validity.” The court then reviewed the history of
Minnesota’s commitment to non-partisan judicial elections. 
The movement towards non-partisan judicial elections
was a reform movement meant to insulate judges from the
party machines that had captured the state courts during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between
1910 and 1958, eighteen states adopted non-partisan judi-
cial elections. Among states that elect their judges, the
majority use nonpartisan elections; currently, twenty states
have nonpartisan elections for at least some of their judge-
ships, as opposed to fifteen who have at least some partisan
elections. Among the states with non-partisan judicial elec-
tions, there [are] a wide variety of measures to enforce the
non-partisan character of the election; some states have few
such measures, but many have measures similar to those at
issue here.  Thus, the idea that  [*780]  non-partisan cam-
paigns might protect the judiciary from improper external
pressures is hardly a novel idea, but must be placed within
a broad national reform movement that still has significant
sway within the states. . . . [*781] 
The hearing the Minnesota Supreme Court held before
the 1997 amendments to Canon 5 included consideration of
whether partisan activities restrictions should be limited to
political parties as defined in Canon 5 or whether they
should apply to other advocacy groups. There was testi-
mony on both sides of that issue. In addition to the testi-
mony of Judge Meyer (which the Court quotes [in a foot-
note]) and others against the definition adopted, DePaul
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Willette testified:
Let’s assume that the rule is not in place and
two candidates in a race; one is endorsed by
the republican party, one is endorsed by the
democratic party. What do we have? We have
a party race. It’s not a nonpartisan contest. We
have a party contest which will lead us, in my
judgment, to the kind of fund-raising and the
problems that Illinois and Texas are facing
today with multi-million dollar budgets for
people who want to retain or gain judicial
positions.
Willette’s testimony also refutes the idea that the
Minnesota Supreme Court intentionally failed to address
the threat from partisan activity by single-issue interest
groups. Willette testified that one reason single-issue inter-
est groups were not included in the partisan activities
clauses is that single-issue groups would require a commit-
ment that would have been banned under the announce
clause at the time. Obviously, the announce clause can no
longer play any role in the regulatory scheme; however, the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s expectation that the announce
clause would serve to moderate a candidate’s relation with
interest groups was reasonable at the time and therefore
tends to show that the partisan activities clauses were effec-
tive at the time adopted. Moreover, the invalidation of the
announce clause has apparently had a profound effect on
the pressures on judicial candidates in that it is apparently
now common for organizations to send judicial candidates
questionnaires asking them to state their positions on an
array of disputed legal issues. See, e.g., North Dakota Family
Alliance, Inc. v. Bader (D.N.D. 2005) (example of “voter’s
guide” questionnaire submitted to judicial candidates in
North Dakota, including items asking candidate to agree or
disagree with statements such as: “I believe that the North
Dakota Constitution does not recognize a right to homo-
sexual sexual relationships” and “I believe that the North
Dakota Constitution does not recognize a right to abor-
tion.”). In light of the invalidation of the announce clause,
I believe a remand for further evidence on the issue of pre-
text would be more appropriate than for us to order sum-
mary judgment on a record with evidence supporting both
sides of the question.
Once again, the most pertinent evidence about the think-
ing behind the current Canon 5 is evidence that has not yet
been presented to the district court. . . .  [*782] 
McConnell demonstrates that the distinction between
political parties and other interest groups could be defended
as a valid response to “salient differences” between the kind
of threat each sort of organization poses to the state’s inter-
ests. In addition to its institutional experience with non-
partisan judicial elections since 1912, in 1997 the
Minnesota Supreme Court had before it some evidence vali-
dating the distinction between political parties and other
interest groups, and some challenging that distinction. It
resolved that conflict, concluding that political parties
posed the greater threat. The conclusion was reaffirmed in
2004 by a committee of lawyers and scholars charged with
the task of scrutinizing Canon 5 for constitutional prob-
lems, and later by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Our Court
errs in concluding as a matter of law that the distinction
between political parties and other interest groups is pre-
textual. The evidence as to this distinction is best consid-
ered by the district court on remand.
III.
Our Court’s underinclusiveness analysis goes astray by
failing to recognize a compelling interest and by failing to
allow the Boards to rebut the inference of pretext. Sections
I & II, supra. But the signal failing of the Court’s underin-
clusiveness analysis is that it envisions a kind of strict
scrutiny that simply cannot work when  [*783]  applied to
real cases because it does not take into account the need for
limited deference to the state’s attempt to solve the prob-
lems that besiege it.
“Deference” is not a word we associate with strict
scrutiny review, but there is indeed a place for limited def-
erence, as shown in the recent case of Grutter v. Bollinger
(2003) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer.”). There are three reasons why we should
employ some limited deference to the judgment of the state
of Minnesota in this case, if after remand, we were satisfied
that the judgment was well-supported by cogent evidence
and the possibility of pretext had been rebutted.
The Court’s primary reason for striking the partisan
activities clauses today is that the provisions are underin-
clusive. The main thrust of the narrow-tailoring require-
ment is directly to protect speech rights by avoiding an
infringement broader than the need to protect the govern-
ment’s interest: “The purpose of the test is to ensure that
speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the
goal, for it is important to assure that legitimate speech is
not chilled or punished.” Exacting, de novo review by the
courts to assure that the government has chosen the least
restrictive alternative directly protects the individual’s
speech right. The objection that a measure is underinclu-
sive, on the other hand, cuts in the opposite direction; it
being the command of the First Amendment not to abridge
the freedom of speech, one is at first surprised to learn that
a law can offend the First Amendment because the law does
not forbid enough speech. The vice in an underinclusive
law is not that the underinclusiveness directly suppresses
speech but that it raises a suspicion of pretext—which is
just an inference, and which can be rebutted by sufficient
evidence. Even in questions subject to strict scrutiny, there
simply has to be some room for judgment about how wide
to cast the net, and it should be apparent that it is more
offensive to the First Amendment for a measure to be too
broad than to be too narrow. The problem with applying the
same kind of exacting, de novo review to underinclusive-
ness as we do to overinclusiveness is that the two require-
ments form a Catch 22 situation, in which a drafter’s very
effort to avoid overinclusiveness makes the measure vulner-
able to attack for underinclusiveness. . . . [*784] 
A second reason for some limited deference is that this is
a case of competing constitutional interests, so that what-
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ever protection is afforded First Amendment interests
comes at the expense of due process and separation of pow-
ers interests. . . . 
Finally, this is a case in which the parameters of the evil
addressed cannot be outlined with a high degree of preci-
sion. The difficulty is that the threat to the governmental
interest is not from unambiguously evil conduct, but from
behavior that forms part of a continuum with desired
behavior—attempts of the citizenry to make their voices
heard in their government. The critical and difficult ques-
tion posed by this case is that the danger to judicial neu-
trality comes from that sometimes salutary behavior, at the
point at which participation in the democratic process
becomes undue influence over judicial decisionmaking,
preventing a judge from acting as the law’s representative,
rather than as the representative of a political patron or
donor. That point will vary from candidate to candidate,
according to whether he or she is stubborn or persuadable,
experienced or naive, young or old, poor or independently
wealthy, ambitious or modest. No law can account for all
these imponderables without restricting some candidate
who would not have been swayed by temptation or leaving
some candidate at liberty to compromise himself. . . .
[*785]
. . . . When Congress grapples with such a protean con-
cept as “undue influence on an officeholder,” the Supreme
Court applies strict scrutiny in such a way as to acknowl-
edge that Congress’ task requires exercise of some judg-
ment. In contrast to the Supreme Court’s approach, our
Court today takes a bludgeon to a state’s attempt to solve a
delicate problem.
IV.
The futility of requiring unattainable precision is illus-
trated by our Court’s treatment of the solicitation clause.
The basic scheme of the solicitation clause is to erect the
campaign committees as a barrier between the candidate
and contributor. As recently as 2002, all but four of the
states that had judicial elections prohibited candidates from
personally soliciting campaign contributions. The Court
today  [*786]  seems to implicitly approve the concept of
the campaign committee as a barrier between contributors
and the judge or would-be judge. Yet, in effectuating the
concept, there are necessarily details which could be moved
an inch one way or another. It is clear that for the candidate
to sign letters himself is one way to hack at the wall between
the candidate and contributor—presumably, that is why
Wersal wants to do it. It is perhaps true that the entire wall
would not fall down, but it would be somewhat less effec-
tive in achieving the goal of removing personal obligation
from the candidate-contributor relation. If each detail of the
scheme must be proved as critical, rather than as forming a
part of a scheme that works, then each detail, and therefore
the scheme as a whole, is foredoomed. 
Moreover, while the Court’s ruling today seems to attack
only one small aspect of the solicitation-restriction scheme,
the ruling contains the seeds to strike the whole scheme.
Today Wersal asks only to sign solicitation letters himself
and to personally ask for money from large groups.
However, the Court states that any candidate can flank the
campaign committee’s confidentiality obligation simply by
looking up public records showing who contributed to
whom. In light of the Court’s underinclusiveness analysis,
this reasoning will likely require us to condemn the entire
scheme as soon as the next plaintiff asks us to.
In sum, though strict scrutiny must, of course, be strict,
it must, at least in some instances, be applied with limited
deference to the decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment. If we
pretend that it is otherwise, we adopt a model for strict
scrutiny under which no state’s attempt to deal with certain
problems can survive, and so very real and dangerous prob-
lems must be left unaddressed. Every place where the line is
drawn is arguably either overinclusive, because too much
activism is restricted, or underinclusive, because too much
threat to judicial open-mindedness is tolerated. The courts
then occupy the enviable position of not being required to
say in advance what line would be permissible, but of being
privileged to veto every possible legislative attempt to draw
the line because it would have been possible to draw the
line somewhere else. If strict scrutiny is simply a way to
strike down laws, in which any law is doomed as soon as we
invoke strict scrutiny, it is a charade. That is not how the
Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny, nor should we
adopt this flawed methodology in our Circuit. Instead,
where the states or other branches draw the line in a place
which the governmental actor can defend, with convincing
evidence, as the place where the threat to its interest
becomes the most acute, the measure should pass strict
scrutiny, though it might have been possible for another
hypothetical decisionmaker to have moved the line an inch
in one direction or another.
V.
There can be no question that the interests at stake here
are compelling. There are questions of fact-first, as to
whether the threat to those interests posed by partisan
involvement in judicial elections and personal solicitation
of contributions are [*787]  severe enough to warrant the
measures taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court and sec-
ond, as to whether the particular remedy chosen was truly
selected for the asserted reason. I would remand to the dis-
trict court for trial of these factual questions in light of new
evidence of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s most recent
deliberations on the subject. If the defendants prove by con-
vincing evidence that the threat was as they assert and that
the clauses were adopted to remedy that threat, I believe the
clauses should be upheld as constitutional. Today’s ruling
invalidates Minnesota’s current attempts to preserve its
courts’ integrity and public repute without any evidence
having been heard on the most recent rule amendments. At
the same time, our ruling in effect dooms any future
attempt as well by adopting a form of strict scrutiny that no
measure will pass. I therefore respectfully dissent.
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VIDEO
Inside the Law, Judicial Independence:
The Freedom to Be Fair (2005).  $29.95
(DVD).
AJA’s National Forum on Judicial
Independence formed the basis for
this Inside the Law program shown on
PBS stations throughout the United
States.  Producers took material from
the final AJA panel discussion (found
at pages 54-64 of this issue) and
interviews of some of the speakers
from other panels.  Court TV’s Jack
Ford moderated the one-hour pro-
gram, which was supported by a
grant from the Joyce Foundation.
The DVD can be ordered from
Recorded Books, (800) 638-1304, for
$29.95.  A limited number of free
copies are available to AJA members.
They can be ordered while supplies
last from the Association Manage-
ment Division at the National Center
for State Courts, (757) 259-1841.
d
PUBLICATIONS
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR COURT
MANAGEMENT, COURT SECURITY GUIDE (2d
ed. 2005).  $10.
The National Association for Court
Management (NACM) has put out a
new edition of its
Court Security Guide.
The booklet contains
a variety of checklists
to help local courts
assess their own
security situation.
Areas of concern
addressed include
the courthouse perimeter, public and
staff areas, and courtrooms.  In addi-
tion, several other topics, including
handling high-profile cases and
workplace violence, are covered.
And there are materials concerning
the basics of security plan develop-
ment, audit, and review.
There will no doubt be additional
materials and publications concern-
ing court security, given recent
events.  The National Center for State
Courts convened a “security summit”
following the Atlanta courthouse
shooting earlier this year and has a
follow-up session planned for
November 2005.  For those wanting a
good starting point, the Court Security
Guide, revised from its initial publica-
tion 10 years ago, may be helpful.
Copies may be ordered from the
Association Management Division at
the National Center for State Courts
at (757) 259-1841.
o
USEFUL INTERNET SITES 
Public Trust and Confidence:
California
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
reference/4_37pubtrust.htm
An extensive survey of 2,400
California households and 500 prac-
ticing California attorneys released in
September 2005 showed higher pub-
lic trust and confidence in the courts
than in the 1990s.  Sixty-seven per-
cent of the public had a positive atti-
tude about the courts, compared to
less than 50% in 1992.  The survey
also showed that the key predictor of
public trust and confidence is that
court procedures be perceived to be
fair ones.  “[T]he survey . . . shows
that the public’s perception of proce-
dural fairness—being treated with
respect, being listened to, and having
one’s case individually considered—
has the greatest impact on their trust
and confidence in the justice system,”
said William C. Vickrey, administra-
tive director of the California courts.
The public listed protecting consti-
tutional rights, ensuring public safety,
and concluding cases in a timely
manner as among the most important
areas on which to spend judicial
resources.  The survey showed that
56% of respondents had been
involved in a case that brought them
to the courthouse, mainly through
response to a jury summons or actual
service on a jury. Service as a juror
was found to increase confidence in
the courts, while defendants in traffic
cases and both litigants and attorneys
in family or juvenile cases were less
approving of the California courts
than other respondents.
The survey was carried out by the
Public Research Institute at San
Francisco State University, with the
assistance of the National Center for
State Courts.  A thorough report writ-
ten by National Center researcher
David Rottman is found at the web-
site noted above.
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FOCUS ON JUDICIAL 
CAMPAIGN-CONDUCT RULES 
In Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), the United
States Supreme Court held the provision
of Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct
precluding judicial candidates from
“announc[ing] his or her views on dis-
puted legal or political issues” unconsti-
tutional under the First Amendment.  On
remand in August 2005, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
has held the Code’s “partisan-activities”
and “solicitation” clauses unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment.  The
Eighth Circuit held that the state interests
advanced—maintaining the indepen-
dence and impartiality of the judiciary—
did not provide sufficient support for the
restrictions on speech and association
under strict-scrutiny analysis. Three
members of the 15-member court dis-
sented, urging an evidentiary hearing; a
fourth dissented in part.
Although a request for review by the
U.S. Supreme Court is expected, the
decision has immediate importance
within the seven states of the Eighth
Circuit and may well have nationwide
importance.  We reprint excerpts from
the decision beginning at page 66.
 
